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Content

Religious Democracy in Iran: Discursive Analysis of Imam Khomeini's Political Thought

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Keywords

Abstract

Almost two decades after the advent of the Revolution and the system of the Islamic Republic, the model of "Religious Democracy" was introduced. It resulted in various scientific issues and dialogues about the concept of "religious democracy," its potentials, limitations, pillars, and institutions. Therefore, in the present article, the discourse formation of religious democracy is presented with a brief look at its concept. In accordance with the author, religious democracy is a conception of democracy that recognizes the collective power and people's participation as the essence of democracy, and also justifies, analyzes, and explains that referring to religion and its principles. According to a methodological study of discursive analysis, in religious democracy, "religion" and according to its Iranian discourse, "Islam" is regarded as nodal points. The main floating signifiers of Religious Democracy in the Iranian discourse are "People", "Law", "Political Equality", "Freedom", and "Independence". The meaning of these signifiers will be understood by referring to Islam as the nodal point of the Religious Democracy. Nowadays in Iran, this kind of Democracy is exercised, and it seems that the most important "strategic and political necessity" for Islamic countries is exercising the "Religious Democracy" of their own.

Introduction

The 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran was the formation beginning of the pattern of the political system in Iran known as the Islamic Republic. Leaving behind the "monarchic order," the revolution laid the groundwork for shaping up a new order defined as "popular order." So this order is the first experience of political life for Iranians outside the "monarchic one." In such an order, the socio-political relations of citizen with rulers are regulated by people themselves, who enjoy the right of organizing their order. The Islamic Republic established this order in the socio-political life of the Iranians in 1979.

Almost two decades after the advent of the Revolution and the system of the Islamic Republic, the model of "Religious Democracy" was introduced. Raising this pattern emanated from the theoretical necessities that were felt both at home and abroad. The model was brought up not apart from the Islamic Republic but as an extension to it in order to greatly enhance its potentials. Moreover, it resulted in various scientific issues and dialogues about the concept of "religious democracy," its potentials, limitations, pillars, and institutions. Questions such as what does it mean? How can a political system be religious and at the same time democratic? Isn't it paradoxical? Also, the like "were discussed." The result of these discussions was the formation of relatively popular literature, providing suitable awareness. However, less attention has been paid to the theory in a discursive approach. Therefore, in the present article, the discourse formation of religious democracy is presented with a brief look at its concept. Clearly, understanding the theory and its deference with another type of democracy depends on the understanding of this discourse formation.

Definition of Religious Democracy

At first glance, it seems that religious democracy is a compound term. Thus, the combination of democracy and religion is considered a compatible one and spoken of as religious democracy among other types of democracy. However, while democracy is regarded as the pattern of a particular political

system based on particular political thinking and philosophy, the combination of religion and democracy appears to be a conceptual impossibility. Indeed, the incompatibility of secular democracy with religion in the modern era is taken for granted according to this view. Since incompatibility with Islam is regarded as an integral part of a term, there is no point to discuss its compatibility (Mesbah Yazdi, 2001, p. 297).

Given the mentioned incompatibility as to the concept and basis of democracy, the advocates of religious democracy have set out to explain the compatibility of democracy with religion, using a different approach. In their opinion, democracy relates to the manner of governance of a society rather than being a mere socio-political philosophy. This view is based on an approach, which is related to a kind of political system and the interpretation of people's political lifestyle (Kelayer, 1972).

According to this approach and based on Karl Cohen's view of democracy, some writers have analyzed the concept of democracy, by segregating democracy as a method from democracy as a value, and considered religious democracy as an acceptable approach. Admitting to the impracticality of the principle of "government of the people by the people," Cohen considers the existence of "democratic order" in the political structure of society as the main characteristic of "governance based on public participation." Therefore, Cohen's definition of democracy is widely accepted today, and it seems that the issue of religious democracy should be investigated in light of this version of "democracy" (Eftekhari, 2006).

Although such an approach prepares the ground for discussing religious democracy, it is based on segregating methodological democracy from value democracy, which is not much acceptable in the history of discussions on the concept of democracy and the formation of democratic systems. Democracy is a pattern of the socio-political system, which has been discussed throughout history based on presuppositions and particular theoretical bases and has introduced a particular method for governing the state as well as the society.

On the contrary, it seems that it is possible to talk about, instead, of

another approach to the possibility of the concept of religious democracy. Given the linguistic distinction made between 'concept' and 'conception,' various conceptions could be presented from a single concept. In other words, every term or expression has a single concept, which could have various conceptions based on particular aspects of its concept. These conceptions are multiple and various since they are based on different presuppositions and principles. However, because conceptions finally refer to aspects of a single concept, they possess a kind of unity. Indeed, conceptions are interpretations that different schools of thoughts have presented from facets of a single concept, justified it and its aspects based on their acceptable principles, and, as a result, provided a particular definition of the concept in question. That is why there is no prejudgment in concept, and its facets do not evoke a particular value.

According to this approach, religious democracy is a possible concept. Hence, it is a conception of the concept of democracy, which justifies and envisions the concept of democracy based on presuppositions and religious principles. In fact, religious democracy accepts the essential concept of democracy, and also justifies, analyzes, and explains it based on religious principles. Understanding the essential concept of democracy seems confusing, but Antony Arbelaster (2000). states, in roots of all definitions of democracy lies the idea of collective power and a situation in which power and, possibly, authority are derived from the people.

As such, collective power or authority reflects the essential aspect of the concept of democracy. Such power in a democracy does not possess an individual or collective nature - democracy talks of an ideal in which important decisions in the society as a collective should be made based on the views of all people. Moreover, all members of society should enjoy equal rights in order to participate in decision-making processes (Beetham & Boyle, 1997). Based on this outlook, the collective nature of power and authority brings about public participation as the essence of democracy.

In the present article, religious democracy is a conception of democracy that recognizes the collective power and people's participation as the essence

of democracy, and also justifies, analyzes, and explains it, referring to religion and its principles. Here, justification is interpreted concerning credibility in which the aspects and essence of democracy are represented as justified based on epistemological sources. Analysis means the discovery of various principles and presuppositions based on which aspects and essence of democracy are justified. Moreover, finally, explanation refers to the description of statements, which determine the boundaries of the aspects and essence of democracy. The result of the three stages of justification, analysis, and explanation based on religious sources and principles is the formation of a conception of democracy defined as religious democracy.

Therefore, religious democracy explains the justification of collective power or authority and public participation with the help of religious statements, analyzes the ontological, anthropological, sociological, and teleological foundations of democracy based on religious sources, and finally determines the conceptual boundaries of collective power and public participation based on religious teachings. According to this definition, religious democracy stands opposite to other types of democracy such as liberal democracy and social democracy. While these two justify, analyze and explain the essential aspects of democracy with the acceptance of the authority of liberalism and socialism, the religious democracy accepts the authority of Islam in justifying, analyzing and explaining the essential aspects of democracy.

Religious Democracy as an Iranian Discourse

At the end of the second decade of the Islamic Revolution, religious democracy entered the political literature of Iran. Raising the issue of religious democracy in this era derived from the internal and external requirements. In this period, the Islamic Republic put forward the theoretical model ruling over its political system as a rival model against other models of democracy, especially liberal democracy. In such a situation, considerable theoretical efforts were made to explain this model, and remarkable literature was compiled and presented. However, discursive analysis has not been

done much to explain this model. Consequently, the charting out discourse on religious democracy as an Iranian discourse is quite significant and would, provides the possibility of comparison with other models.

Nodal Point of Religious Democracy

In every discourse, floating signifiers become meaningful in light of "Nodal Point." The process of finding meaning for signifiers is called articulation. In the act of articulation, signifiers and various concepts of discourse become meaningful regarding the nodal point. Therefore, the possibility of meaningful understanding of reality in discourse theory depends on articulation (Laclau, 1990). In fact, in such a process it is possible to determine the position of signifiers and concepts of discourse, and explain the formation process of signifiers and concepts. As a result, in every discourse analysis, first, determining the nodal point is necessary, and second, the meaning of other signifiers should be taken into account in light of this nodal point.

According to a methodological study of discursive analysis, it is first necessary to determine a nodal point in order to explain religious democracy. In religious democracy, "religion" and according to its Iranian discourse, "Islam" is regarded as nodal points. As it was mentioned earlier, in religious democracy, the authority of Islam is recognized. However, it is quite clear that Islam is interpreted in this discourse in terms of political Islam. Political Islam insists on the inseparability of Islam and politics plus regards Islam as a potential political religion. In Iran, such an attitude towards Islam is explained based on different approaches of which juristic approach is the most important one. For this reason, it is possible to speak of juristic political Islam, which is based on the political and juristic thinking of Imam Khomeini. According to Imam Khomeini's outlook, the government is the pivot of Islamic thinking, and jurisprudence is regarded as the provider of its rules and regulations. He believes, "For a real jurisprudent, the government is the practical manifestation of jurisprudence in all aspects of human life. Government reflects the practical aspect of jurisprudence in addressing

social, political and military and cultural challenges. Jurisprudence is the real and comprehensive theory of ruling over human being and society from the cradle to the grave" (Khomeini, 1992, p. 98). So, jurisprudence is an Islamic knowledge regarded as a theory provider and supporter of the Islamic government. It includes a number of rules and regulations regarding the Moslems political life.

The authority of Islam and jurisprudence in political life and the necessity of forming an Islamic government based on Islamic teachings as defined in jurisprudence naturally lead to the formation of the theory of the Rule of Jurisconsult According to this theory, "An Islamic ruler must have two characteristics, which are the bases of a legal state, and without them, (the existence of) a legal state is not logical. One of these two characteristics is the knowledge of the law, and the other is justice" (Khomeini, n.d., p. 460).

In this theory, knowledge of law means knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence, and justice means the existence of conditions and states that guarantee the safety of a government and prevent deviation from Islam. For this reason, in an Islamic government, the primary objective is the execution of Islamic decrees (Khomeini, 1992), and jurist stands in a central position to execute and guarantee these decrees. Of course, he needs more qualifications such as the ability to manage the society, a good experience in management and the like so that he can implement the Islamic ideas.

According to what was mentioned, accepting the authority of Islam in the religious democracy of Iran is based on the relation between religion and politics and the negation of secularism. As a result, the juristic approach to Islam introduces "wilayat al" as the essence of political Islam during the occultation of the twelfth Shi'an Imam (Imam Mahdi). Hence, juristic political Islam and the idea of wilayat al-faqih are regarded as the nodal point of religious democracy in Iran.

Floating Signifiers of Religious Democracy

As it was mentioned earlier, in discursive course analysis after the explanation of nodal point, the explanation of floating signifiers plus their

way of formation reveal discourse formation in which floating signifiers become meaningful in relation to the nodal point. The main floating signifiers of Religious Democracy in the Iranian discourse are:

People

The first floating signifier of religious democracy is the people signifier. In religious democracy, people are regarded as the first signifier that becomes meaningful based on the outlook of juristic political Islam. In this process, people are the central pillar of religious democracy. In fact, in this theory, the people's sovereignty right is recognized, but it is derived from a divine right whereby "the law of Islam is known as the cause of liberties and true democracy" (Khomeini, 1992, p. 102).

Considering the Islamic democracy as more comprehensive, the juristic political Islam tries to explain the compatibility of Islam and democracy with emphasis on Islamic teachings and juristic approach. Such an outlook links the system of the Islamic Republic with Islamic teachings as such: "The government of the Islamic Republic receives inspiration from the policy of Prophet Muhammad and Imam Ali, is dependent on the votes of people, and people's votes will determine the form of government. Establishing the government of the Islamic Republic is based on the principles of Islam and the votes of people" (Khomeini, 1992, p. 230). This interpretation of the Prophet Muhammad and Imam Ali policy can be justified by the fact that their governments were established by Bay'at (i.e., taking the oath of allegiance, which is equal to the votes of people).

Therefore, although divine law forms the essence of the political system, the votes of people is the only basis for the formation of the Islamic political system. Imam Khomeini as the leading theorist and representative of the process of juristic political Islam in modern Iran asserts, "Criterion is the votes of people. Sometimes a nation votes by itself. Other times, it determines a group of people to vote" (Khomeini, 1992, p. 173). This statement reveals the role and status of people and their votes, and at the same time, introduces the concept of "nation" in the juristic political literature of Iran.

The centrality of the nation (being a yardstick) is analyzed from various aspects:

1. System-Making

According to the theory of religious democracy, the Iranian nation stands in the position of system-making. However, as it was mentioned earlier, the meaningful role and status of people rely on the nodal point of this theory, which is political Islam and wilayat al-faqih. Although the votes of people do not grant legitimacy to Valie-h Faghih or Supreme Jurisconsult – since he enjoys a divine right and legitimacy – they provide him with authority to form the government. Imam Khomeini explains this role as such, "A jurist enjoys the authority in every aspect [of society]. However, the governance of Muslims' affairs and the formation of government are issues dependent on the votes of the Muslim majority, a point, which is also mentioned in the Constitution, and was interpreted as taking the oath of allegiance (بیعت) to the Guardian of the Muslims (Wali Muslimin) after the advent of Islam" (Khomeini, 1992, p. 173).

Therefore, the legitimacy and guardianship of wilayat al-faqih are not based on the votes of people rather the formation of the government is only possible through the votes of the majority. Equating votes of the majority with the concept of allegiance as one of the Islamic teachings reveals the aim of the theory of religious democracy in Iran, an aim, which intends to refer the concepts and requirements of democracy to religion in the process of justification.

2. Decision-Making

The second field of public participation in the theory of religious democracy is the field of decision-making and law-making. According to this theory, the votes of people determine the role of institutions and the law-making and decision-making organizations. Moreover, the role of people in the process of decision-making is explained with emphasis on the concept of consultation (Showra) as one of the essential Islamic teachings. Therefore, the votes of people determine the formation of the Islamic parliament

(Majlis) as the most critical decision-making and law-making institution, and for this reason, parliament enjoys a very significant position. In accordance with Imam Khomeini's view, "Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis), which supersedes all other institutions of the system of Islamic Republic, has particular characteristics of which the most important one is its Islamic national identity. It is Islamic since all its efforts are directed at enacting laws compatible with the holy decrees of Islam, and it is national because it emanates from the context of people. Today, Majlis is the true home of people" (Khomeini, 1992, p. 459).

In these statements, the role of people in shaping up the Islamic Consultative Majlis is recognized, but it is interpreted in terms of passing laws compatible with Islamic decrees. In other words, accepting Islam as the nodal point of religious democracy makes the role of people meaningful in law-making as long as it does not contradict Islam and divine laws.

3. Implementation

Public participation in religious democracy is also recognized in the field of implementation of the law in addition to system-making and decision-making. Referring to this theory, the president is directly elected by the votes of people, which are also determining in the implementation of the laws. However, the role of people becomes meaningful in the light of Islam and juristic approach. The theory of religious democracy in Iran explains the legitimacy of a presidential body with the "confirmation" policy of the Islamic leader or wilayat al-faqih. For this reason, Imam Khomeini writes about the presidential confirmation of a number of presidents as such, "Because the legitimacy of president must be based on the appointment by the Supreme Guardian (Vali-yi Amr), I confirm the votes of the noble people, and appoint him as the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran" (Khomeini, 1992, p. 420).

Law

Law is one of the most important signifiers in the theory of religious democracy in Iran. According to this theory, the socio-political relations

between people and government are determined based on law. Therefore, the law is considered as the most essential basis of regulating the socio-political life, and democracy would not be realized without it. In the discourse formation of religious democracy in Iran, the floating signifier of law becomes meaningful in the light of the political Islam as a nodal point, so law here is the Shari'a Law, which is discussed and written in the Jurisprudence. According to this discourse, the most advantage of this law is that it is the Divine Law, so is perfect and can make the happiness of humankind both here and hereafter. Law becomes meaningful in this theory in the following two main areas (Khomeini, 1992):

1. The Constitution

Although the constitution of religious democracy in Iran is enacted [by human beings], it receives its legitimacy from divine law and Islamic teachings. For this reason, according to this outlook, the Islamic Republic as a religious and democratic model is a "state based on Islamic principles; its Constitution is Islam, which is the executor of Islamic precepts" (Khomeini, 1992, p. 145). In fact, it is safe to say that with the acceptance of the authority of Islam in democracy, Islamic law is regarded as the principal source of the Constitution, and is recognized as the source of the socio-political life. Therefore, the policies and laws of the country cannot be inconsistent with Islamic law.

2. Normal Law

The compilation of the Constitution based on Islamic law in the theory of religious democracy in Iran does not mean the denial of the credibility of human law-making. This theory recognizes the usual law-making in political life but interprets its legitimacy in the process of the meaningful discourse based on its non-inconsistency with Islamic law. According to religious democracy, law-making as planning and regulating laws and rules of political life based on the logicality of people's representatives should not be inconsistent with Islamic law. For this reason, according to the theory of

religious democracy, "All programs that are carried out in the governance of society in order to fulfill the needs of people should be based on divine laws" (Khomeini, n.d., p. 461).

The necessity of the compatibility of normal laws with the Constitution and Islamic law justifies the existence of the Guardian Council in the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Based on this necessity, the Council, which consists of legal experts and jurists, announces the non-inconsistency of normal laws with the Constitution and Islam. Therefore, the normal laws approved by the Parliament receive legitimacy and become binding.

In religious democracy, any inconsistency between the normal laws and the Shari'a is resolved through state-issued decrees on the basis of "expediency." As Imam Khomeini stated: "Government, which is a branch of the Guardianship (Wilaya) of the Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him, is among the primary decrees of Islam and takes precedence over secondary decrees" (Khomeini, n.d., p. 452).

Such an outlook led to the institutionalization of the Expediency Council in the system of the Islamic Republic, this institution intends to recognize the interests of society, and provides the Supreme Jurisconsult with the necessary advice.

Political Equality

The concept of political equality as one of the floating signifiers is put forward in the discourse formation of religious democracy. This concept becomes meaningful concerning the nodal point, which is the political Islam. Political equality recognizes two types of its kind in the discourse of religious democracy:

1. Equal Political Participation

In the discourse of religious democracy, equal political participation is recognized for all citizens. In this discourse, the equal role and presence of all Iranians in the formation of various institutions of the system of the Islamic Republic are accepted, and every Iranian enjoys an equal right to

vote. Of course, this type of equality divides citizens into Muslims and non-Muslims in relation to political Islam. Non-Muslims of Iran including Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians enjoy the right of participation as religious minorities, although there might be some differences regarding their rights and powers compared with those of Muslims. Imam Khomeini explains the status of minorities in Iran as such, "Islam has respect for them. We give full rights to all of them. They have the right to have a representative in Majlis (Parliament), and freely have their social and political activities, and freely practice their own religious rituals. They are Iranians" (Khomeini, n.d., p. 452).

There are some points here that should be taken into account. First, Islam is the basis of classification among citizens, but there is no difference between Shiites and Sunnis. Sunnis are not considered as a minority despite Shiite majority. Second, the right of religious minorities for equal political participation is explained in the light of Islam. As a result, the discourse of religious democracy in Iran takes into account the concept of people, and therefore, recognizes equal political participation for each person. Imam Khomeini believes, "it is the primary right of every nation to determine its fate and the type of government it wants to have" (Khomeini, 1999, p. 292).

2. Equality before the Law

In religious democracy and the conceptual process of political equality, equality before the law is distinguished from equality in law, and at the same time is recognized. According to this outlook, all citizens enjoy equal position before the law, although they are not regarded as equal in law. This is how democracy is defined: It is the right of all people to express their views about public issues through institutions of civil society and participation in state, and this right belongs to all citizens based on the principle of equality (Khomeini, 1999).

Religious democracy recognizes these principles and explains equality based on Islamic teachings. As a result, it accepts fair inequality in law. According to the law and based on the principle of justice, citizens enjoy

their own exclusive rights; however, the application of laws and their restrictive rules is done on an equal basis. So this inequality can be fair in the sense that it will apply equally to all people. For this reason, the powers of people and political leaders are determined in the Constitution, but in general, the equality of all people before the law is emphasized in Article 14 of Principle 3 (Beetham, 2004). The equality before the law even applies to the leadership as the supreme official of the country. In Principle 107 of the Constitution, the principle of equality before the law is even mentioned for him: Leader stands before the law in an equal position with other people of the country (IRR. Cons, III).

Freedom

The notion of freedom is other floating signifier in the Iranian discourse of religious democracy. This type of discourse aims to explain freedom in the political arena based on the philosophical and discourse bases of freedom, and uses the practice of religious jurisprudence or ijtihad to explain the concept of freedom in relation to the nodal point of political Islam. Political Islam basically recognizes God's absolute ownership of the universe and mankind plus negates the domination of people over people. According to Imam Khomeini's viewpoint, "The root and principle of all of our most important and valuable beliefs is the principle of monotheism. This principle teaches us that humankind must only be submissive before God, and must not obey any human being unless obeying him is meant to be obedience to God. From this principle of belief, we learn the principle of human freedom based on which no person has the right to deprive another human being or society or nation of freedom"(IRR. Cons. CVII). According to this view, freedom is regarded as a divine right for "God has created every human being free" (Khomeini, 1992, p. 166).

The divinity of man's right to freedom puts it into the framework of divine sovereignty, and consequently, divine law explains its boundaries. For this reason, teachings such as Enjoining of Goodness and Forbidding of Evil (Amr Be Maroof Va Nahi Az Monkar) are applied to explain this concept.

These teachings promote freedom from right to duty, and as a result, one of the most important duties of humankind is his freedom. Freedom as a duty is introduced in various areas, the most important of which is the freedom of dissent and protest, criticism and participation in organizations. Imam Khomeini explains the concept of freedom as a duty as such, "all people are obliged to supervise the affairs (of their statesmen). If I deviate from the right path a bit, people are obliged to warn me, and tell me to correct my conduct" (Khomeini, 1992, p. 61).

There is no doubt that public supervision brings about the license of criticism and protest. In his discussion on the of the right of protest and criticism, Imam Khomeini regards this right as the source of preparing the ground for prosperity in society, "In the Islamic Republic, all of the people should prepare the ground for prosperity in society through criticism and raising problems" (Khomeini, 1992, p. 118). Of course, criticism is meant to be constructive criticism. Imam Khomeini asserts, "I have said that creative criticism does not mean staging an opposition, and if a criticism is done rightfully, it will lead to guidance. No one should consider himself as an absolute person and exempt from criticism" (Khomeini, 1992, p. 78).

Independence

Independence is one more floating signifier and concept in the Iranian discourse of religious democracy. In this discourse, the independence of the Islamic Republic is investigated in relation to other political systems. The cultural, economic, and political independence forms the most important aspects of this concept, which was introduced from the beginning as the slogan of "Independence, freedom, Islamic Republic." According to this discourse, the achievement of independence relies on the negation of any dependence on the Western blocs that existed at the time (Khomeini, 1999, p. 378). For this reason, Imam Khomeini asserts, "if we want to be independent and free, we should find ourselves. We are lost. We must leave behind …" (Khomeini, 1992, p. 153).

Conclusion

The primary aim of this essay is a discursive formulation of Religious Democracy in Iran. Based on the linguistic distinction between "concept" and "conception," Democracy as a concept and Religious Democracy as conception can be considered. This essay, therefore, reached the following conclusions:

1. Religious Democracy is a conception of Democracy, so, it can be considered as a rival conception against liberal democracy and other conceptions of democracy.

2. Religious Democracy is a conception that recognizes the authority of "Religion" in the "justification," "analysis" and "explanation" of the components of Democracy, i.e. "collective authority" and "public participation."

3. Recognizing the authority of "Religion" leads to the recognition of "Political Islam" as the "Nodal Point" of the Religious Democracy, so the theory of wilayat al-faqih" will be regarded as the basis for the legitimacy of the political system.

4. The most important "Floating Signifiers "of the Iranian discourse of Religious Democracy are People, Law, Political Equality, Freedom, and Independence. The meaning of these signifiers will be understood by referring to the Political Islam as the nodal point of the Religious Democracy.

Nowadays in Iran, this kind of Democracy is exercised, and it seems that the most important "strategic and political necessity" for Islamic countries is exercising the "Religious Democracy" of their own as the alternative for Liberal Democracy in the globalization era.

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External Barriers to Political Freedom
from the Quran's Point of View

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Abstract

Political freedom has faced internal and external barriers over time. This study aims to investigate external barriers to political freedom, approaching to Quran with the question that, what the external barriers to political freedom are that manifest themselves in the political and social arenas. It also stresses the assumption that the external barriers to political freedom must be observed within their oppressive scope with its specific principles, and counter forces to freedom, in addition to the internal barriers to political freedom. Those counter forces, which are regarded as freedom barriers include the Taghuts (Dictators), Mostakbers (arrogant rulers), aristocrats, the opulent, scholars. Hence, we set this question forth from the Quran: what the external barriers to human freedom are that often appear in political and social forms. Employing a local method of discretional interpretation and adopting a Quranic perspective, the study innovates in that it investigates external barriers to political freedom including the role of oppressive structure, fabricated rules together with the role of people and Taghuts.

Introduction

When it comes to discussing human freedom in political and social settings, the investigation of barriers is raised. That is the main principle in political freedom is striving to relieve human from restraints. But before taking any measure, identifying the barriers and learning about them are deemed necessary in order that requirements for guidelines and approaches are met. Motahari argued that freedom is one of the fundamentals in any creature. It doesn't matter if it's a plant, an animal or a human being; it needs freedom anyway. A living being may enjoy security and evolution factors, while still, some barriers constrain it from making any further progress (Motahari, 1999).

Freedom is defined as there being no barriers, yet our perception of barriers can engender diverse schools of thought. There seems to be a significant difference in viewing political freedom in the ideology that takes only external Taghut into consideration as a barrier and the one that takes heed of both internal and external Taghuts. The citizen who is mindful of relieving himself from sensuality besides liberating from tyrants, has a different opinion from the one whose only concern is absolute freedom to satisfy his lust in (political, financial, etc.) arenas and likewise in any other aspects. "In line with western attitude, some think highly of freedom, just like human beings were created for freedom, and so they reject religion because it hampers human freedom. Therefore, for them, God has given place to freedom". Islam however, has a moderate view of freedom. It suggests that human reverence is safeguarded in the light of freedom, but not in a way that it becomes a pretext to oppose morality and makes humans obedient in the face of desires. (Sobhani, 2004). The discussion over freedom barriers is to investigate how boundaries defined by religion lead us to true human relief, such that specification of which makes it clear that freedom barriers are not the religion and its teachings, but rather the restrictions caused by the individual himself or by other people.

By now, some books have dealt with political freedom in different contexts. For example, "Conditions of freedom in Islam" by Seyyed Muhammad Baqer Hakim, investigates freedom conditions in Islam and

composes issues such as freedom in western and Islamic views, the scope of freedom in Islam, genuine elements of freedom, freedom obligations in Islam and ultimately the role of religious guardianship in that setting. Another book, "al-horiah al-siyasiah fi al-islam" written by Ahmad Shoghi Alfanjari which discusses issues such as Quran and the contemporary society, and parties' status in Islam. Mansour MirAhmadi also has investigated issues like an explanation of the concept of freedom, principles of political freedom and its domains in Islam political philosophy, in "Liberation in the Islamic Political Philosophy" (MirAhmadi, 2002). Another book is "Freedom in Quran" by Seyyed Muhammad Ali Ayazi including subjects such as freedom principles, freedom of belief, freedom of speech, apostasy, and preliminary Jihad. Moreover, Seyyed Muhammad Baqer Sadr in a book titled "al-horiah fi al-quran" has discussed issues like the restriction of freedom and freedom in western and Islamic civilization. However, little attention has been paid in these books regarding barriers of political freedom. Therefore, the respective innovation in this paper pertains to the fact that it tends to investigate the barriers to political freedom from Quran's viewpoint by relying on a local approach to discretional interpretation and its respective potentials. Another innovation that it takes advantage of is the investigation of the role that the cruel structure of the sovereignty plays beside the role of people and Taghut in obstructing political freedom, by stressing the word of God.

Generally speaking, there are three elements influencing freedom: "liberation", "non-existence of barriers", and "goal". Political freedom takes place when political individuals and entities have freedom in their appropriate political activities and fundamental rights despite the challenges that governments might pose to their way (MirAhmadi, 2002). AlsdirMacIntyre (2001) defines freedom as the social independence of people in relation to others. AmartyaSen states in his book "Development as Freedom" that freedom is defined as no obstacles being present for people and their deeds in making appropriate situations (Sen, 2000).

In the Quran's view and Islam political attitude, freedom has been considered from different perspectives. Hence, political freedom means that people, groups and entities can dismiss the oppressive forces imposed by the government together with external political-social barriers and function in line with human improvement bypassing internal limitations. In political freedom, the key point is relieving from totalitarianism, which stands beside political tyranny in which the fundamental rights of its citizens are denied. This paper seeks the external barriers to political freedom, which is also of the Quran's concern. It also emphasizes the assumption that in addition to internal barriers, external barriers should be sought in an oppressive structure and the rules coming from the opposing forces such as Taghuts, Mostakbers, aristocrats that obstruct the way to establish freedom should also be investigated. This paper has been drafted by taking a thematic commentary approach and a discretional interpretation method. In order to better understand the issue of the barriers to political freedom; the study uses of Quran, and almost all of the verses of the Quran, which were somehow linked to this area of study, were identified and investigated accordingly. We made use of all sorts of perception tools such as word perception, investigation of other verses, consideration of the context of the verses, taking advantage of interpretative narratives and the perceptions made by other commentators. Freedom barriers can be noticed all over the Quran, and one may have a specific perception out of any of them. Therefore, if anyone wants to know the precise meaning out of the Quran, he should have a comprehensive look at the whole context. He should resort to it from different perspectives and exhaust all of the potentials in the discretional perception method. In this method, some matters like word investigation, understanding the literature of a verse, investigation of the occasion of transmission of verses to Prophet Muhammad, use of supportive verses, referring to interpretative narratives, use of intellectual and scientific evidence throughout history is of importance.

We try to investigate some of the barriers to political freedom by using this method.

Typology of barriers of political freedom

In typology of barriers of freedom, we can divide them into some subcategories. For example, we can sort barriers of political freedom into two subcategories of internal and external. Some of the internal barriers of political freedom can be found in affairs such as lack of spiritual freedom, lack of self-esteem, lack of subjection morale, obedience and devotion. In internal barriers, we emphasize that freedom is initiated from within us. When viciousness conquers one's soul, the first step towards freedom has failed. When the individual is spoiled from within, he would first violate his own rights and then the rights of others. Consequently, by entering such a person to the arena of political power, major steps are taken towards tyranny. In other words, piety gives human spiritual freedom, which means being released from the slavery of carnal soul and eradication of social slavery. Individuals who do not accept to be under the subjugation of money and power never fall in line with social slaveries (Motahari, 1999). In the same way, in the intellectual arena too, feeling associated with deterministic thoughts and dependence on habits and fanaticism can be investigated.

Though political freedom is often interpreted in its negative meaning as relief from restrictions and irrational external compulsions in behaviors, (Berlin, 2002) this freedom is also designated in its positive meaning as realizing the rights, talents, capabilities, and potentials (Taylor, 1985). Given the logic and the literature of the Quran, if the negative freedom means that one can behave in any way without any limitations in the political arena, it doesn't make any sense and it's not accepted since the political deeds of all must be under the surveillance of the values and ideologies stipulated by the divine. Therefore, the very positive freedom will be taken into account, which is in line with rights and flourishing talents.

The dominant portion of barriers to political freedom takes place outside which is a type of freedom with external manifestation. Most of the time,

tyrants are considered the most common type of barriers to freedom, which doesn't allow the citizens a free and active involvement. That is because, with political freedom, thinkers will find the opportunity to challenge the regime and evaluate the authorities' behavior, decisions, words, and thoughts making the process of exercising power transparent. This way, the first people who obstruct the way to freedom are authorities with illegitimate power and their self-serving followers. Late Naeini wrote about the tyrannical overthrow of Israelites by Pharaoh. Though they never worshiped him as Copts did, they couldn't tolerate it in Egypt. In Shu'ara surah, Hazrat Kalim (A.S) tells Pharaoh: "وَ تِلْكَ نِعْمَةٌ تَمُنُّها عَلَيَّ أَنْ عَبَّدْتَ بَنِي إِسْرائِيـلَ" (Holy Quran, Shu'ara, 22). In addition, in another verse he quotes Pharaoh's people: " وَ قَوْمُهُما لَنـا عابِـدُونَ" (Holy Quran, Mu'minun, 47). It seems that worship of Israelites was the reason for which they were doomed to subjugation (Naeini Gharavi, 2007). Pharaoh intended to bring people to absolute slavery an attempt to sabotage freedom.

We can observe other forms of freedom barriers in the arena of political and lawmaking structures. A political structure is applied to entities that enjoy political power and shape independent integrity (Naghibzade, 2008). Since structures integrate a set of different elements, forces, and capabilities they find a synergistic characteristic and so they take advantage of a multiple power compared to individuals. Often, rulers could become Taghut and restrict freedom when they find a way to the political system. In a structure, forces become integrated enabling an easier abuse of power and negation of freedom while making it more challenging to stop it. In political structures, lawmakers serve for power and make laws based on the objectives of opponents of freedom, negating people's freedom in a deceivingly legitimate form. This paper stresses the external barriers to political freedom, oppressive structure, the laws resulting from them and forces opposing political freedom while paying attention to the effective role of internal barriers of political freedom authority of Islam in justifying, analyzing and explaining the essential aspects of democracy.

Oppressive structures

We can have an overlook of Pharaoh's ruling structure by resorting to the Quran. This structure appears in a way that has no room for freedom. Pharaoh, with full authority and exorbitant claims to be worshiped as God (Holy Quran, Nazi'at, 24) sat on the top of the pyramid of power while others like the opulent, elites, aristocrats, military commanders, corrupt scholars and authorities not only made no objection to the system but also firmly supported him by their wealth, military power and legitimizing propagandas inspiring more arbitrary behaviors in him. Such a political structure is so prevailing that hampers any kind of freedom and no one can object to it. In addition to slaves and soldiers who have no choice but obedience, this structure made the people of Pharaoh who obey without any disapproval abject (Holy Quran, Zukhruf, 54). Even when the magicians failed to compete with Hazrat Musa and started to believe in God, Pharaoh warned them that they can't believe in Musa's God without his permission otherwise they would face his (God= Pharaoh) fury (Taha, 71). Such people refused the message of God (Holy Quran, Naml, 14) and denied his Prophets (Holy Quran, Mu'minun, 48) in the form of suppression and superiority. They have too much pride and seek superiority over others, and their only logic is more and more domination (Karami Hoveizi, 1982). Such structures try to weaken their dissidents with the help of other government components and have the company of the simple-minded with a glamorous characteristic. They shut the voice of freedom. Pharaoh slanders Musa in a dazzling voice that, oh Musa, have you come here to dislodge us from our own land by showing magic:

قالَ أَجِئْتَنا لِتُخْرِجَنا مِنْ أَرْضِنا بِسِحْرِكَ يا مُوسى (Holy Quran, Taha, 57).

Meanwhile, it's not Pharaoh alone who says that. His followers also show their approval about it by stressing that Hazrat Musa and Harun are nothing but wizards who want to discard people's religion: "These two are certainly wizards who want to dislodge you from your land and eliminate your religion by magic." (Holy Quran, Taha, 63).

Figure 1. Pharaoh's ruling structure

Such structures make the society lifeless, therefore, "factors contributing to lack of freedom include one hand insensitivity, negligence and submissiveness to fate and on the other hand the disability, against which Islam has fought, refuted the oppression and regarded it as an evil, and accepted vindication of rights as a virtue" (Motahari, 2003, p. 121). An oppressive political structure is set, the tyrannical elements back each other and surveillance the society in a way that no one is capable of realizing freedom and people get used to their misery. Such a structure encompasses all of the social interactions and there is no way left for people to feel the freedom.

Countervailing forces of freedom

Most of the external barriers emerge in a form of countervailing forces of freedom that often play an effective role in the oppressive structure, employing which the dictatorship limits the freedom of the citizens. These countervailing forces are called tyrannical elements and the study will discuss some of them from the viewpoint of the Quran.

1. Taghut (Dictator)

One of the external barriers mentioned in the Quran is Taghut. Taghut

systems are examples of tyrannical regimes, a manifestation of which is sabotage of political freedom of citizens. Taghut refers to a person whose viciousness surfaces in a way that denies people's rights and stands against God's expedients. Satan is a true manifestation of Taghut, and whoever after him invites others to obey him is an oppressive king, a hypocritical scientist, or a ruler who is a fund of governance and power. (SeyedBaqeri, 2015). One of the traits of these persons is ignoring people's rights and taking their freedom away. With a self-serving desire, such persons want everyone to be at their service. Therefore, if anyone objects their unlawful demands or question them, they will threaten them to death and torture. Quran quotes that after the victory of Musa over wizards, they started to believe in God and Pharaoh said to them:

آمَنْتُمْ لَهُ قَبْلَ أَنْ آذَنَ لَكُمْ إِنَّهُ لَكَبِيرُكُمُ الَّذِي عَلَّمَكُمُ السِّحْرَ فَلَأُقَطِّعَنَّ أَيْدِيَكُمْ وَ أَرْجُلَكُمْ مِنْ خِلَافٍ وَ لَأُصَلِّبَنَّكُمْ فِي جُذُوعِ النَّخْلِ.

> Do you begin to believe in him without my permission? He is certainly your master who has taught you magic. I will cut an arm and a leg from you, one from the right and the other from the left, and hang you from a date tree (Holy Quran, Taha, 71).

With a power gained unlawfully, Taghut tends to change people's beliefs. Shaykh Tusi (2002) quotes that cutting an arm and a leg in an opposite direction and hanging the body from a date tree was first done by Pharaoh. "Crucifixion" refers to many executions just like "chop" meaning cutting many people from different parts of their body. They both refer to Pharaoh threatening his own people to torture (Tabatabaei, 2002).

God narrates about Pharaoh that he threatened Hazrat Musa and his followers to death:

When Musa brought the truth of us to them, they said: kill the sons of those who believe in him and let their women live as forced labors. And Pharaoh said, let me kill Musa (Holy Quran, Ghafir, 25-26). Another measure Taghuts take to restrict citizen's freedom is threatening to jail, just the way Pharaoh threatened Hazrat Musa:

قَالَ لَئِنِ اتَّخَذْتَ إِلَهَاً غَيْرِي لَأَجْعَلَنَّكَ مِنَ الْمَسْجُونِينَ.

He said: "If you serve any other God but me, I will definitely jail you" (Holy Quran, Shu'ara, 29).

The arrogance of Pharaohs led them to the extent of viciousness that they propagated their propaganda of divinity while considering everyone as their slave and follower (Javadi-Amoli, 2002).

It is mentioned in Nahj al-Balagha that Pharaoh brought Israelites under his slavery:

اتَّخَذَتْهُمُ الْفَرَاعِنَةُ عَبِيداً.

The Pharaoh made them their slaves and servants.

Then that Hazrat explains how this took place:

And they let them suffer and remain in agony; therefore they were under the repression of Pharaoh and had no choice but obedience and no way to defend themselves. (Nahj al-Balagha, Sermon. 92).

Given that the role of Prophets is the most crucial in fighting against stranglehold and manifestations of viciousness. Quran reminds us about Prophets opposing tyranny and tyrannical class of the society (Motahari, 2000).

According to the Quran, every Prophet tried to release human from worshiping anyone but God and fighting against Taghut:

وَ لَقَدْ بَعَثْنا فِي كُلِّ أُمَّةٍ رَسُولاً أَنِ اعْبُدُوا اللَّهَ وَ اجْتَنِبُوا الطَّاغُوتَ.

And in fact, we sent any society an envoy to give this message: "Follow and worship God and stay away from Taghut" (Holy Quran, Nahl, 36).

Taghut systems are characterized by slavering people. There's no chance of criticizing the policies made by the rulers in such governments and any criticism or benevolent comment would be perceived dangerous. The personal opinion of the ruler has priority over the opinion made by the intellectual elite. They want a blindly support from the people and think highly of themselves while they are entangled with perfectionism and narcissism. Pharaoh says from this point of view:

أَنَا رَبُّكُمُ الْأَعْلى (Holy Quran, Nazi'at, 24).

Tyrannical rules take the path of terror instead of logic rationality. They even want the true beliefs of their people subjected to their own capricious aspirations. They make false statements about their dissidents accusing them

of ambitiousness and rabble-rousing. They consider the wealth of the country as their personal asset allowing themselves to impinge on it in any way they wish (Mousavi Zanjani, 1961).

All of these verses plus many others imply that one of the most common crimes committed by Taghuts is sabotaging political freedom of the people who must conform to all their ambitious requests.

2. Mostakbers (Arrogant rulers)

Mostakbers avoid any comments or criticisms in a self-centered way and since they only care about their own interests and desires think others are to serve their ambitions. Therefore, they crucify anyone standing on their way. They are also obstinate and reluctant to accept the truth. The word oppression also contains this concept:

الامتناع عن قبول الحق مُعاندة و تَكَبُّراً (Ibn Manzur, 1988, p. 127)

Arrogance is a trait of someone who expresses superiority and pride even though he is not (Qorshi, 1992). Mostakber is someone who seeks superiority for himself and wants to express it to others. However, Motakabber is a person who has accepted vanity as a trait of him (Tabatabaei, 2002). Therefore, it is in a narrative that Imam Sadeq states:

مَن ذَهَبَ يَرى أنَّ لَهُ عَلَى الآخَرِ فَضلاً فَهُوَ مِنَ المُستَكبِرينَ.

Whoever thinks he has superiority over others is arrogant (al-Kulayni, 1968, p. 128).

Another narrative refers to lack of companionship with the truth:

اَلكِبرُ أَن تَغمِصَ النّاسَ وَتُسَفِّهَ الحَقّ.

Vanity is to belittle people and undervalue their rights (al-Kulayni, 1968, p. 310).

Quran narrates that Pharaoh was an arrogant Taghut and according to the interpretation of Alforghan, he was a manifestation of the agony Israelites because he insulted human reverence by imprisoning people:

فَاسْتَخَفَّ قَوْمَهُ فَأَطاعُوهُ (Holy Quran, Zukhruf, 54).

And he murdered them put the men under slavery and got the women to endure forced labor:

يُذَبِّحُ أَبْناءَهُمْ وَ يَسْتَحْيِي نِساءَهُمْ إِنَّهُ كانَ مِنَ الْمُفْسِدِينَ (Holy Quran, Qasas, 4).

Pharaoh was an arrogant ruler seeking superiority over followers of God proclaiming himself God (Sadeqi Tehrani, 1986, p. 411).

One of the most common traits of Pharaoh and the aristocrats surrounding him was arrogance. It is mentioned in Mu'minun surah:

فَاسْتَكْبَرُوا وَ كانُوا قَوْماً عالينَ (Holy Quran, Mu'minun, 46)**.**

But they showed arrogance being defiant and narcissistic.

We can read in another verse that:

He and his troops went about arrogance ignoring people's rights (Holy Quran, Qasas, 39).

Arrogance is reinforced by political power and the individual rises to claim divinity, a fancy that takes freedom from citizens. According to the Quran, Pharaoh announces the aristocrats following him that:

يـاَيُّهَا الْمَلَأُ ما عَلِمتُ لَكُم مِن اِلـه غَيرى (Holy Quran, Qasas, 38)**.**

I don't see any other God for you but myself. All of these inappropriated fancies turn to a full state of arrogance when they are summoned in one person and the expected result would be the ruling of stranglehold, terror, and suppression.

3. Jabbars

Jabr, according to the literature of the Quran, is the trait of another one who restricts freedom and stands in people's way by denying their right to decide about their own lives. He uses his power for defiance and aggression (Anis et al., 1978) subduing dissidents taking power from them in a way that they find no chance what so ever to make a choice (Mostafavi, 1996). In its literal meaning, tyranny is attributed to someone who makes up for his deficiencies by proclaiming perfection and the dignity that he doesn't deserve. He condemns the people and they have no choice but surrender. "Sultan" is also called "Jabr" (characterized by compulsion) because he has the power to rule people in any way he wishes, and coercion in its original form means reluctance (Ragheb Esfahani, 1991). It is also said that jabbar is the one who kills with no mercy (Tarihi, 1996). With a jabr approach, which is a characteristic of suppressive emperors, the ruler takes any freedom from the citizens.

The power that dismisses the people's rights forcing them to conform to his wishes, has taken the dishonest path of jabr to restrict their freedom. Naeini writes in this regard "in such a rule, the ruler just like usual owners assumes the country as his personal asset and the people as his slaves. He accepts whoever obeys him and rejects and suppresses whoever defies him" (Naeini Gharavi, 2007, p. 8). With this attitude taken, no room for human freedom remains. Hence, when a jabbar finds power in a society the result is the denial of political freedom.

4. Arbab (Master)

Another external barrier to political freedom is the Arabs who assume themselves gods and that they are free to treat people in any way they want. Arbab or such a tendency has been condemned by the Quran and a true believer doesn't accept any other one instead to besides God. The one who only believes in God and not anyone else reaches transcendental freedom and follows no one but God.

God criticizes the Jewish and Christians who accepted to follow their scientists and monks instead of God:

اتَّخَذُوا أَحْبَارَهُمْ وَرُهْبَانَهُمْ أَرْباباً مِنْ دُونِ اللَّهِ وَالْمَسِيحَ ابْنَ مَرْيَمَ (Holy Quran, Tobe, 31).

Referring to the parties functioning back in the ruling times of Imam Ali, Late Naeini explains that people would be subdued in Israelites rule

و ايم اللَّه لتجدنَّ بنى اميّة لكم ارباب سوء بعدي (Nahj al-Balagha, Sermon. 92).

And I swear to God that you will find Israelites, such bad rulers.

In interpretation, decadence from "Wilayat" to "Arbab" is to describe the same concept (Naeini Gharavi, 1966).

God says clearly to the literates that come and let's stand for the belief we share. Let's not accept anyone's rule but the God's.

لا يَتَّخِذَ بَعْضُنا بَعْضاً أَرْباباً مِنْ دُونِ اللَّهِ (Ali 'Imran, 64).

This verse is concerned with the rational reason beyond the need for Tawhid (oneness of God), Islam and justice in social-political systems. That is because exploitation and slavery of people do not occur by the owner of power unless he is ego-centered and wants no one to have superiority. Thus,

he seeks personal discretions and wants all political, economic, judicial, legal, and business arenas under his command, something which is against God's will and the logic he designed for even distribution of rights among his creatures (Bohrani, 2005). Elimination of the attitude of being Arbab among rulers is an essential measure towards the desired right of freedom. "Given this point, a verse of Quran states that the system that stabilizes justice in societies is the one rooted from Tawhid and lordship is only for God; and that worship is only for him or the one leading to him. In light of such a principle in human systems, oppression is eradicated. Thus, in Islamic systems, everyone follows God and his actions and not anyone else instead. This logic eliminates all oppressive classes who want others under slavery" (Bohrani, 2005, p.329) and any human Arbab who is considered as a human barrier is taken out of political settings and power related interactions.

5. Mala (Aristocrats)

Mala is another group that the Quran mentions as the external barrier to freedom and a sabotaging factor of people's rights. A class of the society that shares the same opinion and has luxurious lives (Ragheb Esfahani, 1991). Therefore, "mala" is another word for aristocrats of the society (Ibn Manzur, 1988). It is mentioned in a narrative that Prophet Muhammad heard from a man coming back from Badr war that: "we killed some old men". Then, Prophet Muhammad said: "they were aristocrats of Quraysh, if you were before them, they would underestimate your action" (Ibn al-Athir, 1996, p. 351). These groups of people, who are rich and powerful, treat others with arrogance and take the freedom away from them. Aristocrats who are forceful by keeping each other's companion infringe other people's rights easily due to their high position in the society. That is why Pharaoh and the first class of Israelites group seek superiority and extravagant and restrict people's freedom by aggravating and torturing them:

فَما آمَنَ لِمُوسى إِلَّا ذُرِّيَّةٌ مِنْ قَوْمِهِ عَلى خَوْفٍ مِنْ فِرْعَوْنَ وَ مَلَائِهِمْ أَنْ يَفْتِنَهُمْ (Holy

Quran, Yunus, 83)

At last, no one believed Musa other than some children of his own tribe

who were afraid that Pharaoh might find out about it and torture him or her.

Quran narrates that aristocrats and those holding power infringed other people's rights and restricted their freedom. God reveals about aristocrats of Shoaib tribe who threatened believers and said:

"Oh, Shoaib! Return to our tradition! Otherwise, we will banish you and those believing in you." (Holy Quran, A'raf, 88).

Shoaib reply is an implication of their efforts to restrict their freedom:

قالَ أَوَ لَوْ كُنَّا كارِهين.

"Do you want to take us back despite our willingness?" (Holy Quran, A'raf, 88).

They don't even pay attention to Hazrat Shoaib advice. In return, they threaten him and other believers to exile. In their words "لَنُخْرِجَنَّكَ" and "لَتَعُودُنَّ" are in the same context containing stress on the "ن" implying their resolution to this job (Tabatabaei, 2002). This is how oppressors reveal their true nature accepting the companion of power rather than the companionship of God and following him (Modaresi, 1998). We can see in these verses that the aristocrats are arrogant choosing the path of indulgence and vanity over moderation.

There is always too much pride in their words and deeds that is they deny other people's freedom. Quran narrates that the aristocrats said to Hazrat Noah that:

إِنَّا لَنَراكَ فِي ضَلالٍ مُبينٍ (Holy Quran, A'raf, 60).

This aspiration will lead to the denial of Prophets just like they denied Hazrat Noah:

فَكَذَّبُوه (Holy Quran, A'raf, 64).

God says that owner of power and wealth also in Ad people alleged HazratHud to have been insane and liar (A'raf, 66).

Regarding Samud people, God uses the word mala (aristocrats) along with "arrogance":

قالَ الْمَلَأُ الَّذينَ اسْتَكْبَرُوا مِنْ قَوْمِهِ (Holy Quran, A'raf, 75).

According to Sayyid Quṭb's (1987) interpretation, it is clear that the arrogant authorities' questions were for threatening and summoning people to deny the path of believers and the poor by teasing them.

Hence, aristocrats do not recognize any rights for others being regarded as an absolute barrier to political freedom, in a way that they want the citizens to follow whatever they dictate to them, otherwise, they will face their fury.

6. Motrafin

From the logic of the Quran, another barrier to political freedom is the opulent class of the society who thinks of themselves as superior to other people just because of their wealth and luxurious lives. Although the opulent and mala are in the same category and both seek superiority and they are self-centered, they have differences. "مترف" is a past participle form derived from "تـرف" meaning "to have and enjoy the earthly blessings in any way" (Ragheb Esfahani, 1991, p. 166). In Quran, it is mentioned that "تُرفـه" means blessings in plenty. "تَـرَف" means living in pleasure and comfort. The form "افعال" of that is "اتراف" meaning insisting in oppression, and "متـرَف" means being left to oneself to do whatever he desires, or unleashed to commit any sins without any limitations. It also means mollycoddled, suppressive and indulgent (Mohaqeq, 1985). In the Shaykh Tusi's words, the opulent are those who preferred wealth to reason and they are rulers overwhelmed with wealth:

وهم الذين آثروا التّرفُة على طلب الحجة، وهم المتنعمون الرؤساء (Shaykh Tusi, 2002, p. 192).

Means exploiting the earthly blessings:

وَ أَتْرَفْناهُمْ فِي الْحَياةِ الدُّنْيا (Holy Quran, Mu'minun, 33).

We bestowed upon them our blessings.

It is also said that:

إِنَّهُمْ كانُوا قَبْلَ ذلِكَ مُتْرَفِينَ (Holy Quran, Waqi'ah, 45).

Meaning that they were overwhelmed in luxury and blessings, and ignorant of the spiritual aspect of life and religious rituals. The difference between "مترف" and "مـنعَم" is that the "مـنعم" will enjoy all the spiritual and unspiritual blessings, either partly or totally, aware or unaware of it. On the other hand, "متـرَف" is the one who is overwhelmed in unspiritual blessings and unaware of spirituality (Mostafavi, 1996). "أَتْرَفْـنـاهُمْ" means we gave them

blessings and kept them in power. It also says: "مُتْرَفُوهـا" (Holy Quran, Saba, 35) meaning "those who had the blessings of the earth without following God" (Tarihi, 1996, p. 30). One can find out from all of these that the opulent were rich, stubborn, mollycoddled and irresponsible (Mohaqeq, 1985). On the other hand, "mala" is a united group of people or class of a society who have a glamorous position in society.

Given these features of the opulent, they are people who take no civil or ethical liability. Rather, the only thing that preoccupies them is this assumption that "only money solves all problems", and they suppose that they can behave in any way they want disrespectful of other people's rights. Qarun was one of those who enjoyed economic power. He was ambitious and ignorant about people's rights just like Pharaoh who had and abused his political power. When these two factors intermingle, the outcome is corruption in society. Qarun is the symbol of opulence in God's words. He was characterized by oppression. He had abundant treasure and inflicted oppression on Musa's people:

إِنَّ قارُونَ كانَ مِنْ قَوْمِ مُوسى فَبَغى عَلَيْهِمْ (Holy Quran, Qasas, 76).

In fact, "Baghi" means the intensity of demands and when used with "عَلى" it means assault (Mostafavi, 1996). Ragheb also suggests that "بغى" means a desire for assault accompanied by oppression and seeking superiority (Ragheb Esfahani, 1991). We can see in "العين" that "البغى: الظلم" means oppression (al-Farahidi, 1993). Hence, "بغى" contains concepts such as intensive demand, excessive indulgence, oppression, and ever seeking superiority. Though God had granted Qarun so many treasures of wealth whose keys' burden was found intolerable by the forceful servants (Holy Quran, Qasas, 76). His people told him not to indulge himself in an excessive way that God doesn't admire (Holy Quran, Qasas, 76).

Also, his people told him to seek the blessing of the afterlife while enjoying pleasures of the current life and seek goodness after God blessed you. Do not go after corruption when God disapproves of it (Holy Quran, Qasas, 77). However, his assertive response was that "this is the result of my knowledge":

إِنَّما أُوتِيتُهُ عَلى عِلْمٍ عِنْدي (Holy Quran, Qasas, 78).

It is also mentioned in Zumar surah that human comes to this boastful claim when he forgets where his blessings originated in:

ثُمَّ إِذا خَوَّلْناهُ نِعْمَةً مِنَّا قالَ إِنَّما أُوتِيتُهُ عَلى عِلْمٍ (Holy Quran, Zumar, 49)**.**

Then, when we grant him a blessing, he says: "I have earned it by my knowledge."

Another trait of the opulent is committing crimes, as God says:

وَ اتَّبَعَ الَّذِينَ ظَلَمُواْ ما أُتْرِفُواْ فِيهِ وَ كانُواْ مُجْرِمِينَ (Holy Quran, Hud, 116)**.**

And those who were oppressive went after wealth and indulgence, and they were offenders. It is deduced from "كانوا مجرمين" in the sentence that some of the people of Egypt were corrupt and got used to corruption (Tabarsi, 1993). Oppression is infringing other people's rights which a manifestation of restricting freedom.

According to Sayed Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah's interpretation, the problem that many human societies are entangled with is in choosing the wrong path, oppression, and misdirection, the opulent who stand against believers who encourage in faith and amendment in the society and want to reduce the social gap changing the materialistic values to spiritual ones. It is the opulent class who try to stand against Prophets through disinformation and by any social, economic, political tools and mislead people by spreading fabrications and accusations. They "disbelieved in what we sent to them" because messages from God are for human freedom and his relief from humiliation. The purpose of sending Prophets is to free the proletariat (Fadlallah, 1998). However, since this group only think of amassing their wealth and enjoy power, they are always ignorant of other people's freedom.

7. Monks and scholars (Ahbar)

The word scholars (احبار) is the plural form of "حِبر" or "حَبر" meaning wise men and scientists. The original form of this word refers to blessing and prosperity in life, given that, joy, admiration, elegance, all of which are among the blessings. "حبر" has been seemingly derived from the Hebrew word "حابر" meaning wise man. But about the question that whether or not it incorporates the concept of magic in it, we should say that magic and

priesthood seemed to be common back then (Mostafavi, 1996). These people can make a false notion in society and restrict other people's freedom just because of their wealth and high social status.

Another group of the same category is monks who are religious worshipers. Monks play an important role in drawing people, showing a fabricated path to them and lead them to any direction they want. Quran narrates that, the Jewish and Christians made monks, scholars and the Christ their masters (Holy Quran, Tobe, 31). Late Tabarsi quotes Imam Baqer and Imam Sadeq who said, swear to God that they didn't fast or say prayers for their wise men or monks, yet they did halal (permissible deeds) haram (forbidden) and vice versa, while the Jewish and Christians followed and worshiped without noticing (Tabarsi, 1993).

Adi son of Hatam says: Once I went to Prophet Muhammad and saw him reading the 31st verse of Tobe surah. I said we don't worship them. Then he asked, don't you find forbidden what they find forbidden? And don't you find permissible what they find permissible? (Tabarsi, 1993). In this sense, wise men (scientists) and monks try to make and fabricate policies, teachings, and interpretations to make the affairs in line with their own perspectives and interests. Therefore, captivation of people takes a legal and legitimate form while opposing which for reaching freedom costs heavily. The false notion they support in the society has sometimes been just some profit-seeking thoughts, as such the bunch of superstitions and misinterpretations and spreading them in the name religion have been a fundamental barrier to the political-social freedom. They are hypocrites who stand beside oppressive dictators imposing restrictions on freedom in the name of religion. "It's been centuries that the mentality of humans has become inactive and ultimately without sense under the pressure of superstitions and blind imitation. The cost of the oppression imposed by the heads of tribes, monks, and kings who exercised their power in human societies has been so tremendous that devastated the human willpower" (Mousavi Zanjani, 1961, p. 184) and not many attempted to seek freedom.

Conclusion

In this paper, the authors tried to investigate some of the structural barriers and the forces opposing political freedom such as Taghuts, Mostakberin (arrogant rulers), Jabaran, masters, aristocrats, the opulent, monks, and scholars.

When human is entangled with an oppressive system, strangling power, amass of data, disintegration, and downfall of vocabulary by the media; he will be confined by visible and invisible external factors. The confinement resulted from police power, and soft and hard powers take the power of choice away from human. There is a precise relation between the internal and external barriers to political freedom. The humble society and the people whose willpower has faded away in time would have little strength to decide and think freely. They would make little efforts to gain their political freedom; therefore, they would easily fall for Taghuts. Understanding these barriers, and awareness of the internal and external foundations, which hamper freedom will give them a wake-up call to be able to tackle them by demanding freedom in their thoughts and deeds.

When those barriers are taken out, the atmosphere would be ready for public participation, free statement of opinion, political multilateralism, evenly distribution of political-social opportunities. Citizens not only "can" freely criticize their lawmakers, but also "have to" do so to stand against oppression as one of the biggest crimes.

In Islamic political teachings, citizens cannot restrict their own freedom or the freedom of others. Human is not allowed to restrict his own freedom or let Taghut takes his freedom. In Islamic culture, opening the way to or allowing oppression as a major barrier to freedom is condemned. That is because the individual infringes his own right of freedom by accepting oppression and inactivity, silence and ignorance with respect to the social duties. He is not allowed to endanger his political-social rights just like he is not allowed to do so regarding other people's rights and give away his or other people's freedom and power or choice to tyrants.

One of the duties of the Islamic government is to eliminate barriers to

political freedom by establishing a fair structure and employing faithful forces. Given the capabilities and facilities that governments have, they can devise the necessary framework to ensure the existence of freedom in society and provide advancement and growth in all sectors.

In eradicating the barriers and the effort to achieve political freedom, we can't blame individuals. In fact, paying attention to the desired structure takes more priority. It is often the structures that play fundamental roles. Structures and rulers have enormous responsibilities to realize political freedom. They are able to provide necessary atmosphere and infrastructure for experts and wise men and women to share their opinions with no fear or obsession of potential consequences; as such, to have a society in which criticism, exhortation, benevolence, encouragement of good deeds, deterrence from forbidden affairs and brainstorming are allowed.

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Political Participation in Democratic Political Orders

A Comparison between the New Caliphate, Constitutional, and Religious Democratic System

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Keywords

Abstract

Political participation is seen as the backbone of a political state and an element ensuring the efficiency and reliability of a political system. Political participation varies according to every reading of political system, approach, contraction and expansion, as difference in the genre and scope of political participation in these systems is consistent with the principles and structure of that political order. This research investigates three genres of a democratic order used in Islamic nations' namely new caliphate, constitutional monarchy, and religious democracy. Consistent with the queries about the political participation capacities of a religious democratic system, the paper, based on a descriptive, analytical, comparative, and critical method, maintains that political participation in this political order profits from a wider scope and capacity, plus the reliance on religious principles; and it also can ensure a desirable supervision of agents as well as the efficiency of the political system, in addition to providing a pervasive political participation between the elites and the masses. It can also be introduced as a political order, which is an alternative to democracy in the modern world.

Introduction

Contrary to the origin of theocracy, which associates the legitimacy of political systems with the divine appointment, the origin of democracy links the legitimacy of a political system to the public opinion. Accordingly, while rulers in political systems like the reign of Pharaohs, emperors, Medieval kings, as well as Umayyad and Abbasid rulers, ruled the people as God's representative and messenger, and dismissed the public position in the administration of society, preferring what they deemed appropriate to the public demand (Vincent, 1992), the state in democratic systems is conventional and contingent on the people's vote and will. Thus, rulers are elected as individuals associated with the public in an electoral process for a certain period of time. They are representatives of people, with certain powers granted to them.

A majority of political systems in the contemporary world have accepted democracy, and have denounced any evasion of it as the acceptance of tyranny and the ignorance of the public right. Despite this a variety of democracies, consistent with their indigenous and Islamic culture as well as preservation of democratic components and religious foundations in the Muslim world, have manifested themselves. Two examples of these are the "new caliphate" in the Arab world and the "Constitutional Monarchy" in some Islamic countries.

As opposed to the two instances of democracy, a religious democracy-based political order in the Islamic Republic of Iran has contributed a lot to the public acceptance of the political system and the desirable administration of society within the framework of Islamic norms as it respects the public efficiency and consent together with the divine legitimacy.

Given that the principles of state legitimacy vary in these three forms of democratic political systems in the Muslim world, as they employ a host of approaches in the realm of governorship. Thus, this research, besides putting an emphasis on the authenticity of religious democracy presented in the Islamic Republic of Iran and drawn on religious learnings (absolutist

approach), versus the approach of the other two readings which are not based on religious principles in the face of the references of some learnings to religion (minimalist approach); aims at comparing and assessing the proper capacity of the three democratic orders in the Muslim world. It also explores the domain of political participation and its political requirements, the effect of political participation on the supervision of administrators, and the efficiency of the democratic political systems drawing on religion in the Muslim world. It accentuates the score of the religious democratic system against the other two systems in terms of authenticity, the scope of political participation, and the efficiency of the political system, due to the maximum presence of religion and people in the administration of society.

Even though there are no records of the research subject concerning the assessment of the capacity of democratic political orders; we can mention two papers titled "Political orders in Shia Jurisprudence and assessment of their capacity for political participation" and "Capacities of political participation in the reading of Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist theory", written by the author of this article. And state some other articles such as "A model of political participation in a system based on the absolute Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist", written by Mohammad Foladi. In this article, in addition to investigating the three forms of democratic systems by a descriptive and analytical method, the paper compares and analyzes the capacities of the three systems with respect to the basis and reference to Islamic foundations as well as capacities for their political participation by using a critical method.

Shared aspects of political participation in democratic orders

The democratic reading of a political order, which is today seen as a prevalent theory in all political orders and any evasion of it is interpreted as the ignorance of the public right, is held to be a common requirement (relative to political participation) in political orders. Accordingly, political orders built on religion-based democracy are within the purview of the

common features, and we can observe political participation in the approach regarding all readings:

1. Unlike a non-democratic reading that holds the Sultan responsible and grants him all ruling powers as he delegates some of his duties to others he approves of; a democratic order views law as a benchmark for ruler's powers as he is just an executor of the laws approved by people's representatives.

2. In opposition with family, racial and party affiliations, which exerts an absolute effect on the appointment of system administrators in a non-democratic order, competency or people's choice is a benchmark for administrator to work in a democratic order.

3. Unlike a non-democratic order where people often have obligations and duties in support of the political system and have minimal rights as rulers' vassal, people have citizenship rights for the duties and obligations set by rulers in a democratic order.

4. As opposed to a non-democratic order where the criterion for the legitimacy of a political system consists in various factors such as race, heritage, power, etc., and people have no role in the ruler's legitimacy; in a democracy, the legitimacy of a political system rests on the views, votes and choices of people and an inclusive election is the criterion for choosing rulers and administrators.

5. Contrary to a non-democratic order in which state legitimacy is concerned with anything but people, and people lack a supervisory role over rulers and administrators, because they do not find themselves accountable. In a democratic order, people assume a crucial role both in the election of rulers and observation of their performance, and accountability to people is the backbone of the system.

This study conducts the review of three democratic readings of political order (new caliphate, Constitutional Monarchy, and religious democracy). Paying attention to some shared features of the readings, we study their participatory capacities, as well as stating the supremacy and efficiency of religious democracy compared to the two other readings.

First: Political participation in the democratic reading of caliphate (new Caliphate)

Given the fact that the non-democratic discourse of the present age has come across widespread opposition in the political arena, as the prevailing theory of a political order underpins democracy and the centrality of the public view in the legitimacy of a political sovereignty, the Sunni people, by reviewing their own references and principles, have come up with a democratic reading of caliphate theory, as a theory whose origin represents the view of the Sunni about political sovereignty, consistent with the new order arisen in the global arena. In opposition to Shia' rationality, the Sunni hold that Prophet Muhammad did not appoint anyone as his successor, and this should be taken over by people (Shahrestani, 1990). As opposed to the theory of the old caliphate drawn up in the wake of Prophet's death based on the reality and the approach of caliphate's sovereignty, in that the public position is reduced to the domain of Bay'ah (an oath of allegiance to a leader), a reading of caliphate system has been proposed, which conforms to indigenous Islamic components like Shura (consultation) and Ijma (consensus), and takes advantage of the maximum support by creating democracy, as it dismisses any special appointment of a person by God for ruling people.

This reading of caliphate order consists of a democratic approach, as some contemporary thinkers of the Sunni believe that a legitimate political system entitles people to sovereignty rights (Feirahi, 1996).

Accordingly, some thinkers conceive of caliphate as a kind of advocacy contract, believing that caliphate is concluded by consultation, i.e. election and an allegiance oath (Group Author, 1924). The democratic viewpoint of the thinkers lead Shura to take on an elite-based approach, as the vote of the elite people is considered an allegiance oath by relying on the view of the contract pundits. In addition to rendering him as chairman of election and dismissal (Rashid Reza, 2013), they believe that the caliphate rises to power from his Ummah (community). Thus, Ummah is the source and epitome of his power (Abd al-Raziq, 2000).

According to this approach of political order, the Shura and political participation is the basis of a political system. Besides this, delegating political power and the power to appoint and dismiss a ruler is up to people's representatives in Majlis e Shura (Consultative Assembly), and the ruler should consult with the elites and Ahle Hel Va Aghd (Sharia community of Influential thinkers and scientists) regarding issues on which there is no clear consensus or legitimately clear text (Maududi, 1985).

In the approach that pursues an ideal political situation and is in conflict with the political tradition in the past and the modern society, as it was passively drawn up with respect to the Western democracy, which aims to adapt itself to the democracy, a structure of political order is proposed that taps into special and different capacities compared to other political orders, which is achieved by laying emphasis on its capacities in terms of the scope of political participation.

1. Pervasive elite caliphate: Contrary to the theory of the old caliphate in that a person with distinct characteristics (like being a Quraysh tribe member) should take over the caliphate of the Muslim community (Maverdi, 1986), sovereignty was taken away from the Quraysh members in the theory of new caliphate, and is entangled with people's votes and opinions. In this way, although everyone cannot be suited for this position, such qualities of Islam as justice, knowledge and trusteeship are conditions for the ruler (Maududi, 1985). Accordingly, sovereignty is taken away from the monopoly of a particular family, and all elites can share it.

2. Establishing democratic institutions in political structure: Given that Shura (consultation) is pivotal to the theory of new caliphate, the condensed form of a democratic position in this theory can be sought in the concept and nature of Shura. Thus, with an emphasis on this element, Sunni theorists attributes a distinct role, i.e. establishment of a particular institution, to the element in the new political order, and consider a lofty position for this institution in the structure of sovereignty (Maududi, 1985).

Apart from the fact that the ruler is required to consult with the Sharia community of Influential thinkers and scientists as the people's representatives in this political order in the process of decision making (particularly in cases of war and peace, public interest, and important national affairs), the representatives of this institution, referred to as Majlis Shura (Consultative Assembly), are involved in this process of sovereignty, and profit from a lofty position in appointment and dismissal.

On the contrary, as opposed to the theory of the old caliphate which is the only official authority of the Sharia, the law approved by representatives of Shura Council is the basis of decision making in the new theory, and the laws will be binding on everyone, even on the Caliph.

Although the identity of the Shura Council body is not agreed by Muslim thinkers, some acknowledge its position as the Sharia community of influential thinkers and scientists, recognizing it as a consultative position rather than binding proposition. Some scientists, however, do not see representatives of Shuara Council as the members of the Sharia community, but as the representatives of the masses and public opinions. Hence the position of Shura is held for that matter and the laws approved by them are considered binding (Kowsarani, 1996).

3. Reducing the power of rulers: given that Muslim Sharia encompasses the whole human life (either private or public) and the old caliphate theory accedes to the necessity of caliph intervention in all human affairs accordingly, caliph's political sovereignty is not reduced to the public sphere, as there is a small authoritarianism for the ruler in the new theory. Hence there is no room for rulers to meddle in the private sphere of people, yet his sovereignty is reduced to the constitution and its requirements (Feirahi, 1996).

However, contrary to the old theory of caliphate that sees no time restriction for the caliphate of a caliph, and presumes it to be permanent, in that issues like the decline of justice and rationality poses no obstacle in his permanent caliphate (Maverdi, 1986), sovereignty in the new caliphate is reduced to a certain time specified in the law and without a lifelong property.

Moreover, in this theory the institutionalized and structural supervision is more thoroughly applied to the ruler and his conduct, in the sense that the members of the Sharia community (Ahali Hel-o-Aghd) can dismiss him and assign another person to this position in the event of violation of Sharia and law or the abuse of power (Rashid Reza, 2013).

Critical analysis: although the theory of new caliphate has disallowed the inclusive author based on the theory of old caliphate in the political participation arena due to the democratic approach, letting the masses and political elites to participate, what the approach of political participation in this reading of democracy, advocated by Sunni community, has impaired is that in the theory of new caliphate the legitimacy of the state just like material political systems is attributed to the people and is devoid of a divine approach in spite of using the traditional components of Faqih (Islamic jurisprudence) such as Shura, Bay'ah and Ijma (consensus), yet in this theory some inter-religious components were used and justified to associate the theory with the Islam by maintaining democracy as a requirement for the current age, because this reading of a democratic order is not a genuine and indigenous reading attributed to the fundamentals of Islam, but it is an updated approach to political order that calls for its development in Muslim societies by upholding Western democracy models. Accordingly, the notion of the new caliphate should be regarded as the upshot of the problems in the Ottoman Empire until the time of its disintegration (Lamoush, 1982), which laid down the new caliphate by underpinning such ideas relative independence of religion from politics and secularism, though it remained pessimistic about the political theory of the old caliphate.

The hatred against the Ottoman's past sparked a wave of the globalization of state, modernity, and psychological and epistemological tendency of the Arabs for the theoretical foundation of the victorious civilization of the West, which were held to be the three major causes that called for a historical revision in the jurisprudential ideas of caliphs (Kawsarani, 1996).

Second: political participation in the order of constitutional monarchy

Given that the political order of the monarchy, as a special individual sovereignty over the destiny of people in society with regard to law, enforcement and jurisdiction, has often ended up with despotism, scientists have reduced the scope of rulers' power to the enforcement of laws in an attempt to protect society from sultans' autocracy, apart from recognizing their sovereignty, and attempted to involve people in political processes by allowing people representatives to legislate and fair judges to arrive at a verdict.

The change of approach from monarchy to constitutional monarchy in Iran is more reliant on environmental conditions of king autocracy and requirements for dealing with kings than political theorists, which was accomplished in the beginning in response to the tyranny of Western rulers and introduced in Muslim nations after a while. Thus, many scientists strived to elaborate on this new system and in response to the despotic monarchy. In the same vein, some jurisprudents attempted to come up with a proper understanding of the concepts geared to religious teachings and draw up treatises based on religious principles on the achievements of modern state and its participation components in reaction to the circumstances of the time, besides reconsidering the new order and its pillars and components such as constitution, separation of powers, parliament, people's position, freedom, equality, etc. (Hosseinizadeh, 2010). Instead of the despotic monarchy, they suggested constitutional monarchy (with a focus on the reduction of ruler's power domain to law and public opinion.

Allameh Naeini, one of the main theorists in Constitutional Revolution, believed that the utility of the Islamic system is contingent upon the observance of divine laws, denouncing sultan's absolute governance and non-binding attitude toward governance based on the interests of citizens and the fulfilment of their rights as unpleasant governance. In this regard, he utilized such religious concepts and teachings as "Amanat" (trusteeship) and "Wilayat" (Guardianship of the Muslim) (Hosseinizadeh, 2010). He also emphasizes the need for administration's binding to law and supervision and rulers'

accountability for their behaviors and dismisses tyranny and autocratic governance as unpleasant (Zargarinejad, 1995).

Certain capacities of a constitutional political order associated with political participation are reviewed in a nutshell in accordance with the norms of political jurisprudence:

1. Governance by law (constitution): political participation based on the law in constitutional theory is in the spotlight because rulers govern a society in a despotic manner in monarchy order and in the administration of the state consider their own benefits and those of their relatives more than the interests of society. Similarly, constitutionalists uphold the centrality of law and believe that law override sultans' conduct. However, despite the advocates of constitutional order, they accentuated the limitation of power as the backbone of the new system. Many scientists like Sheikh Fazlullah Nouri believed that constitutional order makes rules conventional and detached from Islamic doctrine, and maintained, as declined the use of laws based on human mind in society by denouncing human rules as Western souvenirs and the order of modernity, that if one thinks that the requirement of the era is to change some of the provisions of the Divine Law or can serve as its supplement, such a person is outside the purview of Islamic belief (Zargarinejad, 1995).

Thus, jurisprudents who are constitutional adherents made an effort to reconsider the nature of Sharia laws, shared some part of case law in the administration of society, and declared for Islamic teachings (Naeini, 1999). Accordingly, as the parliament cannot legislate laws in cases where there is an explicit religious law in the Sharia, it is possible to legislate laws in cases Sharia has not decided on with the advice and the vote of the majority of people's representative. Therefore, these rules, which have been forged on the basis of the demands of the time, can be modified in certain circumstances and in accordance with the views of the people's representatives. Similarly, as the parliament ceases to legislate against the Sharia, there is no prohibition on the laws which are not a religious forgery and are approved

by the Majles (Naeini, 1999). In addition, as for the validity of the vote of the majority in the lawmaking, we can refer to the principle of Shura and the life story of Ahl al-Bayt (AS) and the hadith by Umribn al-Hanzaleh (Naeini, 1999).

Accordingly, the constitution, besides limiting the power of tyrant rulers and delegating state powers to the people, has paved the way for the maximum participation of the elites and elected individuals in decision-making and participation of the masses in political activities in a coherent and legal fashion.

2. Freedom: the diversity of the perception of freedom in the new order has led to the establishment of two basic readings of (proponents and opponents), as the source of the disagreements can be traced to the lack of a real understanding of the modern notion of freedom and political participation.

On the one hand, freedom in its traditional sense has been underscored in the personal affairs of people as well as in social affairs, and the lack of trust of constitutionalist thinkers attempting to consolidate Western values and Western rights of political order for Iranian society, on the other hand, have led some jurisprudents to disagree with the newly emerged notion of freedom and denounced its project as a plan for abolishing Islam and downplaying it in the administration of society (Turkaman, 1983).

On the other hand, some jurisprudents supporting constitutional system have interpreted freedom to its denotation in the context of political participation in order to eliminate tyranny and involve people in their destiny, declaring it to be a rational property and the prerequisite of Islam by attributing the legitimacy of the freedom to Islam (Zargarinejad, 1995). In the same vein, the researcher Naeini (1999) believes that freedom consists in nation protector's refusal to enslave people under his arbitrary will and his refusal to involve men of wisdom in equally sharing power with the ruler. By referring to verse 55 of Surah An-Nur and the words of Imam Hussein, liberty has been interpreted as freedom from the enslavement of tyrant rulers and attainment of liberation.

It is natural that this perception of freedom and its reference to religion in the form of a constitutional order has brought a wide range of political participation to citizens and can expand the level of public participation, involving them in their own destiny and in the process of large-scale decision-making.

3. Equality: Although the denial of discrimination and special privileges to specific individuals are accepted in any society, advocates of legitimate constitutional system, by disavowing the new reading of equality, failed to endure the equity intended by intellectual constitutionalists, on the one hand, and argued against it according to Islam's point of view (Turkaman, 1983), in response to the reading of equality generalized to all human beings regardless of their religion and other discrepancies (Turkaman, 1983), but, by contrast, some jurisprudents who agree with the constitutional monarchy, by understanding the new circumstances and the necessity of overthrowing tyranny, consider the revision and reconstruction of the modern concept of freedom in accordance with religious concepts and within the framework of religious discourse and acceded to the sameness of the laws of Sharia for everyone.

In addition to acknowledging the forgery of laws in relation to different situations, Allameh Naeini (1999), declared the principle of equality for all citizens in all laws to be the requirement of disagreement with the ruling of reason, and at the same time construed the inequality of guilds and special groups as what is confirmed by all regions.

It is evident that equality suggests fairness to citizens against the law, which is valid with all its features and presumed to be the axis of state's administration. Hence this sense of equality takes on a political-legal approach, and any abuse or discrimination by those in power in society will be negated with regard to the equality of the people in society against the law, and the lack of the privilege that upholds the supremacy of certain individuals or groups over others.

In the process of argumentation about the legitimacy of the notion of

equality, Allameh Naeini (1999) construes equality as the basis of justice and the spirit of all political laws, postulating the necessity of Islam for not allowing anyone to violate it.

It is obvious that this reading of freedom encompasses a wide range of political participation for citizens, in that not only the sultan is devoid of any special privilege and required to be accountable for his conduct, but everyone in society also has a vote and the agents of the system are elected and representatives by the people's votes.

4. Principle of the separation of powers: separation of powers, which implies the administration of a state in three branches - legislature, judiciary, and executive - and delegation of its administration to top three institutions versus Sultan's initiatives for administrating the state, was taken off as a subject by a philosopher called Montesquieu in the aftermath of the medieval authoritarian order and the necessity of the limitation of rulers' power, and after a while became the axis of political order in modern societies and brought about a lot of capacities in the political participation arena. As a result, in the constitutional era it was heralded as one of the constituent elements of the constitution system.

The scientists' adherents of constitution, besides reconsidering the principle of separation of powers, accentuated the use of it in the structure of political system, contending that it draws on the doctrine of Sharia for the administration of society rather than the prescription of Western culture; that is to say, it aims at limiting tyrant rulers. They also believe that as the infallible Imams' holy laps is inaccessible (Naeini, 1999), and hence the lack of the legislature power of the incorruptible innocence, the least power in limitation should substitute for it. And this substitution suggests the disintegration of state power (Naeini, 1999). In light of the disintegration of state power and the reduction of incumbents' position, we can limit political power.

Consistent with the legitimacy of the principle of separation of powers, Allameh Naeini associated the principle with the history of Islam and the

teachings of the Sharia, as well as with human history (Naeini, 1999).

It is apparent that the acceptance of separation of powers and delegation of some powers to people and their representative has provided an inclusive capacity for the political participation of the masses and the elites, reducing the dominance and authority of a tyrant ruler.

5. Parliament: according to constitutional political power, people's representatives, on the one hand, play a part in the process of decision making and they are required, on the other hand, to take an influential role in the supervision of system agents' performance. The two influential duties of people representatives have given rise to the establishment of an institution called parliament, so that people with their representatives are able to fully carry out these two tasks.

Despite the fact that legislation has been traditionally taken over by jurisprudents as they were accountable for the legal needs of society, and the establishment of parliament stripped them of legislation power and delegated it to the representative of people, who had no specialized understanding of the Sharia, many jurisprudents, adherents of constitutional system, besides reconsidering legislation in a political system, took account of Shura (consultation) as a component of jurisprudence, and set a specified domain of legislation for people representatives in the parliament, as well as maintaining the monopoly of lawmaking for the Sharia (Zargarinejad, 1995). According to this, by separating conventional affairs from the Sharia, it is incumbent on the National Assembly to legislate laws in conventional and non-religious affairs, as well as recognizing the reference to jurisprudence in the Sharia laws (Naeini, 1999).

Conversely, while the acceptance of the vote of the numerical majority of Majlis representatives is set down as the most important requirement for parliamentary approval, the supremacy of a numerical majority has never been regarded as a truth condition among the Shia. However, in an attempt to illustrate the legitimacy of the reference to the opinion of the majority of Majlis representatives and bring the category of parliament, as a Western

topic, closer to the concept of Shura, as the best component of political participation in Shia Jurisprudence, Naeini reiterated the reconsidering of Shaira teachings, coming up with some points like preferring the vote of the majority, modifying some narrations and preserving the system (Naeini, 1999).

It is apparent that accepting parliament in political system and setting the vote of the majority of the people representatives as a benchmark have provided a vast range of political participation for people, ensuring a vast domain of people's rights to political participation for the political system. Nonetheless, in elaborating on the special task of parliament, in addition to its position of lawmaking, Naeini took account of its supervisory position (Naeini, 1999).

Critical analysis: although constitutional theory managed to abolish the theoretical foundation of tyranny and provided plenty of capacities for the elites' political participation in decision making, administration of society, and political participation of the masses in different domains of political system by limiting sultan's power, it referred many modern components of political participation such as separation of powers, election, parliament, freedom and the like to jurisprudential foundation. Thus, it is evident that in every political theory two pivotal problems are concerned; "legitimacy of state" and "its efficiency in society. Accordingly, the theory needs to be construed as plausible, essential and legitimate with respect to prior justification, in the sense that ruler should not ac as the usurper of the government office. Conversely, the theory should be in such a way that it can effectively fulfil its special task in society and demonstrate a good efficiency. However, apart from its failure to prove its legitimacy inclusively in society and among thinkers, the theory of constitutional monarchy has failed to practically limit sultan's autocracy and bring about legitimate freedom for people.

Therefore, though it offers citizens a good capacity for political participation, the theory makes it difficult to use its participatory strategies with regard to its flaws and challenges, because;

First: the theory is not based on Islam according to the views of thinkers advocating constitutional system, and it is at odds with its fundamentals as Adamiat puts it, regarding the nature of constitutional monarchy and its conflict with Islam, "the notion of freedom and the principles of constitutionalism and democracy system stem from neither Sharia nor the innovations of Mullahs, yet constitutionalism is based on the opinion of people sovereignty. Such a political philosophy was in conflict with the foundation of divine and unchangeable Sharia laws" (Adamiat, 1976, p. 227). However, the theory is not a genuine and ideal viewpoint of the Shia but it is just a system that constitutes a relative utility for abolishing tyranny, in accordance with the view of jurisprudents advocating constitutional system, because the design of the constitutional theory was not interpreted by its theorists as the authenticity and legitimacy of the political system, but instead it is equivalent to despotic and outrageous system due to the lack of a possibility for achieving a desirable system and relative utility (Naeini, 1999).

For this reason, the jurisprudents against constitutional system not only expressed their disagreements with the theory, but they practically took issue with it and denounced it as an anti-Islamic category. Thus, with the lack of an inclusive confirmation and legitimacy of the theory, the foregoing components concerning political participation are virtually devoid of authenticity, and ultimately it has an effect approach to the limitation of tyrant rulers' power, which could have been a plausible theory in order to evade the problem of autocracy in society. As it is not naturally an ideal view of the Shia, it works well under certain circumstances and requirements of the time.

Second: the version of the political participation suggested in this theory is not only consistent with the desirable mode of a political system, but also the structure of the political system is not aimed for the reinforcement and efficiency of the administration of the Islamic system in conformity with the main norms of the Shia, yet the structure is appropriate to limit sultan's political power. Thus, as opposed to the desirable system of the Shia at the time of the Occultation in that all powers of the Islamic system are reliant on

the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist and strive to come to the aid of it to work in political system more efficiently. In the constitutional order, the legislature and the judiciary have a religious and popular approach to the realization of affairs like administering justice, negating oppression, negating the enforcement of non-Islamic rules, and limiting or supervising tyrant sultan's power.

Third: political participation in religious democratic order

Although some scientists in the political arena, while upholding the origin of democracy in the West, have set the inclusion of "religious" provision for "democracy" down as victimization of democracy and its pillars and components, and some of those who are acquainted with jurisprudence and Islamic though believe that the failure to use democracy in Islamic history accounts for the non-authenticity of religious democratic theory, and contend that democracy comes with presuppositions in the Western culture none of which is in agreement with Islamic thought (Hashemi, 1997). However, it should be noted that the use of democracy in the religious system does not suggest an approach to instrumental and eclectic (benefitting from its advantages in the system in conformity with Islamic law) use, but instead it consists in religious resources and teachings and has its root in the life story of the Messenger, Imam Ali, and Imam Hassan (PBUH) (Khamenei, 1983).

Despite the fact that the adherents of "religious democracy" theory have come up with different ideas about its nature, we can encapsulate these ideas in two basic readings;

On the one hand, some believe that a blend of these two terms is due to the combination of two main pillars of the system. That is to say, "democracy" indicates the shape and form of a political system, and "religious" condition suggests the position of religion as the content of system and the origin of its rules. In this regard, Imam Khomeini holds that "Republicanism" is the legal form of a system and is determined by people, and is reliant on the majority of people, as "Islamism" implies the content of the state, and the laws of Islam are interpreted as comprehensive religion and

the axis of the laws of society (Khomeini, 1999). On the contrary, some scientists believe that the compound term "democracy" has a non-compound concept, as the blend of the two words is due to an attributive compound rather than a genitive compound; therefore, democracy has a religious approach and its origin is traced back to Islamic teachings rather than to the Western system (Izedehi, 2015).

According to this, the theory of religious democracy is referred to Islamic teachings, and yet it is not indebted to Western democracy. However, Islam itself has come up with a reading of democracy, which is different from its Western instances, and is immune to its flaws as it enjoys the privileges of democracy.

"One should not be mistaken; this democracy is not certainly linked to the roots of Western democracy. First, religious democracy is not two things; it is not true that we borrow democracy from the West and pin it to religion so that we can have a complete set; no, this democracy itself belongs to religion" (Khamenei, 2000). It is evident that people as the backbone of political system have a fundamental contribution to the legitimacy of the Islamic system according to the rationality of religious democracy. In the same vein, according to the theory of divine appointment, a legitimate system cannot ever be actualized unless with the presence of people, and Ayatollah Khamenei has accordingly introduced the position of public vote and opinion as the basis of legitimacy application and the survival of political sovereignty, stressing the combination of two basic elements namely religion and people in the realization of religious democracy:

"Some consider people's vote to be the basis of legitimacy; at least it is the basis of applying legitimacy. Without the people's vote, presence and the realization of their will, the tent of the Islamic system cannot and will not stand" (Khamenei, 1999).

According to this, consistent with the narrations that stresses the necessity of divine appointment of rulers and dismisses a ruler who is not concerned with divine appointment as Taghut, there are narrations in the Shia's references that emphasize the necessity of gaining people's

satisfaction and consider the governance of agents unfavorable unless in the light of citizens' satisfaction. Among these narratives, the appointment of leader is undertaken by the General Council, the muhajirun and the ansar as well as people' election, which means Allah's pleasure (Nahj al-Balagha, Letter 6). The reasons why Amir al-Mu'minin (AS) accepts caliphate are encapsulated in three factors, two of which are associated with public determination and will. And Imam Hassan (AS), in a letter to Mu'awiyah, attributed his guardianship to people's election, as well as illustrating his divine rights to be an incumbent of the state (Majlesi, 1984).

The series of narrations maintain that governance should be taken over by people, and people satisfaction with the ruling of rulers will gain Allah's pleasure as well (Izedehi, 2015). It is obvious that democracy from Islam's desirable point of view suggests delegating governance to people not in an absolute manner, but it means an indigenous order based on the fundamentals of the Islamic system, in line with people's political participation in the political structure of society; that is to say, "democracy" and "religious state" are two sides of a coin and emphasized equally.

The capacities of political participation in the religious democratic order: the rise of the Islamic Republic of Iran, apart from the blessings that it has had in action and the development of spirituality and Islam in the world, has brought about a new form of political order (in the form of religious democracy). According to this, in addition to searching for the origin of the legitimacy of political system certainly in religious governance and divine criteria, the reference of the divine legitimacy of political sovereignty by divine appointment is not a barrier to the reference of the system to people, and hence people in different stages of state administration (election, support, and supervision of ruler) assume a real and influential role, and the divine appointment of ruler is not a barrier to the democratization of political system as well as the need of ruler's accountability to people for their action and performance.

This reading of democracy sets the theory of Guardianship of the Islamic

Jurist down as the basis at the time of the Occultation, despite the fact that it enjoys modern components in political system just like the theory of constitutional monarchy, as well as denying the passive approach to the political orders of Western societies and compliance with them. However, it cleverly used the components in the process of their inferences and in line with their efficiencies in the democratic form of political system in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The reading of the democratic system involves certain requirements relative to the participation of political elites in decision-making and more inclusively the participation of people in electing agents, supervising their conduct, and protecting political system against the dangers and attacks of enemies. Since it has inclusive capacities for political participation, some part of them will be addressed:

1. The laws of the Sharia have been implemented and institutionalized in society, in the form of the constitution that the Mujtahids elected by people drew up and people gave their vote.

2. The law is the same for all, as people can participate equally in their fate, everyone is equal before the law, and any discrimination and injustice toward individuals are prohibited.

3. As per the 19th principle of the Constitution, "the people of Iran from any tribe or clan shall enjoy equal rights, as color, race, and language and the like mean no privilege". Yet, according to Article 107th of the Constitution, the Supreme Leader, as the highest person in the political system, is not excluded from this principle: "The leader is equal to the laws with other people in the state".

4. Political sovereignty is taken over by those who are competent and possess attributes such as knowing religion, dispensing justice and possessing wisdom, instead of being referred to a race or color or clan. However, the legitimacy of ruler in this system is not dependent on the above attributes but on their survival, in the sense that when ruler commits a sin or unjust action, not only he deserves to be dismissed from power, but he will also be inevitably dismissed from his position.

5. "If a jurisprudent does something contrary to the standards of Islam, i.e. "may God forgive" he violates the Islamic law (Fasiq), he will be automatically discharged from the state" (Khomeini, 1998, p. 61).

6. Political sovereignty of religious democracy holds ruler and administrators accountable for their actions, and people also monitor administrators' actions, so they need to take a decent and timely position according to "enjoying good and forbidding wrong" and fair criticism.

7. "If I have tilted my foot, you are responsible, because if you don't tell me why you tilted your foot, you need to step forward, and do not let it happen and say why? …The nation must forbid wrong, and enjoy good" (Khomeini, 1999, pp. 487-489).

8. As a pivotal institution in the system of religious democracy, the parliament involves people's representatives who are responsible for legislating, budgeting and overseeing the administration of the country (Principles 62, 65 and 71 of the Constitution).

9. The Islamic system's agents, having proved their qualification in the process of election, are assigned to governmental positions directly or indirectly by people. It is obvious that they are held accountable for their actions to the people's representatives in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and Majles representatives can impeach the ministers for their conduct (Article 89 of the Constitution).

10. The people's representatives in the Islamic Consultative Assembly have the right to investigate all affairs of the country in order to oversee the country's affairs (Article 76 of the Constitution).

Critical analysis: Although many of the political capacities mentioned in the constitutional political order can be seen in religious democratic order, the scope and variant of political participation in religious democracy are not only incomparable to the constitutional order, but also to other democratic orders, because:

First: given that the source of the political order comes from the religious

teachings of Islam, the democracy proposed by the political order is not derived from its Western variant as it is reliant on the fundamentals of genuine Islam, and the scope of people presence, reference to their vote and opinion, and the relation between Islamism and democracy should also be sought in the texts of religious teachings. However, the use of participatory strategies based on Western societies can be considered following a reconsideration of their reference to the Islamic fundamentals.

Second: the political participation developed in the political order is built on the ideal order of the Shia at the time of the Occultation, the participatory behaviors of the elites and the masses are in agreement not only with the supervision of power but also with the efficiency of the Shia's political system, apart from all pillars and structure of the political system that fit under the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist Institution. Thus, referring to people in a religious democratic system is not a matter of urgency and desperation in the form of secondary rules, but it is a matter of the belief in the necessity of people's political participation, which is built on a legitimate justification and the political life story of the Ahlul-Bayt (Family of the House) (AS).

Third: the simultaneous look of Islam at religion observance and democracy have led the flaws and weaknesses of both democracy and theocracy to disappear from the religious democratic system, foregrounding the advantages and privileges of the two systems in this desirable system.

"The democracy is the most prominent type of democracy that the world have ever seen, because it is within the framework of divine laws and guidance. It is people's choice, but a choice that managed to follow a right path and direction by heavenly laws devoid of any defect" (Khamenei, 2001).

Fourth: people' political participation in political system is not only a right for them to demand their own rights whenever they deem it necessary, but it is an obligation that people have to participate in a political process and become involved in their fate and effectively enter the political space according to the Sharia (Khamenei, 2002).

Conclusion

There are a variety of readings of democratic order in the Muslim world, which enjoy greater capacities for political participation than a constitutional order in terms of structure, law and purpose, and can ensure the interests of society much better. However, the various readings of democracy in the Muslim world have fundamental differences regarding political participation, due to their reference to different foundation and approaches in terms of authenticity, scope and reference to religious foundation. Thus, with the principle of new caliphate theory which is much indebted to the modern requirements of the Sunni community in the wake of the fall of the Ottoman Empire and prominent presence of democracy seeking in the world, not based on the genuine teachings, the Sunni thinkers proposed a reading with reference to religion, rather than based on religion, of democracy, apart from reconsidering Islamic texts that refer some Western components of an democratic order to religious teachings.

However, the constitutional monarchy theory was built on the modern requirements of society in order to abolish rulers' tyranny, and the utility scope of the theory can be assessed at the level. Thus, although the Western components used in the theory are referred to religious fundamentals on the part of some jurisprudents, the theory has been introduced as a strategy suitable for a specific time and in the form of a secondary law rather than an authentic view of the Shia on a desirable political system. Thus, the strategies proposed by the political theory just adhere to the restriction of tyrant sultan's power. Despite the reference of the components of the political system to religious teachings, we cannot interpret it as a system developed from religion. In other words, as we can consider it to be a system referring to religious teachings, we cannot view constitutional monarchy order as a religious system.

The theory of religious democracy, instead of being interpreted as a revised version of democratic systems and being in agreement with the Islamic requirements or as a modern requirement for the issues concerned by society, is seen as a revised and updated version of a desirable Islamic

system which, in addition to being developed from authentic religious teachings, utilized Western components as emerging problems in the process of Ijtihad. The theory, besides providing an indigenous reading of these components in the Islamic system, offered an alternative version of the readings of democracy order, which benefits from efficiency in the administration of society, as well as referring to religious fundamental and teaching. However, in addition to profiting from the advantages of similar political orders, it is not affected by their flaws. That is, the reading of democracy has the advantage that it can be rebuilt in every nation and society in accordance with their local capacities and cultures, and can offer a distinct reading and steer the structure of world order toward democracy together with prosperity and justice. Introduced as "religious democracy" in religion-oriented countries and "natural democracy" in non-religion-oriented countries, the theory, besides assigning priority to people' prosperity and interest over their will because of the understanding of society thinkers and intellectuals, is endowed with the maximum participation of people in social-political events, and this can earn material and spiritual interests of people and ensure their prosperity and well-being, in light of leadership, guidance and supervision by elites and intellectuals.

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The Status of Imagination in Avicenna's Political Philosophy

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Abstract

Undoubtedly, Avicenna is one of the most outstanding intellectual and cultural characters in the Islamic civilization. Though the stand of Avicenna is somehow clear in areas such as metaphysics, natural sciences, logic and other disciplines, there is little consent regarding his political philosophy. The present study aims to observe his reflections on politics from a new perspective, i.e. studying Avicenna's political thought in the context of his oriental (or eastern) philosophy. To do so, the paper demonstrated that instead of following Peripatetic philosophers who regard politics as a subcategory of practical wisdom, he intended to derive his political thought under the subjects of prophethood. This was the reason that the subjects such as speculation (Hads) and imagination in Avicenna's political philosophy drew significant attention. Hence, we can say that in his extensive framework the political philosophy is converted from a rational-civic knowledge to a cosmic imagination-based wisdom. From this perspective, we can assume that not only he was the precursor of Sohravardi but also influenced a significant portion of Iranian intellectual history based on a unique system of wisdom.

Introduction

Avicenna helped wisdom reach its pick in Islamic civilization and compile. Accepting the Peripatetic classification of philosophy to practical and theoretical, and division of each of them to three subcategories and setting this classification as the base for authoring his philosophical encyclopedias, Avicenna initiated an evolution in composing philosophical compilations influencing the whole history of Islamic philosophy afterword. Avicenna's encyclopedias, including Shifa, Isharat, Nijat, 'Uyun al-Hikma, and Alaei Encyclopedia lack a part allocated to the practical wisdom. On the other hand, he has authored short treatises some of them may include political implications. However, there is no independent political treatise left from him that the ascription of which is certain. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the philosophical reflection of Avicenna doesn't miss implicit political implications, on the contrary, consideration of which, especially around the investigation of so-called Oriental Wisdom, is stressed. The main concern of Avicenna just like many other thinkers and authors of his era is making reconciliation between the classic philosophical tradition and revelatory teachings. Such a concern manifests itself in Avicenna's political writings, and that is because just like Farabi, he established a firm connection between politics and prophethood while implicitly trying to avoid some of the obstacles that Farabi was facing as a result of his philosophical reflection, and coming up with solution.

One can view the political subjects raised in Avicenna's compilations from different perspectives and derive different results appropriate with the methodological approach. The present study addresses some of the aspects of political philosophy in Avicenna's compilation from a specific point of view. Here, we strive to stress the place of Avicenna in the history of Islamic-political philosophy in which discussion of imagination is the focus. The scheme for compiling the prophetic philosophy initiated by Farabi who also attempted to explain the phenomenon of prophethood and its relation with philosophy and politics by extending the functions of imaginative faculty, especially in his well-known book, the Opinions of the Citizens of

the Ideal City. The present study claims that Avicenna's reflections should be viewed within the framework that Farabi established, and after Avicenna, Sohravardi continued with compiling illuminationist Philosophy. Avicenna's role as a philosopher who extended Farabi's reflections and addressed two important subjects of "speculation" (hads) and "imagination of celestial souls" (nufus-e falaki) is of great importance. As such, he paved the way for Illuminationist philosophy whose the "imaginal world" was a pivotal concept.

Therefore, in the present research, we investigate the place of imagination in the Islamic-political philosophy by stressing the role of Avicenna and his venerable position. Our main question is that: "what role and position Avicenna's thought plays in the history of political philosophy in the Islamic world and especially in Iran?" This question is of great importance due to the reason that many have found Avicenna without any political stand, or they have softened his political image assuming it as an imitation of Farabi's reflections. From the perspective of the present study, the answer to this question is that Avicenna's political reflections should be studied as a subdivision of his theology and prophetology. His most important involvement in the history of political thought was studying on metaphysics of imagination which started by Farabi and reached its point by Sohravardi. Meanwhile, Avicenna has played an important role in the continuation of oriental wisdom. Since political philosophy in Islamic civilization focuses on revelation and prophethood, the concept of imagination has had clear political manifestations in the Islamic intellectual history.

The present study is based on a phenomenological approach and especially a narrative that Henry Corbin gives on this school of thought in the sense that he addresses the phenomenology of imagination in Islamic civilization. However, it is worth noting that it is fundamentally different from the attitude of Corbin from the perspective of the political dimensions of prophethood and imagination. That is because Henry Corbin pays little attention to the political and civic dimensions of imagination and concerns himself with the internal logic of evolution and ways of its extension in the

Islamic civilization (Wasserstorm, 1999).   Nevertheless, the present study pays special attention to the political results and requirements of the metaphysics of imagination. Muslim philosophers from Farabi to Mulla Sadra have all been involved in continuing the scheme which could be considered as a passage through Greek philosophy and compiling a kind of oriental wisdom. According to the phenomenological viewpoint of Corbin, from the era of Farabi forward, this scheme has become richer and the dependency of Iranian philosophers to Greek philosophy has lessened. This way, Farabi extends the discussion of imagination though limited to Aristotelian Islamic psychology, and adds new tasks to it. Setting forth the discussion of the imagination of celestial souls, Avicenna takes another step towards extending metaphysic of imagination, and ultimately, Sohravardi completes this pattern by proposing the discussion of imaginal world. The present study aims to put Avicenna's discussion of imagination within Farabi and Sohravardi's perspective. To derive important political results from that, we investigate in more details, Avicenna's role in the history of political thought in Iran.

In this paper, first, it will be discussed the place of politics in Avicenna's view and his classification of wisdom. I will also demonstrate how gradually Avicenna establishes a special position for prophethood and Sharia as independent political discipline while reviewing and revises the Greek classifications in this regard. Then, I will focus on the discussion of prophethood and imagination by Avicenna. In the end, I investigate some of the political results of the discussion of oriental philosophy set forth by Avicenna.

The Position of Politics in the Science Classification

Classification of wisdom into two subcategories of theoretical and practical and maintaining secondary branches of mathematics, natural sciences and metaphysics for theoretical wisdom and ethics, economics (household), and politics for practical wisdom was a peripatetic teaching, influenced by Aristotle's writings which could be seen in the compilations of philosophers

such as Farabi and Miskawayh Razi. But Avicenna established it and made it the base for authoring his philosophical encyclopedias. He maintains politics into two subcategories of monarchy and prophethood after pointing to this classification in the treatise fi aqsam al-ulum al-aqliah (Ibn Sina, 1989). Although Farabi stressed Sharia, he never considered it as a branch of political knowledge. Rather, he classified it in the books such as Kitab al-Milla under the category of political knowledge or civics. From this perspective, we can say that Avicenna was more influenced by Abulhassan Ameri who recognized political leadership consisting of two principles one of which addresses prophethood and the other concerns monarchy (Ameri, 1989). Here Avicenna, as scholars such as Leo Strauss (1995) nomoi as expressed by Greeks. This perception is fully addressed in the book the Oriental logic in which an independent discipline is specified for Sharia while dividing the practical sciences into four sorts of knowledge, instead of three (Ibn Sina, 1982).

Hence, for the first time, Avicenna adds tashri' (religious jurisprudence) to the triple practical sciences, recognizing it as science from God. Although Avicenna and Farabi have different ideas in this regard, they share political conception of prophethood which is an important result of what has been called "prophetic philosophy". In Avicenna's opinion, the prophet should rule all creatures because he is the best of them (Ibn Sina, 1989). Sharia plays a fundamental role in the political-prophetic philosophy, yet there exist diverse opinions among researchers about the nature of Avicenna's political perspective regarding the concept of Sharia. Some believe that his political perspective is influenced by Twelver Shi'a (Seyyed Rizvan, 1984). On the contrary, another group regards him as a theoretician of the Islamic caliphate and political theology of Sunni Muslims (Murad, 1999,). These groups both investigate "Sharia" within Islamic scholastic theology (Kalam) and jurisprudence (Fiqh) and seek to find its roots in one of the Islamic denominations. Among all, Mohsen Mahdi's interpretation which is influenced by Leo Strauss shares a specific conception of Sharia in connection with the political perspective of Muslim philosophers. Strauss and Mahdi argue that these philosophers

perceived Sharia within the framework of Platonic principles in a way that authors of Sharia (who followed Caliphate) believed and not in its literal meaning. Avicenna argues that the advantage of civic wisdom lies in the awareness about the practice of the involvement among individuals for cooperation in the secular interests (مصالح الابـدان) and in the ones associated with survival of mankind (Ibn Sina, 1989). This argument is consistent with the Greek old definition of politics and different from Farabi's definition which stresses attaining virtues and taking the right path to permanent happiness (paradise). That is why some researchers put realism of Avicenna in front of Farabi's idealism (Galston, 1979). According to Muhsin Mahdi, Avicenna here combined an Aristotelian teaching with Islamic Sharia. He believed that human wisdom can only deal with incorporeal entities, while politics is not the arena of wisdom. In the temporal life of humans, the soul is intermingled with the body and secular obsessions and as a result, tendencies of the soul such as passions, emotions, and fantasies play a crucial role in politics. Muhsin Mahdi believes that in Avicenna's view, Sharia takes charge of circumspection of all the factors affecting soul (self) and takes care of the fact that soul and body are associated and intermingled (Mahdi, 1998). Classification of politics under the category of Sharia which is specified in some of Avicenna's writings should be understood within this framework and based on that one can explain some of the contradictions in Avicenna's political thought. However, this interpretation still leaves an unanswered question that why Avicenna has addressed political subjects within the domain of and as a subcategory of theology (in theoretical philosophy), rather than practical wisdom (Ibn Sina, 1984b). That is why some scholars argue that Avicenna has paved the way for the demise of political philosophy in the Islamic world by raising the political subjects within the domain of theology and theoretical wisdom (see: Tabatabaei, 2005).

Imagination and Prophecy

Farabi struggled to come up with a philosophical explanation of prophecy and its relation to ideal city in his various political treatises. The brief

explanation of Farabi in his book Ideal City created the notion that he considered the position of philosophy higher than that of prophethood since a prophet associated with active intellect through his imaginative faculty while a philosopher associated with it through his rational faculty. From the perspective of Peripatetic philosophers, the rational faculty enjoys a higher position in the hierarchy of faculties of soul. Avicenna has struggled to solve this problem in his study of prophecy and present a different philosophical explanation of revelation. Farabi regards the mustafad (acquired) intellect as the highest rank of human faculties, using which the philosopher can connect with the active intellect and receive the intelligible truths (Farabi, 2003).

As such, Avicenna argues that prophecy is connected not only with the rational faculty, but also with its highest rank, to the active intellect and hence the prophet has been distinguished from all human beings and found supremacy over them. To explain the features of this faculy, Avicenna deals with the concept of hads or speculation, for the first time. "Speculation" is the highest rank of the human knowledge and the evolution of which is the prerequisite for the sacred intellect. Avicenna argues that speculation is a matter finding out about the middle term of the syllogism, without education and in a short time, the reason for which is the extraordinary readiness of mind to connect to the active intellect (Ibn Sina, 1985). Some scholars argue that this concept is derived from Aristotle's Posterior Analytics (Ziaei, 2006). Before Avicenna, Farabi recognized speculation as one of the characteristics of the ideal ruler (Farabi, 2003). However, Avicenna believes that hads is the most important characteristic of the first ruler and not one of his traits. Here, the point is that according to Avicenna, hads enjoys degrees and ups and downs, and humans make different uses of it, given that the sacred intellect takes the highest rank of it (Ibn Sina, 1990). This point leads us to one of the most important teachings of Avicenna which is of significant importance for studying the intellectual history in Iran. Unlike Farabi and his Peripatetic precedents, Avicenna perceived that connection to the active intellect is possible for all of the humans (Morris, 1992). Avicenna explains that humans connect with intelligible worlds according to their intellectual ranks and their

speculation. As such, unlike Farabi, he argues that connection with the active intellect is not limited to prophets and philosophers. This theory includes a kind of connection between the human and intelligible world as well as a belief about a kind of universal wisdom which affects ulterior intellectual doctrines and especially mystical thinking.

However, prophet possesses two other features besides speculation: the ability to capture the nature and perfection in imaginative faculty (Ibn Sina, 1985). Avicenna stressed the first one for the first time as a feature of the prophet to explain their miracles. Nevertheless, discussion about the imaginative power of the prophet draws more attention in the present paper and we should investigate it more closely. Prophet, in Avicenna's view, possesses perfection in both faculties of reason and imagination. It is due to the faculty of imagination that the prophet reveals the absent and missing things with details just the way that veridical dreams connect with this faculty. Before addressing this subject, we should refer to the study of soul in Avicenna's chapters devoted to nafs (human soul) in his well-known Physics of Shifa. Avicenna's conception is somehow consistent with Aristotelian psychology according to which, the spiritual faculties of soul, among which imagination, are common between humans and animals. In the psychology of Avicenna, imagination has two primary functions, maintaining the sensible forms and manipulating them. However, like Farabi, Avicenna designates some tasks to this faculty that Aristotelian psychology doesn't approve of them. For this reason, some researchers have discussed a kind of bifurcation and ambivalence in Avicenna's conception of activities of imagination (Jambet, 1983).

Avicenna argues that if soul is released from sensory obsessions, it will go beyond itself and its bounds. In this manner, sometimes the imagination takes sensible forms from intellect and makes them consistent with common sense in a sensible form and this is another function of imagination which is the same as illustration and imitation. This way, the rational faculty receives the truth from the active intellect and transfers them to the imagination. While sleeping, since human is released from the senses, the imaginative faculty transcends, and this is why veridical dreams occur for the individual.

However, the imagination of some people is so powerful that they can receive these forms and details even when they are awake. That is the quality or level that Avicenna refers to as prophecy specific to the imaginative faculty.

However, it seems that Avicenna sought to explain the process of prophethood, not only in imagination, but also in the rational faculty at least for resolving the ambiguity in Farabi's work regarding the superiority of philosopher over prophet. He did not, however, dismiss the rational faculty, regarding it as an important trait of the prophet with this explanation that unlike Farabi, he realized it was directly connected with the active intellect. One of the deficiencies to Farabi's study of prophecy was that he believed in a connection between imagination and the active intellect, though there was no significant relationship between them. Avicenna solved this problem from the point that he believed that prophecy was connected to the sacred reason with imagination serving it. Connecting to the active reason, the prophet receives general truths through his rational faculty. Also, he receives details through his imagination by connecting to the celestial souls. Avicenna's theory, however, suffers from some deficiencies in explaining the prophecy. These deficiencies have resulted from the lack of consistency of Aristotelian and Peripatetic principles with the prophetic wisdom. That is because the functions of imagination in Aristotelian philosophy cannot account for prophecy and revelation. Avicenna, however, states that prophet possesses the knowledge of general truths (through the sacred reason and fair speculation) and the knowledge of details of present and future (through connection with the celestial souls).

The important point here is the emphasis on the celestial souls. According to old physics, every minor event in nature is subject to the effects of the changes in celestial objects. The celestial souls have their own imaginative faculty, and therefore they perceive details. Assuming imagination for celestial objects is the idea of Avicenna which was not proposed before him. For instance, Farabi believed that celestial objects only had rational faculty (Farabi, 1996). Avicenna argues that all the minor events of the past and the

future are consistent with the celestial souls (Ghazali, 1985) and if human soul is relieved from worldly obsessions it can connect with it when sleeping or awake (in the case of prophecy) and be aware of the details. This perception of Avicenna influences his prophetic philosophy and political thought. That is when the foundation of an "Iranian" philosophy is provided by Avicenna, as Henry Corbin mentioned (Corbin, 1991). That is a philosophical system appropriate with the Islamic-Iranian civilization and based on a radical criticism over the Greek philosophy. Devising the Illuminationist wisdom by Sohravardi, which was the revival of Iranian ancient wisdom of light, reached its highest quality, changing the trend of the history of the Islamic philosophy.

Oriental Philosophy and Illuminationist Wisdom

One can sense from Avicenna's work that he sought to compile a new philosophical system which was has been called "Oriental" Philosophy or wisdom. The most important evidence in this regard is the pioneering introduction of Avicenna in the book The Oriental Logic that some researchers believe it was part of a more detailed treatise. In this introduction, he expressed that he has authored most of his work for "the ignorant of philosophy that were fond of Peripatetic philosophers" and insisted on Aristotle's failures. He argues that it is not far from reality that sciences have come to us from non-Greeks (Ibn Sina, 1984a). In the case of this oriental wisdom and its nature, no consent exists among scholars and sometimes different interpretations are proposed. In the Western Islamology, this topic was stressed especially with the article (published in 1925) authored by Nalino, an Italian orientalist. Nalino demonstrates in his detailed article that Avicenna attends the geographical east rather than the symbolic and spiritual east as intended in Sohravardi's Illuminationism (Nalino, 1980). Contrary to this argument, Henry Corbin believes that the oriental wisdom should not be investigated in its geographical meaning. Corbin states: "Avicenna and Sohravardi's perceptions of east share common features in a way that both perceive it in its real meaning which is a metaphysic phenomenon and not

geographical one" (Corbin, 1971, p. 29). Corbin also believes that "undoubtedly, Avicenna was the first who intended to compile the oriental teachings which were different from Peripatetic philosophy. However, since he didn't have access to the original principles, he failed to realize his scheme." (Corbin, 1971. p. 28). He maintains that Avicenna's most important works in wisdom are his symbolic (or allegorical) treatises. Referring to some of Avicenna's works assigned to Orientalists, Sohravardi himself does not recognize him as an Oriental philosopher (Sohravardi, 2002). Those who proclaim that Avicenna recognized east in its geographical meaning, maintain different opinions about east and west. However, there are implications in Avicenna's work which approve of both geographical and conceptual perceptions of the east (Gardet, 1951). There is no doubt that the oriental wisdom that Avicenna discusses is different from the one maintained by the contemporary Peripatetic scholars. It associates with a scheme that Iranian scholars followed to review and criticize the Greek philosophy. The most important part of this scheme is emphasis on imagination and its extension. We can also investigate Avicenna's oriental wisdom in the same framework. His oriental wisdom which can be considered "prophetic wisdom" is based on a new perception of imagination. The scope of Aristotle's psychology and the quality of the imaginative faculty didn't allow Avicenna and Farabi to explain prophecy and religious-spiritual phenomena as they should. Hence, Avicenna stepped further to take out imagination from the monopoly of the human's faculty and extended its boundaries to include celestial souls. In the light of this fundamental evolution, the phenomena such as the prophet's knowledge of future details and seeing the angel of revelation find an appropriate explanation. Some of the ancient philosophers like Ibn Rushd have also found oriental philosophy associated with Avicenna's opinion of the souls of celestial objects (Ibn Rushd, 1965).

Hence, to better understand the political implications of oriental wisdom, one should resort to the history of Iranian thought and its evolution path. From two distinct points of view, the implications made by two contemporary scholars who had investigated the subject with different

backgrounds are worthwhile. First, we should refer to Henry Corbin who intends to regard Avicenna's oriental wisdom associated with Sohravardi's Illuminationist wisdom, and refers to its key concept as "imaginal world". All Avicenna's recitals take place in this world; therefore, in this regard, he is the precursor of Sohravardi (Corbin, 1954). Corbin, however, based on Sohravardi's evaluation, specifies that if Avicenna had access to the oriental origin as well as the perspective of Khosrawani wisdom, his oriental wisdom would be more complete. Corbin is the most outstanding scholar who stressed the Iranian dimensions of Avicenna's thought. Though his discussion as mentioned before, doesn't address the political dimensions or implications of this intellectual system, it is of importance in other aspects. Corbin argues that Iranian identity has continued throughout the history by resorting to the imaginal world as the most important factor. Meanwhile, Avicenna plays an important role. He presents a philosophical explanation of imagination and narrates his experience of involvement in this world in his recital treatises in a symbolic format. Hence, according to Corbin, Avicenna is undoubtedly the base for the Iranian thought and identity which later appeared in the works of Iranian great mystics and poets such as Hafiz, Attar and Einoqozat.

Nevertheless, Mohammed Abed al-Jaberi, the contemporary Arab thinker, presented a new interpretation of the oriental philosophy of Avicenna. He investigates the oriental philosophy in a much more extensive way than other researchers, regarding almost all Avicenna's treatises devoted to it. He argues that the oriental philosophy in Iran is influenced by Avicenna's specific attitude to the souls of the celestial objects, which are assumed to have sense and imagination. According to al-Jaberi, unlike Farabi who was the philosopher of reason, Avicenna is the philosopher of spirit and soul seeking to make a connection between human spirits and divine world. This connection takes place only with the help of celestial spirits. Therefore, human happiness is bound to the connection between celestial souls. al-Jaberi writes that:

> The point that the celestial objects assume sense and imagination in

addition to rational faculty- as Avicenna argued so means that they are a mediator between God and the world below. They affect us by the imaginative faculty, meaning that they constantly connect with us and express their love towards God by their rational faculty, consistently being connected to him (al-Jaberi, 1993, p. 166).

al-Jaberi argues that with this idea, Avicenna paved the way for spiritual conception of philosophy- the way that Sohravardi discovered which was led to Hikmat al-Isharq. He observed that Iranian scholars were seeking a system of wisdom that was on the one hand in line with the teachings of Muslim theologians and on the other hand different from the Greek philosophy. This oriental wisdom that imagination is a pivotal element of which is intermingled with Iranians' historical consciousness. al-Jaberi called this a kind of "ethnic ideology" which reflected the Iranian "unhappy consciousness." However, he believes that this ideology is concealed in Avicenna's philosophical system and one cannot easily perceive its political intentions. In al-Jaberi's view, this ideology is rooted in Iranian irrationalism and ethnicity which is latent in the philosophical activities. He even believes that the irrationalism in the late Islamic civilization is the result of Avicenna's philosophy and not Ghazali's attacks to rationality.

It is true that Farabi, Avicenna, and Sohravardi established the same scheme in which imagination is a fundamental element. This scheme was the product of criticizing and reviewing Greek philosophical foundations and establishing a new spiritual system of wisdom. The important point that both above-mentioned scholars agree on despite their differences in principles and results is the Iranian nature of Avicenna's oriental wisdom. al-Jaberi's attitude in assigning the ethnic ideology to Avicenna is just an exaggeration. However, it seems that at least he has accepted Avicenna's role in shaping the Iranian identity. Therefore, we should assume this ruling system with important political results. The first important result is the continuation of prophethood in a philosophical and mystical form which was discussed in some of Avicenna's treatises. Since prophethood is assumed to have political

features in Islam, and the Islamic political philosophy has been a sub-category of the topic of prophethood, one cannot be indifferent to political implications of Iranian oriental wisdom.

Conclusion

The present study investigates the role of imagination in the history of Islamic political philosophy stressing Avicenna's thought. Unlike Greeks who paid little attention to imagination assuming it only limited to literature and art, Muslim scholars had distinctive care for it. Islamic philosophy, as demonstrated by some of the researchers, was a kind of prophetic wisdom in which imagination took a significant place because it explained the process of revelation and the connection of the ideal ruler with superior worlds. In other words, the same role that the world of ideas played for Plato's ideal city, the world of imagination played for the Muslim philosophers' political wisdom. Therefore, we can suppose imagination as one of the most important subjects in the Islamic-political philosophy. Farabi is the first philosopher who took measures in theoretically compiling on the area of political imagination. However, Farabi had more or less accepted Aristotelian psychology, based on which, imagination, firstly, was a material faculty and secondly in quality lower than reason, and this psychology didn't allow imaginative faculty such extent of development. Hence, Avicenna dealt with devising the concepts of "sacred intellect" and "speculation" to resolve the obstacles that Farabi's prophetology faced. In Avicenna's perspective, also imagination is regarded as a political subject due to the political perception of prophecy.

We should seek his most important innovation in his assumption of celestial souls having imagination. According to his epistemological theory, humans get to know the generalities and details by connecting to the active intellect and celestial spirits, respectively. The point here is that unlike Farabi, he didn't suppose connection to superior worlds limited to prophet or philosopher. In Avicenna's view, celestial souls acted like mediators

between the sensible world and intelligible entities. As such, Avicenna paved the way for ontology of imagination in Sohravardi's Illuminationist wisdom, making oriental wisdom to take a significant step forward. This conception holds extensive political dimensions marking a significant part of the history of political thought in the late Islamic civilization, especially in Iran.

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Transcendental Theosophy and Political Science

An Introduction to the Possibility of Basing Political Sciences on the Concept of Transcendental Theosophy

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Keywords

Abstract

Is it possible to use transcendental theosophy and the fundamental doctrine of Existentialism for the sake of political science? If Philosophy is to be a basis for the guidance of political science, then how is it possible for transcendental theosophy to carry out this crucial task? The present paper aims to explore how political science uses transcendental theosophy's doctrines. The claims that we cannot utilize transcendental theosophy's doctrines directly in political science. However, transcendental theosophy can provide philosophical models of political Science. The way of exploring this claim is a documentary method with comparison and contrast. Its results can be utilized to specify how Political Science uses transcendental theosophy, Political Theorizing, and Philosophical Epistemology. The results can be used to specify the relations between knowledge and excellence as well as between theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom. It is useful on the structure of Knowledge in Humanities and the construction of Social Reality too.

Introduction

Is it possible to use transcendental theosophy and the fundamental doctrine of Existentialism for the sake of political science? Existentialism means that the reality of the world is its existence. Objectivity, hence, is described based on that. According to this notion, existence is something that exists outside of the mind and does not belong to anything else (Oboudiat, 2013). Hence, objectivity is the existence of objects in the outside world. The outside world versus the subjective world refers to the notion that the human mind first understands what it interprets inside and then using this subjective picture, gets to know the object outside the mind and calls it objective reality. Islamic knowledge is a realist type. Hence, transcendental theosophy explores the objective and outside reality. Now the question is that whether social sciences and particularly political science has an objective reality in a way that could be investigated using objective principles. Three notions exists here: First, political reality has an objective being and therefore exists outside of the mind and hence transcendental theosophy cannot explore such matters. The second notion states that political reality is among established affairs that are created based on human needs but transcendental theosophy does not apply here despite political affairs being among established concepts. The third notion states that political reality is among established concepts and hence is placed outside the concept of transcendental theosophy. But this does not mean that we cannot use transcendental theosophy for political reality. To explore this claim, it is necessary that we investigate the two previous notions first. At the first step, the nature of political reality will be explored so that we can explore the applicability of transcendental theosophy in this reality. Then, the how-to of it will be the center of attention.

A. Political reality typology from the viewpoint of transcendental theosophy

How is political reality made? How is the existence of things such as government, civil society, political parties, and generally the political life?

How are they related to existences referred to in transcendental theosophy? To find answers to these questions it is necessary that we explore the typology of existences from the viewpoint of transcendental theosophy and then the type of political reality will be determined.

1. Typology of Existences

If we are to look at the world from the viewpoint of transcendental theosophy, then we can separate the three types of existences in accordance to the existence possibility theory: First there are existences that take place outside of the mind; Second, there are existences that do not take place independently outside of the mind but their existence is reliant on another existence; And last but not the least, there are existences that do not take place outside of the mind at all (Alipour & Hasani, 2011). Taking into consideration that social affairs like other existences are explored and analyzed using concepts, hence, to refer to the first type of existences, we can use the concept of first-hand rationales (Haeri Yazdi, 1982) that are concepts in the mind that have objective equivalent outside of the mind. Concepts such as human and 'animals' are in this group that refer to existences which take place outside of the mind. To refer to the second type of existence, we use second-hand philosophical rationales and abstract concepts. These terms generally mean such subjective concepts that do not have an objective equivalent outside of the human mind but take objective reality due to their matters in the outside. Concepts such as fatherhood, childhood or upper, lower are among these concepts. Although these concepts do not have an equivalent outside of the mind, take abstract reality by the relations between two people or the location of things; two people or things that have objective reality outside of the mind. Finally, to refer to the third type of existence, we use concepts such as social credits or absolute credits that mean subjective concepts that are used in contract-based relations of people and are arisen due to social needs and advantages of people. In brief, we can distinguish among three types of existences: Objective existences, abstract existences, and credit existences. But which existence does political existence relate to?

2. Political Existence Typology

The first step to judge whether we can use transcendent theosophy to evaluate political affairs is to determine the nature of political existences. In other words, the state of political reality will be explored from the viewpoint of being existent outside of the mind (Mesbah Yazdi, 1989b). It is necessary to explain that political existence is part of credit existence and credit existence is a type of existence that practical wisdom has created to fulfill social needs (Hasani & Mousavi, 2016). We can refer to three ideas regarding political existence: The first is the idea that categorizes political existence in absolute credit existence type. The second is the idea that categorizes political existence in abstract existence and finally the idea that categorizes political existence in objective existence type. It is worth reminding that the three stated ideas do not specifically belong to political existence but generally belong to credit existence. However, the author focuses on political existence in this part.

2.1. Objectivity of political existence

The first idea that could be mentioned about the typology of political existence is the idea based upon one of the claims put forward by Zia al-Din al-Iraqi (also known as Mohaqeq Iraqi) who was a preacher in the Qajar era. He has mentioned the idea of objectivity of credit existence in two books entitled 'Maqalat Alosoul' (al-Iraqi, 1993) and 'Nahayat Alafkar' (al-Boroujerdi al-Najafi, 1985). Iraqi has another notion regarding typology of credit existence based on which he says that these existences are abstract. Hence, they will be placed in the second type of the typology of the present paper (al-Naeini, 1989). However, based on the first notion, after categorizing the reality into the three said types, Iraqi calls the recently said type the established type that are created by social norms. Hence, he believes that credit reality should have a contract-based source. Despite this idea, as Iraqi believes, the said realities no longer possess a contract-based reality after going through the stage of establishment and becoming stable but they get an outside reality like objective reality in a fashion that their continuation does not rely on their agents of establishment. From Iraqi's viewpoint, although there is controversy

over the existence of credit affairs, this difference of opinion stems from correctness or incorrectness of the contract creating them not the existence of credit affairs per se (Alipour & Hasani, 2011). For instance, based on Iraqi's viewpoint, difference of opinion regarding the existence of government does not mean doubt over existence or non-existence of it but rather doubt over considering that government legal; a doubt that stems from legitimacy of that government based on international norms.

According to the notion of the objectivity of political existence, these types of existences have the exact same features as the objective existence. Objective existences are those that take place outside of the mind. This means that the said existences are those that fill the world outside of the mind (Oboudiat, 2013) and due to this have real consequences (Hasani & Mousavi, 2016). However, as the author believes, political existences lack some features of objective existences. Political existences lack occurrence outside of the mind in both the stage of creation and after that. This is because realities such as "government" and "political institutions" do not have outside substantiation in a fashion that we cannot say these realities fill some part of the "outside world" of the mind. Moreover, political existences do not have an independent essence in the outside world. However, political existences like objective existences have real consequences in the outside world. Basically, the reason behind the creation of these existences is to fulfill the real needs of humans. In brief, the notion of objectivity of political existences is not justified and hence Transcendent theosophy cannot study them.

2.2. Abstractness of Political Existences

This idea is the second notion that could be mentioned regarding the typology of political existences. Muhammad Taqi Mesbah believes in this notion and has put forward his theory in the three books entitled 'Talighat Bar Nahayat Alhekma' (Mesbah Yazdi, 2014), 'Teaching Hekmat' (Mesbah Yazdi, 1989a), and 'Society and History from Quranic Viewpoint' (Mesbah Yazdi, 1989b). According to this view, ethical, social, and political affairs as well as the law

do not possess objectivity because concepts referring to these things do not have an equivalent outside of the mind. Despite this fact, they have been borrowed from real and objective matters (Ta'lighat Ala Nahayat Alhikma, 1985).

> "From the viewpoint of Mesbah, ethical and social affairs do not belong to substantive matters, this is to say that they do not have an objective equivalent. For instance, the concept of thief, though it refers to a person, it actually refers to somebody who has stolen something from somebody; thus, it refers to the value and money stolen, hence gold. However, if we infer it as something that is desired by human for their needs we can see the point here. Moreover, the money that belongs to somebody refers to another concept namely property which does not have an objective equivalent. That is, by assigning owner to a person and assigning owned to gold, no change is made to either the person or the gold" (Alipour & Hasani, 2011, pp. 136-137).

According to this, political and social existences are abstracted from the human existence and his needs. These realities are related to objective realities and are not limited to social and individual desires of people. Hence, they are placed in the realm of causal rules.

Alipour and Hasani call political and social realities abstract realities and state that:

> "In fact, what we mean is that social and law-related concepts are not substantive rationales whether they are essential or accidental (accident in philosophy) but do not belong to credit concepts either" (Alipour & Hasani, 2011, p. 139)

In the explanation of this excerpt we can say that Islamic clergy has categorized the realities of the world into three groups: First is objective reality (that is referred to by substantive concepts such as human), second is abstract reality (that second- hand rationales of philosophy such as 'cause' refer to), third is rational reality (that second-hand rational concepts such as material refer to them). Substantive concepts are abstracted from objective realities without much contemplation. For instance, the concept of human is abstracted when seeing the name 'Ali', this is while two other concepts need

contemplation because realities related to these two concepts do not exist outside of the mind. Hence, political existences do not take place outside of the mind and do not fill any space in the world but this does not mean that they are non-existent. Islamic clergymen believe that second-hand philosophical rationales have a kind of existence reliant on substantive realities. In other words, as Mesbah believes, a concept such as government refers to a reality whose existence takes place beside the existence of humans.

According to this notion, political existences do not take place independently in the outside world and hence lack an objective equivalent in the world outside of the mind. However, they are not totally separated from these realities because the source of abstract existence creation is the real and unreal needs of humans. This is because of this objective trace that they are considered real and objective (Mesbah Yazdi, 1989b).

> "Social and law-related concepts are those that are abstracted from real outside sources and are within the realm of causal relations. In fact, real human needs and developmental affairs that humans consider when they wish to reach prosperity are the ground for abstraction of such concepts and because these grounds such as human needs are real and developmental, concepts that are abstracted from them are also real. However, they are not like substantive concepts but like second-hand abstracted concepts; this means that second-hand non-rational rationales are similar to second-hand philosophical rationales. Hence, they have an outside dependent existence that depends on the source of abstraction (or in other words, outside concrete existence) and due to this do not change by difference of taste" (Alipour & Hasani, 2011, pp. 139-140).

According to this, political existences are objective despite lacking an outside equivalent but their existence is concrete and takes place beside objective existences. Hence, it is clear that the lack of outside taking place does not mean being non-existent. There are realities that take place alongside independent realities. Moreover, political existences have real results and consequences because they can fulfill human developmental desires.

As the author believes, to judge whether political existences are concrete or not depends on an analysis of the mechanism of political existence abstraction from objective existences and human needs. In other words, first it should be specified that whether the abstraction of a reality such as government from the needs such as security and well-being is like the abstraction of the concept 'upper' or lower from the relations between 'sky' and 'earth' or not. Hence, here we should compare the mechanism of abstract concepts abstraction and the how-to of concrete existence creation from independent existence to the mechanism of political existence creation.

Muhammad Hussein Tabatabaei and Motahari have explained the mechanism of concrete existence creation and second-hand philosophical concepts in the fifth article of the book 'Philosophical principles and realism methodology'. According to their explanation, the said concepts are created by the mental comparison of an objective existence to itself or to another objective existence. Motahari explains that "concepts such as existence or non-existence, integrity or plurality, necessity or possibility, are all found after 'carrying something on something' and when the relations between two things is established" (Tabatabaei, 2006, pp. 58-59). This mechanism is conducted after theoretical science turns into practical science and at least two facets of objective existences are brought in the memory (Tabatabaei, 2006). Hence, concrete existences are created that take place alongside objective existences. Essential and concrete beings have an outside taking place despite the existence of two beings because concrete existences need an essential existence to take place (Tabatabaei, 2006b). In brief, concrete existences and second-hand philosophical concepts depend on objective existences. According to the idea of political existences being concrete we can say that it is possible to study political science from the viewpoint of transcendental theosophy because political realities would be under the realm of the world rules and principle and are analyzed by wisdom.

To answer the question that whether political existences are concrete and second-hand or not, it is first necessary to analyze credit existences and concepts.

2.3. Absolute credit-bases of political realities

This idea that political realities are credit-based is accepted by philosophers such as Muhammad Hussein Tabatabaei (2006), Morteza Motahari (Tabatabaei, 2006), and Mahdi Haeri (1982). According to this notion, political affairs are unreal existences that do not exist outside of the mind.

Hasani and Mousavi explain the unreal aspect of credit concepts:

> "Credit concepts are unreal concepts […]. The force of illusion always comprehends affairs that firstly are 'meaning' not 'face' and secondly do not have any real side outside of humans or animals, that is do not have objective realities whether it be dependent or independent. Hence, credit concepts are not tangible and objective but meaning-based and subjective. Credit concepts are created based on real meanings with the source of objective matters […]. This does not mean that credit concepts have a source of abstraction in the outside but rather the human mind creates these meanings based on real meanings obtained from the world outside. This creation creates another type of constancy in them; that is they are not optional […]. This feature refers to the human imitation at the stage of practice in the real world because as Allameh Tabatabaei believes humans create these meanings from the meaning obtained from objective matters. Generally, credit means that the definition of something is passed to another affair […]. This means a kind of patterning or the transfer of features from somewhere to another place just like what happens in a metaphor" (Hasani & Mousavi, 2016, p. 120).

When comparing this idea to the idea of political concepts being abstract, it is clear that the present idea calls the realities that were discussed in fact a result of the force 'illusion' and not wisdom. Via the mechanism of borrowing, objective existences features have been created for this type of concepts. The idea of political existences being credit-based calls the mechanism of the emerging of these existences a 'practice of trope'. This is while, as said, according to the idea of political existences being abstract, the mechanism of the said existences emergence is the practice of 'comparison.' Trope is the use of a word in the meaning that is not the main meaning. For

instance, in the sentence 'Ali is a lion' trope is used because lion is used in the sense of 'brave'.

Motahari believes that in order to avoid the wrong usage in trope, the trivial meaning should have the trace of the meaning that is central (Tabatabaei, 2006). Because lion and Ali are both live entities, hence the word lion can be a good fit to replace Ali.

Metaphor is a type of trope in which the force of imagination assumes a word (lion) to be an adjective of another word (for instance Ali) and then ascribes an adjective (such as having glory or being strong) to the first word (lion) (Hasani, 2011). If the speaker assumes Ali to be strong, in the process of metaphor, this strength is ascribed to lion and the speaker says 'lion is strong'. In this sentence 'lion' is a word that has been borrowed from the meaning 'a brutal animal' and has been used instead of the word Ali because the speaker has assumed Ali to be brave like a lion and he has seen fit to assume the lion is Ali because of this braveness.

As Hasani and Mousavi believe, the notion of political existences being credit-based specifies the establishment structure of the said existences (Hasani & Mousavi, 2016). According to this, humans consciously make and create affairs and matters only to fulfill their political needs. The reason behind creating these existences is to fulfill these needs and provide a ground for humans to survive in their political lives. The said existences are created in a virtual process despite having real results in life. To obtain this, the human mind calls the needs and status that cause the political survival the source of the borrowing process and then creates a set of concepts from the said status and needs. For instance, the human need of security compels him to find the best man in the society for security matters and assumes his status as the relationship between the head and the body in the process of trope and calls this person head of the society or in fact the king. The mind ascribes the importance of head (the survival of the whole body) to the said person and ascribes importance in regard to the survival of political existence to his being. Next, the mind has this ability to make this 'king', which has a real

existence the trope for another entity (such as the government) and then call the government the head for the society (that is important to keep a living thing live) and pass all the features a king possesses to a government (Hasani, 2011). Hence, it is not possible to use transcendental theosophy in studying political existence because these political concepts not only do not have an equivalent in the outside world but also (on the contrary to the last viewpoint) it is not possible to imagine a dependent existence for them. Now, when all three ideas about political existences are clear, which one this paper favors?

2.4. Conclusion to the discussion

After discussion about the typology of abstract and credit concepts and existences thereof, now it is time to answer the question that whether political existences are concrete and abstract concepts or not. To find the answer it is necessary that we refer to the emergence of theories, principles and political concepts by the scholarly society who have been active in political and social sciences. As the author believes, the content creation in social and political sciences shows that the said science has been created and spread via the mechanism of concept to concept borrowing and not by comparison of concepts to one another. This means that the way social and political academia operate in fact verifies the idea of political existences being credit-based.

An investigation of theories, approaches, and concepts in the realm of political and international studies verifies that political existences are credit-based. 'Decision making theory' (Bashiriyeh, 2001), rational choice theory (Hay, 2006), games theory (Bashiriyeh, 2001), coalition theory (Bashiriyeh, 2001), interchange theory (Bashiriyeh, 2001), neo-realism theory (Hay, 2006), and neo-liberalism theory (Hay, 2006) have all borrowed their concepts, approaches and patterns from economy and math. In the same way, behaviorism theory tries to create the principles of political behavior according to observable experimental patterns (Bashiriyeh, 2001) while old essentialism and new

essentialism on the contrary to political behaviorism have built their doctrines upon historical and law realities but not on the present order (Hay, 2006). If we continue to wander in theories and doctrines of political and international science, we see that some of the teachings of political science and international relations have objective credit-based sources. For instance, 'systemic analysis' is borrowed from exact sciences (Ritzer & Goodman, 2011) and cybernetic attitude has borrowed from the mechanism of brain as an automatic system (Bashiriyeh, 2001). Besides what was said up until now, there is another set of theories in political science and international relations that have been obtained from trope-based interventions of the imagination force in other credit realities. Realism theory (Hay, 2006) with benchmarking from Thomas Hubs' natural status notion, mass selection theory (Bashiriyeh, 2001), and spatial models (Bashiriyeh, 2001) have borrowed their teachings from Jeremy Bentham's benefit authenticity pattern; and groups' theory has borrowed from Manchor Olson's individual well-being pursuit. As can be seen, the theories referred to up until now include a vast range of credit existences that have been obtained from the mechanism of metaphor. The author believes that if another set of international relations theories are not referred to, it would not be possible to prove his claim. Two theories of "constructivism" (Hay, 2006) and "postmodernism" (Hay, 2006) are what the author intends to talk about. The former takes its root from borrowing from shared perception patterns of humans to infer the meaning of other's behavior. This is while the latter theory, on the contrary to constructivism theory, has an anti-rational superficial approach and tries to use the criticism of Aristotle rationale of postmodern scholars such as Bourdieu for the foundation of postmodernism theory in international relations.

In brief, the investigation of how scholars in political science and international relations operate shows that the emergence and spread of political science and international relations has been due to borrowing from substantive, abstract and credit concepts and not comparison or evaluation of objective existences with themselves or to other objective existences. This

means that political existences are part of credit realities and concepts and hence cannot be in the realm of theosophy (Haeri Yazdi, 1982). But the crucial question in this paper is whether we can use transcendental theosophy (that looks at the outside taking place of existence) to explore credit existences and if yes, how is it done? Hence, we shall explore the answer. In so doing, we will see the relations between objective realities and credit realities.

B. The relations between objective existence and credit-based existence

Political affairs are realities that do not take place in the world outside of mind whether it is independent (objective and substantive existences) or concrete (abstract concepts). But as it was mentioned earlier, political existences are created because they fulfill some internal needs of human beings. Hence, it would seem that there are relations between political existences and objective ones. How is this relation? Two different answers can be found among contemporary philosophers that follow:

1. Relations between objective existence and political existence

Some Muslim philosophers have affirmative answer to the question of whether there are relations between political existence and objective existence. But their answer is not based on one philosophical foundation. In other words, those philosophers that believe in the idea of political existences being concrete explain the relations between objective existences and political existences differently than those who favor political existences being credit-based. Philosophers such as Muhammad Taqi Mesbah who believe that social existences generally and political existences specifically are in the typology of concrete and abstract concepts. Hence, the relationship between political existences and objective existences is like other abstract concepts and objective existences. It was said earlier that the mechanism of the emergence of concrete existences and abstract concepts is in fact the act of comparison. This is to say that the human mind, to know an objective

existence, compares it to itself or another objective existence. This is via this process that the mind gets to know new realities and its unknown becomes the known. According to the teachings of Islamic philosophy, the mind finds a face (picture) after having an encounter with an outside reality. This picture is called mental or subjective existence. Because the relations between this mental picture and the outside reality is a real relation, hence the outside reality relation with itself or other outside realities is the same relation between the mental picture and itself or other pictures that exist in the mind. Hence, the mind, to know an objective reality, compares its picture to itself. The mind, in this process of comparison, is in pains to find one of the four of the following between the two mental pictures: epenthesis, necessity, contrast, and parity. This relation manifests the real relation between outside realities that the said pictures refer to; because the existence of mental pictures is the same as the existence of realities. The human mind, sometimes, does not need the intervention of other pictures to find one of the four types of relations between mental pictures. In this case, there is going to be a direct relation between the two pictures and hence two objectives outside realities. However, if there is the need that a third mental picture be present so that a mental picture could be connected to another mental picture, in this case, the relation between the first objective reality and the second outside reality is made possible via the third outside reality. Hence, a real relation between objective realities in the outside world is uncovered (Tabatabaei, 2006).

The relation between abstract and concrete concepts and to other objective realities is like the relation between objective realities to one another because concrete realities are somehow related to objective realities and because of that possess outside taking place. In fact, this very process of taking place causes them to have the four relation types of necessity, contrast, parity and epenthesis. Those who believe in the political sciences being concrete claim that political concepts such as government, parliament,

and the political system have real referents outside of the mind and due to that are considered real. In fact, the emergence of the said concepts in the mind is via those objective realities and these realities are real referents for those concepts. Due to this real relation between political concepts and objective realities various kinds of real relations have existed between objective realities among political concepts and realities; and the principles of logical deduction is operational in regard to them. The necessity to this matter is that political science could in fact be explored and studies from the viewpoint of transcendental theosophy.

2. The lack of (or impossibility of) relations between objective existences and political existence

Philosophers who favor the notion of political existences being credit-based such as Muhammad Hussein Tabatabaei, Motahari, Mehdi Haeri and Abdollah Javadi disagree with Mesbah's idea regarding the existence of real relations between objective existences and political ones. They do not call political existences the real referent of objective realities. According to the idea of political existences being credit-based, the said concepts become referents for realities only in the framework of imagination. The reality of 'credit' that has been regarded in the notion of political existences being credit-based, is that the mind extends the objective reality referents based on motivations in the life and then assumes other concepts as the referents of those realities (Tabatabaei, 2006). But it is worth reminding that the imaginary nature of the said concepts does not block them from having real consequences because according to epistemological teachings of Islamic theosophy, the human essence has first been 'sheer talent' and in fact is like a white sheet that no picture has been drawn on it. This white sheet first comprehends trivial sense-based realities and then reaches mass logical realities according to its special mechanisms (Tabatabaei, 2006). All the trivial or general realities in the mind whether real (adapted to a reality outside the

mind) or abstract (that is, taken from an outside reality) or credit (that is, imaginary referent of an outside reality) or 'error' (that is, not adapted to an outside reality) have all become connected to outside realities. So, political existences should have been taken from substantive or abstract concepts so that they can connect to objective realities of outside. In brief, political concepts and realities are connected to realities outside of the mind with adaptation from real and abstract concepts. Because of this they have real consequences on the human life (Tabatabaei, 2006). If the idea of lack of relation between objective realities and political realities is accepted, then it is not possible to study and explore political sciences directly from the viewpoint of existentialism and transcendental theosophy.

3. Conclusion of the Discussion

According to the notion of 'originality of being' what really constructs the world outside of the mind is objective existences that take place and reside outside of the mind of humans. These existences fall into two groups regarding to their type of taking place and residence: First is objective realities that emerge in the mind with substantive concepts and second is concrete existences whose picture is called abstract concepts. Abstract concepts refer to existences whose being takes place alongside objective realities outside of the mind. But instead of the two said existences, there is also established existences that emerge in the mind as credit-based concepts. Their feature is that they do not take place or reside in the outside world neither in an independent way nor alongside other objective realities and therefore they cannot have a real and objective connection with the two sets of outside realities. However, human beings' needs of these realities and the real consequences that the said realities have in meeting the needs of humans shows that there is a type of connection between established realities and the earlier abstract and concrete realities because the human mind is structured in a way that cannot create credit concepts even in the framework of

imagination without connecting objectively to realities that take place and reside outside of the mind. Hence, the claim of the present paper is that established realities that include political existences can be studies carefully with the viewpoint of originality of being.

Conclusion

An attempt was made in this paper to explain the things that the subject 'originality of being' could entail for 'political sciences'. In so doing, we tried to explore the typology of political affairs at the beginning of the paper and clarify whether it is possible to study and explore the matters in this science with the viewpoint of originality of being. To do so, it was explained that the concepts used in all the human knowledge and hence realities in the world fall into one of the three categories of substantive concepts (that are the mental picture for objective realities), abstract concepts (that are the mental picture of concrete existences), and credit-based concepts (that are the mental picture of established existences).

The results of the study illustrate that in the viewpoint of a minority of Muslim philosophers the things that are dealt with in this science are abstract concepts and hence political existences are part of concrete existences. However, an investigation into the activities of academia of political sciences and international relations shows that the process of political knowledge creation such as abstraction of political existences is not among concrete realities but their scientific work proves the opinion of some other Muslim philosophers who believe that political science issues are in the typology of established existences that do not possess outside of the mind taking place or residence. Hence, these matters cannot be studied or explored with the subject of originality of being because established existences can be referents for objective existences and concrete existences only in the framework of the mind. Only in this way could they obtain dependent and independent taking place and residence in the world outside of the mind.

Hence, political sciences cannot utilize transcendental theosophy in a direct manner. In fact, concepts and principles of this philosophy are borrowed and utilized in political sciences.

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The Expediency of Kingdom in Iranian Political Thought

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Keywords

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Abstract

The concept of expediency is an important and common concept in the history of political thought. Viewing the political legacy remained from ancient Iran and drawing an analogy of which with the literary works remained from the Islamic era, one can perceive that "expediency of the kingdom" is a central concept in the Iranian political thought. Also in the Islamic era and by translation of Iranian works, this concept was reflected in Siyasatnama which resulted in expediency-based politics. Given the history of Iranian political thought, the present article investigates the place and the role of this concept by giving an account of it. The results of the study indicate that in Iranian thought, expediency of the kingdom is not an abstract concept and can be applied to anything that has contributed to the development of the kingdom, spreading of knowledge, increasing the power and credibility and stability of the state.

Introduction

The concept of the expediency of the kingdom is among the key concepts in the Iranian political thought which is compared with the concept of the public interest in the western political thought and the concept of the expediency or interest of the system in the modern political thought. The root of this concept is traced back to the era of Sassanid political thought and the Islamic era, also by reviving the idea of ideal kingdom, it was raised within the theory of Islamic hierarchy. The present article raises this question that, what were the place and role of the concept in expediency of kingdom in the Iranian political thought in the ante-era of Islam. To reply to this question, we can claim that the expediency of the kingdom is the central concept in the Iranian political thought as it not only connects the ancient era with the Islamic era, but also organizes other related concepts, and based on which we can make a perception of the surveilling political thought in this era. This concept includes implications such as the public interest and the interest/expediency of the system in the modern ideology and meaningfully systematizes the desirable political system, restricts the power scope of the ruler and presents a criterion to avoid the autocracy and improve efficiency. In this regard, we first explore the dimensions of this concept in the Iranian ideology before the emergence of Islam, and then investigate how it was transferred into the political thought of the Islamic era in the light of Siyasatnama. In the end, we examine the criteria and solutions on the identification of this concept within the idealistic-Shahi theory and Islamic hierarchy.

Fundamental position

Among the set of concepts in the Iranian political reflection, the concept of the expediency of the kingdom is assumed to be the most fundamental. Just like the ancient Greek political thought in which the concept of public expediency is the central axis which draws the desirable political system, and also the ruling principles which play an important role (Aristotle, 2015), it plays the same substantial role in the Iranian political thought. As mentioned

in Dehkhoda dictionary, the expediency of the kingdom includes whatever that the interest of the country and the expediency of the kingdom depends on. This expression is recorded in the same meaning in many Arabic literary works and Farsi translations in the Islamic era. We can deduce the meaning of the interest and the expediency of the kingdom from any applications of this expression that its Pahlavi equivalent also implies. Accordingly, the Iranian political thought has been obsessed with drawing a kind of political system which could secure the interest of the kingdom. We can affirm that the brightness of the Iranian civilization in the Achaemenid and Sassanid era is due to the reason that they established their political system based on a scheme which facilitated securing the expediency of their kingdoms. Ibn Khaldun assumes the expediency of the kingdom to be the criterion for distinguishing the rational politics from the religious politics believing that it is "the kind of politics in which the expediency is observed generally for the public and specifically for the king. Such a politics was unique to Iranians and relied on wisdom medium" (Ibn Khaldun, 1988, p. 377).

The expediency of the kingdom and the idealistic-Shahi

Zoroastrian wisdom in ancient Iran led to the emergence of a kind of political thought that the concept of Idealism-Shah was central to it. In this regard, Shahi is classified into two general categories of good and bad. The good Shahi who is referred to as Houkhshathre in Zoroastrianism is the ruler who "realizes the ideology of benevolence in his territory" (Kenavat, 1977, p. 58). As properly put by Fatholah Mojtabaei, "the good Shah in terms of fairness is the position that the virtues of whom are in parallel with those of divine; therefore, the righteous Shah who is singled out by God and who is considered the closest to him shall have to be the manifestation of God and represent his will on earth. Whatever such a Shah does is approved of by God; so his rule is the rule of God in the world" (Mojtabaei, 1974, p. 120).

This perception was based on the attitude held by people of ancient Iran over the world which was rooted in the Zoroastrian religion. According to this perspective, Ahura Mazda is God and his followers follow the special

ritual stipulated by him which is referred to as اَشَه or آرته (rta/ aša/ arta). اَشَه was the principle and the order of the universe by which the world was organized and the mankind was bound up with respect it (Rezaei Rad, 2011). The survival of this world, the principle, and expediency of the city and country, and the happiness and fulfillment of humans in both worlds depend on this ritual. Thinking good thoughts, saying good words, and doing good deeds are achieved in the light of coordination with this ritual, and whoever comes to this understanding, he will forever be secured (Mojtabaei, 1974).

According to this perspective, the expediency of the kingdom is also the same as the coordination between the social and the ruling system with this ritual, and an idealistic Shahi system is the one that secures this coordination. Therefore, in the Iranian ideology, the expediency of the corruption of the kingdom is intermingled with the good and the bad Shahi system, respectively. As quoted by Mojtabaei in Dinkret this connection is described as following:

> "The bases of Shahi are wisdom, truthfulness, and constructiveness; its time is for God; its sign is the surveillance of justice in the world, prosperity, welfare, wisdom, truthfulness, and constructiveness; reverence for the wise, trustworthy and helpful people who truly deserve it; humiliation of people who ask for it; happiness and prosperity for all the people; sound reputation for the king whose prudence benefits the world…. the bases of a bad Shah are ignorance, lie and corruption; its time is for the evil; its sign is corruption and oppression in the world, misery, destruction, stupidity, and hypocrisy; power for the ignorant and liars; humiliation for the ones deserve respect; reverence for the ones who deserve humiliation; poverty and misery for the people; reputation for the tyrant of whose ignorance and oppression the evil is prevailing" (Mojtabaei, 1974, pp. 121-122).

Hence, the surveillance of justice, prosperity, welfare, wisdom, truthfulness, constructiveness, reverence for the wise and trustworthy and helpful people who deserve respect; humiliation for the corrupt who ask for it; joy and prosperity for all the people, they are all the main signs and

elements of expediency of the kingdom. On the contrary, surveillance of tyranny in the world, misery, destruction, ignorance, and hypocrisy; power for the ignorant and liars; humiliation for the ones deserve respect; reverence for the ones who deserve humiliation; poverty and misery for the people; reputation for the tyrant, they are all signs of corruption in the kingdom. In the ancient Iranian ideology, the idealistic Shahi system will present when Shah is healthy, victorious in martial arts; possesses traits such as wisdom, truthfulness, religiousness, and in the light of which moves the kingdom forward. Wisdom, in the Iranian ideology, is accompanied by truthfulness and inconsistent with hypocrisy, while truthfulness and opposing hypocrisy are the most important virtues that the expediency of the kingdom depends on. In this regard, Darius says:

> "The king Darius says: From this moment you will be the king. So, refrain from lying and punish whoever lies. If you think so, my country will be safe" (Mojtabaei, 1974, p. 34).

Ruling and religion supporting which form the base for a wisdom-based governorship are two definitions companionship of which in a person is an essential requirement for an idealistic Shahi. In the light of benefiting from these traits, the requirements for the regal arts are met, the king empowers in securing the expediency of the kingdom, and protects people from tyranny and oppression.

In the theory of idealistic Shahi, the expediency of the kingdom depends on the conscientiousness of people and the class (caste) system. Conscientiousness is about doing the duties that everyone is supposed to do in his position (Rezaei Rad, 2011). Conscientiousness is discussed based on the concept of "خوره" or "خُوَرنَه". Whoever reaches his self "خوره" he will attain the self-perfection and the light of "خوره" will flash in his face. To reach this stage of humanity, one should do only what is within his dignity and persist with conscientiousness. "When somebody insists on doing a job that he doesn't know enough about, he may damage it or leave it undone or even if he satisfies the owner, he has assumed the responsibility and the guilt is on him." (Tafazzoli, 1985). The one who doesn't attend the conscientiousness, he

has violated the rituals ruling the universe, disconnected from righteousness and chosen hypocrisy. Therefore, the expediency of the kingdom is intermingled with conscientiousness and class system through the concept of leprosy. That is why conscientiousness which was the highest ambition of Zoroaster is the same as rebuilding the world and life (Mahmoodizadeh Dehbarezi, 2017, p. 328).

According to the literary works remained from Achaemenid ages, humans are divided into three classifications based on their خوره or existential talents. Religion supportive, battle supportive and farmer (Mojtabaei, 1974). In the literary works remained from the Sassanid era, however, multiple classifications present regarding social classes; and Shah is in the top with superiority over others. Attachment to any class was based on the natural qualifications; therefore, transposition from the classes was restricted and transgression from any of them was considered "همه کارگی" (it may refer to a state of idleness) and a sin. According to this perspective, preventing the transposition of disqualified people to higher classes was considered the criterion for justice and while this principle was observed humans enjoyed the expediency of living (Tansar, 1976). A good Shah who is aware of the expediency of the kingdom will be the guarantor of observing this class principle and order (Mojtabaei, 1974; Tansar, 1976). In replying to Gashnasb's criticism against Ardeshir who asked about people's jobs, ethics and families, Tansar evaluated it as a measure in line with the expediency, because it prevents idleness and keeps everyone busy doing what God has assigned them for. He concludes accordingly as follows:

> "keeping people busy with their occupations and prohibiting them from other people's jobs preserve the universe and its beings; and to the rain that keeps the earth alive; to the sun that cooperates; to the wind that blows the souls that if torment comes, excess becomes unlimited; we think that it is living and advisable" (Tansar, 1976).

The idealistic theory of Shahi also finds the expediency of the kingdom dependent on the relationship between religion and government, and the idealistic government is realized when the power is intermingled with

justice, religion and wisdom (Mojtabaei, 1974). The best rule according to this theory is the one that religion and government are amalgamated, and the king who is religion supportive rules. It seems that this feature was raised to prevent division in the sources of power, and unite the government.

The expediency of the kingdom and governorship

In the ancient Iranian ideology, the expediency of the kingdom was considered a criterion for decision making and administrating the government. This limited the scope of the ruler's strength and hampered his tyranny. Contrary to the common attitude that assumes the imperial system of ancient Iran tyrannical, one can learn from the texts and literary works remained from that period that tyranny of Shah was indecent and led to the termination of his greatness and power. Darius describes his virtues this way:

> I am not a tyrant. When I'm angry, I manage it by reason. I have my ego
> fully under control (Mojtabaei, 1974, p. 35).

In idealistic Shahi, expediency was not determined autocratically. We can strengthen this perception by two arguments. Firstly, the ideology of idealistic Shahi has emphasized consultancy regarding it indecent to make any decision without it. According to this perception, the autocracy of Shah and being indifference to other people's opinions led to the termination of his rule. As mentioned in Balkhi's Fars-Nama (book of Fars), Jamshid "commanded a group of wise, knowledgeable and witty attendants to obtain knowledge to resort to them when making decisions on the affairs" (Rajaei, 1994, p. 61) .Secondly, the political system of the kingdom and the social structure in ancient Iran was in a way that restricted the political power in action and prevented Shah from autocracy. As such, a council of adept superintended Shah's affairs evaluating their consistency with the expediency of the kingdom.

The expediency of the kingdom in the Islamic era

The forceful nature of "Iranian" element in the establishment of the Islamic

civilization caused the reflection of the concept of Iranian political thought in the political literature of the Islamic era. This took place in the light of translating the Persian literary works such as Kalila and Demneh, and the letter of Tansar by Ibn al-Muqaffa (724-759AH), an Iranian educated thinker. The concept of the expediency of the kingdom is among the concepts that came into the Islamic ideology in the same way and raised in the compilation, namely Siyasatnama as a criterion to determine the scheme of the political system and the rituals of the governorship. Siyasatnamas rebuild the political thought in the idealistic Sassanian and Shahi eras within a cultural framework and Islamic civilization. Hence, their key concepts are the ones within the context of the literary works in the Ante-Islamic era. Based on this perception, we can investigate how this concept was addressed in two periods within the Islamic era; the transition era and the era of compiling Siyasatnamas

1. Transition era

As mentioned, the fundamental concepts of the Iranian political thought in this era found a way to the Muslim thinkers' mind through translation of Persian literary works. Kalila and Dimna is the first political piece from the Islamic period in which the concept of the expediency of the kingdom was raised. In the first story of Kalila and Dimna, Dimna maintains that his intention for approaching the lion who is the symbol of Shah is to advise him regarding the expediency of his kingdom and inhibit him from corruption:

"I will go to him to find out about his deeds… if he intends to do an affair advisable for the good of the kingdom, I will embellish it in his thoughts and encourage him; and if he tempts to do corruption, I will soften it in his thoughts and condemn it" (Bukhari, 1991, p. 76).The role model in this book, the king by his governorship, "represents the interests of the people" (Bukhari, 1991, p. 208). According to this perspective, "the expediency of the kingdom, its stability and the sustainability of its blessings depends on the survival of Shah, and Shah shall not consider himself equal to anything else" (Bukhari, 1991, p. 248). An Indian philosopher has drawn an analogy between two kinds

of kingdoms; the good kingdom in which a wise and experienced Shah rules who cares about the expediency of his kingdom and people giving their interests priority over his own. The superiority of the king over the base is bound up with giving priority to the expediency of the people treating them as if he is not obsessed with his interests (Bukhari, 1991, p. 156). Second is the bad kingdom in which "the nature of Shah reflects refractoriness and pride, and his kindness benefits no one" (Bukhari, 1991, p. 202).

The concept of the expediency of the kingdom is one of the most fundamental concepts in the letter of Tansar. In Tansar's view, one of the features of a good king is awareness about "the expediency of the world" and "when he is not aware of it, corruption comes to light" (Tansar, 1976, p. 58). Therefore, he shall have to think of securing the expediency of his kingdom and people consistently, and when perching on his throne remind himself that "I will be victorious in determining the expediency of my people, God willing" (Tansar, 1976, p. 89). According to this perspective, the expediency of the kingdom and the religion are intermingled because observing the religious principles is bound up with the expediency of the world, "they were born from the same mother and cannot be separated" (Tansar, 1976, p. 53). Tansar argues that the most outstanding feature of an idealistic king is "acting out of expediency by thinking of the future of the kingdom to be remembered for his good deeds" (Tansar, 1976, p. 52).

Being committed to the expediency of the kingdom and securing it, depends on observing some requirements and conditions that the first of which is the ingeniousness of the king. According to Kalila and Dimna's perspective, "securing the kingdom is more challenging than obtaining it" (Bukhari, 1991, p. 203), and its permanence is at first dependent on the ingeniousness and assurance of the king. That is because the expediency and assurance are not met without the Shah's ingeniousness and knowledge" (Bukhari, 1991, p. 230). Ingeniousness of the king means his awareness about the following affairs; first, he knows the authorities and the staff along with their strengths and weaknesses; he can distinguish the virtuous from the vicious; second, he assigns anyone to his proper job." Third, he evaluates everyone

the strengths and weaknesses of everyone relative to the job they are assigned to, because "not every weakness affects every deed." Finally, he constantly is aware of their functionalities through reports "so that, good-doers can be distinguished from bad doers." The king must not be indifferent to those reports by "rewarding the good doers and dismissing the bad doers" (Bukhari, 1991, p. 230).

Tansa has also stressed providence in governorship after mentioning ingeniousness and capability of Ardeshir and his bright resume in prospering Iran, "careful attention to the expediency of the people who come after him" and giving priority to their interests. In his opinion, the political arena is part of "the world of corruption in its opposite meanings" (Tansar, 1976, p. 87) which is different from the absent world, and just as scholars have said "though we are living in a finite world, it is wise to do things for our survival and the afterlife."

In addition to ingeniousness, "the king must never be ignorant of his affairs that they are critical and never end unless by assurance." The king's assurance means that before doing anything he makes sure it is expedient to prevent from failure." Contrary to this feature is being skeptical which mean "not taking any preventive measures and not knowing what to do to make things right again" (Bukhari, 1991, p. 97). Assurance is subject to not hastening when dealing with affairs and act with caution when treating an enemy. The king also must not leave the affairs to fate, because "it is up to him to act out of reason and leave the destiny and fate to the judge (God), and approach them in a way that others do not assume that there must be other rational solutions for them" (Bukhari, 1991, p. 226).

The second factor in securing the kingdom is benefiting from a group of elite and noble who are characterized by truthfulness, loyalty, chastity, religiousness, wittiness, and dignity" (Bukhari, 1991, p. 231). That is because no one like kings needs people with well-intention, wisdom, knowledge, and art." The noble must be "religious, dignifies, sociable, honorable, loyal, faithful and kind;" people who are not refractory when given power and moderate when being poor" and by and large they keep the balance in any

time. Their intention of getting close to the king is not making money but securing the expediency of the kingdom and preventing corruption. Among the elite who play an effective role in securing the expediency of the kingdom, the role of the ingenious minister is the most outstanding, because "the job of governorship is not done but by the efforts of the ministers, and the job of ministers is not carried out but by the supporters and authorities." The stability of the kingdom depends on consulting the wise and prudent minister" (Bukhari, 1991, p. 245), and "trusting a weak and uncertain minister" is an effective factor in instability of the kingdom. The value of an ingenious minister is more than a division of a great number of soldiers, and he must favor the kingdom by offering wise opinions in a way that does not provoke the king (Bukhari, 1991, pp. 201-202). On the hand, "the minister must be pleased and united with the king, and this unitedness must be accompanied with prudence, reserve, and chastity so that it deserves the king's taking action accordingly (Bukhari, 1991, p. 245).

Besides these matters, Kalila and Dimna illustrate the corrupt and immoral image of politics which challenges the benevolent and leads the kingdom to destruction, in a realistic way. This situation is mostly the result of envy, competition and the conflict between the noble and the elite for getting closer to Shah and taking advantage of the privileges. This makes the virtuous elite to leave politics and stop taking responsibilities (Bukhari, 1991). In the story of the lion and Shahar, the reason for isolation of the good-doers and leaving politics is described as follows:

> "Two people can serve the king and I am neither of them; either the artful who achieves what he wants by cunning or an unknown and meek people of whom no one jealous their position. However, it would be challenging for the one who intends to serve the king with his word of advice, honesty, and truthfulness," since the king's attendants would become his enemy due to their jealousness (Bukhari, 1991, p. 232).

Isolation and dissolution from the king that takes place as a result of jealousness and hatred is the most influencing factor in the devastation of the kingdom and bad for the expediency because, in such a situation, lazy and

ignorable people would gather around the king. In these people's opinion, getting closer to the king provides opportunities to take personal advantages such as resolving deprivation from themselves and from their friends and relatives, security and peace in times of war and sedition, enjoying women's company and so on, in the light of the king. Finally, these people mask their lack of knowledge, ignorance and behavioral deficiencies in the light of the king (Bukhari, 1991, pp. 89-90).

Influencing the ruler's attendants and to fulfill their interests, this profiteer and opportunist group always conspired against the wise (Bukhari, 1991, p 239). This conspiracy is committed in a very clever way that Shah finds it expedient for the good of his territory. The king only resorts to hesitation, avoiding haste, prudence, and consultancy and praying to refrain from its harmful consequences. Though the wrongdoers make a martyr of themselves and look for justifications when their conspiracy is revealed, the king should not overlook it, since their penalty strengthens the kingdom, inspires the divisions and assures the public. The conflict and contest which is the result of profiteering and opportunism of a noble class of the society lead to the ruin of the elite which is damaging for the well-being of the kingdom. King's wives, however, play an important role in neutralizing it. The author, in the story of Shazram and Irehkht, has stressed the importance of Shah's wives in stabilizing the kingdom, after mentioning Shah's forbearance and the wise minister's role:

> "Among all who are thoughtful of the expediency of the kingdom, it's the dwellers who if wise, agreeable, expedient, then people will feel prosperous in the religion and life, and their dignity is bound to their discretion. Though the king stands a man, if not patient and wise, and the wise men and the monks dare not to share their humble benevolences, he would fail in every deed" (Bukhari, 1991, pp. 245-246).

Friendship is another treasure which is emphasized in the story of Kalila and Demneh as one of the effective factors in ensuring the well-being of the kingdom (country) and passing through challenges. The second story in this book under the title of "Hamayeli pigeon, crow, mouse, turtle, and gazelle"

has investigated the importance and role of friendship in the social union. The story ends with a report of the wonderful effects of such a friendship among four animals: "as the friendship among these four animals reaches this point, see if human who is the greatest of creatures and possesses wisdom and knowledge remains steadfast in his friendship enormous comfort and delight will present" (Bukhari, 1991, p. 174).

Just as sympathy is valuable in the relationship between friends, cruelty, and hostility also observe some principles, because "not all friendships are in the same manner and not all hostilities stay with the same entity." The friendships that involve opportunism or fear may take the form of opposition. "Albeit there are friendships with latent enmity and enmities with latent friendship". Even conflict with the adversary should be based on prudence and the king makes decisions after consulting the elite.

The story of "crows and Owls" gives valuable implications on how to treat a strong adversary who has harmed the country and still reckoned to be a threat to the security. It is not recommended to engage in opposition with such an adversary, "because it is not wise to start a conflict with the one against whom you are defenseless". Though the fight is not appropriate, "one should not accept oppression and humility".

Also, in the literary work that Ibn al-Muqaffa has compiled, the well-being of the kingdom enjoys fundamental importance. He believes that the ruler should not only be prudent of the public interest in his time but also have the discretion to make appropriate decisions for their future. Being negligent to the well-being of the country is the most destructive factor in the government, and the most vicious ruler in the public's eye is the one who does not care about that or who is incapable in doing so. He assumes the well-being of the time in the well-being of the ruler, the noble class and the elite. Corruption is mostly rooted in the corruptness of the ruling class and especially the leader himself. The elite and the noble class in the political system have the position of average influence in a way that the well-being of the majority depends on them, while the well-being of them depends on the leader. (Ibn al-Muqaffa, 1989 p. 328). It is a given that the general power of the

people in terms of awareness, knowledge, and skill is limited, therefore when "the noble class of the society among whom the religious scholars and experts superintend their affairs and listen to their objectives and needs and attempt to secure them with expediency, the society will become healthy, God's blessings would be abundance and everyone can achieve what they want". Just like "the noble class who need a leader by the medium of whom God make them virtuous" (Bukhari, 1991, p. 323).

The right and virtuous people do not cooperate until they are asked to. That is why they may not be known or used. On the other hand, the vicious people try to get closer to the leader by flattery and hypocrisy. This tempts others and as a result, a gang of criminals forms the ruler's attendants. Finding such a condition, the virtuous people would tend more to step aside, since they find it hard to work and face such immoral people. Examples of people, in Ibn Moqfe's opinion, are the Iranian educated people living in Iraq who are rarely found among Muslims with such faith, chastity, wisdom, and wittiness. These people live in anonymity and isolation due to the infamy of the authorities, and the flattery of the caliph's advisors (Bukhari, 1991).

Ibn Moqfe's perception about the position of military forces and the way of treating them reflects his attitude towards expediency. In his opinion, military forces need to make their thought, word, and deed right and stay away from aggression and confusion. In this regard, the ruler should provide a clear, brief and comprehensive plan and instruction, while elaborating on what they must do or what they must avoid and asking the wise men to guide others accordingly. The ruler must not leave economic responsibilities like the collection of taxes to the military forces since it damages their image. He also must know the anonymous people who are senior to the current leaders and promote them. Moreover, he must nurture in them the traits like moderation and modesty while keep them unaffected by the opulent. Their payment must be on schedule and regularly paid based on a specific system so as not to take any complaints. The payment must be appropriate with the economy to meet their needs properly. Finally, no military information should be kept from the ruler and he must not worry about spending to

obtain it from reliable people (Bukhari, 1991).

Ibn al-Muqaffa has addressed the political ethics in two books, الادب الكبيـر and الادب الكبيـر, arranging it based on the concept of the well-being of the kingdom. Despite his idealistic view of the governance and considering the moral and expedient governorship, he didn't dismiss the politically wicked minds and power relationships emphasizing on piety. In his opinion, observing ethical principles in the political arena is challenging in a way that one can say: "فان الاخلاق مستحيله مع الملك" (Bukhari, 1991, p. 253). This perception, however, does not negate the desirability of ethical principles in the political arena in practice, it rather implies its frustration given the logic of the ruling power surveilling the political arena.

2. Siyasatnama (book of government) recording era

Siyasatnama writing is an important trend in the history of Iranian political thought which has been shaped in the continuation of Iranian ideology before Islam and around the concepts derived from it. In the abstract of "سـير الملـوك," Khajeh Nizam al-Mulk Tusi (1017-1092AD) argues that the purpose of siyasatnama is to discuss the rules of the governorship and that its primary task is to organize the relationship between Shah and the rest of the classes of the society (Tusi, 1921). The concept of expediency is one of the most fundamental concepts in the siyasatnama and Khajeh has begun the first sentences this book with the following concept:

> "In all eras and times, mighty lord singles out one from among his followers nurturing in him the skills and arts of ruling, attributing him the expediency and the peace of the people to him, closing the doors of corruption and scandals to him and making him honorable in the eyes of his people so that they make a living in the light of his justice and security and pray for the continuation of his governorship" (Tusi, 1921, p. 13).

From such a perspective, the primary task of the governorship is securing the interests of the world and peace while hampering the way to corruption, scandal, and rebel. This way, the government can bring about justice,

security and as a result, people's loyalty. In Khajeh's view, the moral and idealistic kingdom with such description is distinguished from the bad kingdom. The fine kingdom deserves following because it is accompanied by the due "wisdom and knowledge" to provide for its expediency. In the light of this wisdom and knowledge, the ruler "would have his inferiors' company in the best way," realize their reward and punishment and command "what entails the prosperity of the world." In defining expediency, Khajeh stresses construction and prosperity counting them as following:

> "Digging qanats, building bridges, running farms, developing new cities and constructing high buildings, Caravanserai (motel/hotel), schools." The ruler who takes such measures, "the spiritual reward for these deeds and the people's prayers will meet him in joy in the afterlife" (Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, 1961, p. 15)

In Khajeh's perception, God's satisfaction and the expediency of the country is bound to "the good deed in relationship with people and justice established among them", because with the people's prayers "the rule is stabilized," "its power is increasingly pervaded" and such a kingdom "makes its way to prosperity and happiness in this life and the life after which meeting God with happily as said by wise men, المُلك يبقي مع الكفر و لا يبقي مع الظلم. This excerpt means that a kingdom will remain with disbelief but never with oppression" (Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, 1961, p. 17). Therefore, justice and inhibition of oppression is the most superior expediency that the ruler shall have to work for. In doing so, "for two days a week, the king shall have to take care of oppressions, bring the criminals to justice and listen to public's voice" until "the news about this just spreads throughout the kingdom," and "the oppressive be afraid of their deeds." Moreover, authorities should be advised to be fair on God's followers, charge them only what is right with kindness." They should also look out for them "and question ministers and trustees about their earnings to see if they are just because the corruption and truthfulness of the king and the kingdom depend on him" (Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, 1961, p. 19 & p. 30)

Khajeh attributes the expediency of the country to the moral minister because "when the minister is morally qualified the country would be prosperous, the divisions and the people fulfilled and the king relieved. However, when the minister is morally disqualified, there would be unrest in the country that the king could not find out the reason and be constantly obsessed." He argues that "the ruler is elegant by the authorities, and superior to all of the authorities is the minister; if he is bad and oppressive, the authorities will all follow" (Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, 1961, p. 214), moreover, "a good minister makes a good king" (Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, 1961, p. 218).

In addition to a good minister, it is advisable to be thoughtful and pondering when choosing the noble and authorities and other staff, so that they do not intend oppression or restrict people's rights. Khajeh exemplifies the story of Anushirvan who penalized the governor of Azerbaijan for the oppression against an old woman and as such "due to one policy Anushiravan made his all kingdom became sound and fine, all crimes suspended, and the world became a better place" (Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, 1961, p. 50). To prevent misuse of power, he suggests the circling of the elite and replacing them in two to three years so that "they do not find power, have no obsession of progress and contest, treat the people right and that the kingdom finds prosperity" (Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, 1961, p. 52)

In line with restricting corruption and oppression, the king shall have to be constantly aware of the well-being of the people and the division forces. Because, in the public's view, "he is either aware of the corruption and the oppression taking place in the kingdom, or he is not. In the first assumption, he is oppressive, and if he is not aware of it, he is ignorant of it." Of course, the job of reporting to the ruler shall have to be "the responsibility of trusted people who do not have treacherous intentions because the decency and corruption of the kingdom depend on them" (Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, 1961, p. 80) The thirteenth chapter under the topic of, "an account of the issue of sending spies and exercising prudence advisable for the kingdom and the people,"

was designated for the practice of reporting Shah on what was going on in the kingdom (Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, 1961, p. 94).

The perception of Siyasatnama regarding the relationship between religion and government in moving Iranian ideology forward and also the expediency of the country is dependent on the expediency of religion, "because the kingdom and religion are an example of two brothers. Whenever the country experiences unrest, it will be the same with the religion and corruption and misuse of religion will become common. Whenever the religion is endangered, the country will be disturbed and criminals gain power". In Khajeh's view, misuse of religion and bid'ah (an innovation in the religion) are two "evils and corruptions" elimination of which "enhances justice and fairness, benevolence is strengthened and corruption is disposed of" (Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, 1961, pp. 74-75).

As mentioned before, in Iranian ideology, justice has been intermingled with equality, therefore, the expediency of the country depends on it. Siyasatnama, also stresses this principle marking "the lack of regulation and perspective" in the country's affairs as the primary sign of crisis. In such a condition, honorable people are humiliated, criminals find power, and the benevolent are debilitated". Meanwhile, the dishonest and unworthy people gain power, "the noble and virtuous people are deprived", disqualified people use labels for themselves, "Sharia becomes ineffective", the base becomes disobedient, military forces unduly exercise their power and all the country's affairs fall out of balance" (Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, 1961, p. 178).

According to this perspective, when a just and wise king comes to power in the light of God's blessing, "he bestows upon that king wisdom and knowledge to make all affairs right, consult many about king's procedures for moving the country forward, observe all kingdom's rituals, put people to work based on their skills and qualities", bring the worthy staff back to their righteous position and remove the unworthy ones from their position." One of the measures advisable for the good of the kingdom and that "kings in all times maintained" is "they treated the old households and the children of kings with

reverence and kept them from any humiliation." Moreover, they entitled "the master of indulgence and the wise men, Alevilers, warriors, and readers of Quran a share of the house of money (treasury)" (Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, pp. 179-180).

According to this perspective, Khavaheh Nizam al-Mulk regards the matter of securing the expediency subject to scientists and adept people serving Shah. In his opinion, "the habit of open-minded kings has been to revere the elders and veterans, keep the experienced and competent people close, and appoint them to appropriate jobs so that when dealing with an important affair such as marriage, and investigation in the religion, he consults them." In Khajeh' opinion, the task of recognizing the expediency must be based on consulting "the wise men, veterans and the experienced people." He believes that "consultation in the affairs is a sign of making the best decisions," on the other hand, "lack of consultation in the affairs is a sign of being self-opinioned and such a person is an autocrat ruler" (Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, 1961, pp. 116 - 117). Relying on the prophet's character sketch, Khajeh states that despite all the blessings and miracles, God commands him "وشـاورهم فـي الامـر". Therefore, "as the king wants to make a decision or do something important, he can consult the elders and adherents so that everyone shares his opinion about the issue until the best decision on which the majority agree upon is obtained."

Another factor which is considered important according to Siyasatnama regarding the expediency of the kingdom (country) is the stress placed on refraining from assigning more than one job or role to an individual. Khajeh believes that "the open-minded kings in all times never appointed anyone to more than one job or assigned two men to one job" and that was because "when two jobs are assigned to one person, one of them is always ruined" (Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, 1961, p. 201).

He considers the oversight of more than one positions as an indication of the government's inadequacy and writes the following in order to criticize the political structure of his own time: "Today there are men with no competency, who have tens of occupations and if any other vacancies arise,

they will claim them to earn more gold." He reminds us of the marginalization of the competent in this situation: "Why should one of the unprofessional, inadequate and multi-occupational have a reputable, be trusted while one competent man has none?"

Contrary to the idea of ancient Iran, Nizam al-Mulk is pessimistic about women's involvement in politics and does not consider it right. In his view, "women are not striving and full of reason, and their purpose is the survival of generation." The political insight of women is not strong and influences the interests of the proprietors, hence the pursuit of their view in the administration of the state is corrupted. "There will be a collapse in the kingdom and religion ... and whenever the king's wife dominates the king, there will be disgrace and evil, sedition and corruption" (Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, p. 226). According to Buzar-i-Jammuhr, he cites the answer to the question about the Sassanian collapse: "It was caused by two things: one is that great works had been assigned to the ignorant, and another was that they did not buy the knowledgeable and the wise men, and worked with women and children" (Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, 1961, p. 230).

According to the principle of sovereignty, Nizam al-Mulk has also made recommendations on the financial regulations of the king. First, "The king has always had two treasures: One of the treasuries of the principal and one of the treasuries of expenditure and finance, which resulted in more to the original treasury and less to the expenditure." According to him: "This is the order of the king so that the interests of the country do not disconnect from each other, and to maintain the prosperity of the subjects and the treasury and to eliminate the uncaring greed of the king (Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, 1961, pp. 299-300). Secondly, those who were prominent agents or figures shall not "stop serving since it is considered both disgraceful and unmerciful." Thirdly, he shall have financial discipline and plan; he shall write the financial, income and expense account, and shall spend by reflection, and ultimately observe the moderation, and will maintain moderation" (Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, 1961, p. 305).

Siyasatnama also sets out its political ethics and the conventions of

affiliation with the king regarding its view of expediency. As an example, he prohibits the king from joking with the advisor and other associates because the wisdom and self-esteem do not allow harassment and impudence with these people. Instead, he recommends that he should gather his beloved and servants to fill his fatigue with them. He also justifies avoiding haste in decision making based on sovereignty and writes: "I saw many practices that were corrupted because of haste" (Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, 1961, p. 171).

Conclusion

The concept of expediency of the kingdom has always held an important place in the era of Iranian political thought. As in ancient Greece and Aristotle's thought, adherence to the general interest was considered a criterion for distinguishing the correct and healthy political system from false and corrupt, in the political thought of Iran too; the ideal and superlative kingdom depended on sovereignty. The interest of the kingdom, on the one hand, sets out the pattern of desirable government and, on the other hand, has been the criterion for making political decisions and actions. This concept has a central place in the whole of Iranian thought so that the totality of the theory and key political concepts can be arranged somehow around it.

In Iranian thought, expediency of the kingdom is not an abstract concept and can be applied to anything that has contributed to the development of the kingdom, spreading of knowledge, increasing the power and credibility and stability of the state. Expediency discernment has not been arbitrary but has been done through expert and consultative work. In addition, the sovereignty of the kingdom not only did not violate moral norms but was accompanied by adherence to ethical principles. Therefore, Nizam al-Mulk quotes from Buzar-i-Jammuhr, saying: "if the king desires to stand above all the rest of the kings, he shall make his ethos worthwhile." He asked: "how?" He said: "He shall put aside the vice and put in work the virtue" (Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, 1961, p. 235).

This impression is different from the idea of the separation of, morality from the politics that were expressed in the new era in Machiavelli. Because, according to this idea, political power follows the rules and requirements that are not always consistent with ethical rules and may not even be compatible with them. Hence, in the pursuit of the expediency of the system, not only should it not be ethical, but it can be transmitted whenever required. Machiavelli's reflection of the expedient reflects a realistic view, while the Iranian conception represents an idealistic one.

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Iranian-Islamic Pattern of Justice in the Politics

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Abstract

The category of justice and fair governance is one of the crucial issues in the history of thought and political philosophy. The point is important in Iranian-Islamic thought as well. The present paper has raised the question of what the founding principles of fair governance are through the normative and Life-World theory. We can discuss the existence of an Iranian-Islamic justice pattern within the framework of Life-World culture in the shadow of contemporary era necessities. In an address to this hypothesis, the author has argued that, by forming a combination of the world life, Iranian and Islamic dimension, and one can either correct the problems of governance or present a broader idea of that, defined on three axes. The pattern in question owes three historical-theoretical components: Iranshahri political thought and justice, justice in Imam Ali's outlook, and Imam Khomeini's justice-seeking theory realized in the context of the Islamic Revolution discourse that acts as a roadmap in a turbulent world and satisfies the justice seekers in the Islamic Awakening. This article has been written in a descriptive-analytical method within the normative critical theory framework.

Introduction

During history, justice realization has been one of the most adorable ideals of most cultures and civilizations. To put in other words, since old times, there have been diverse interpretations of justice among different peoples plus their ethical and legal texts. Meanwhile, reflection concerning the history of justice theory from ancient times so far indicates that despite failure in comprehending the objectives in question, this significant point has been proved that the ideal of a good and hannonized society has been the actual demand of all great religions and philosophers in the entire world. Thus, the justice question is one of the most significant issues in political thought (in general) and in political philosophy (in particular) in Islam, the West, and the East. The first prominent work in the political thought history is Plato's Republic (Plato, 1987), and one of the furthermost significant recent works in this regard is John Rawls' Justice as Fairness.

Also at present, the political philosophy stage regarding justice is facing several competing discourses. The issue indicates live presence debate about different alternatives to the justice theory. One of these theories is utilitarianism school, which is rooted in John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham's ideas. They regard the principle of utility as the only origin of just society. Within important theory presented by John Rawls, the theory of social contract talks about fair justice under the support of the liberal state. Contrary to that, the libertarian theory of Nozick and Hayek supports the notion of the neoliberal free market and minimal state. However, the most important challenge in this regard is the communitarian theory that supports "the right of being different" according to Otfried Höffe (Höffe, 2004, p. 101). In the present world, full of religious and ideological communities, it is not acceptable to call for a theory for all people. Postmodern critical thought and post-colonial theory have called the stage of justice theory in inviting the "other." Within the framework of mentioned objective developments and subjective changes, it is promising to provide new alternatives and theories on behalf of Islam World. Of course, enjoying various historical and intellectual layers, the life-world of Islamic societies can use historical

capacity and welcome new patterns simultaneously. The crises of global security, covering the threat of ideological extremists like ISIS, to global warming, poverty and other visible inequalities have exacerbated the need to contemplate and deepen the institutions of social and political justice. While the global communication facilities have paved the grounds for sectors and territories to move in the line of knowledge and development, in many areas, the consolidation of black holes of misery observed. As Christian Delacampagne has argued, concerning justice scale and fair governing, "the health condition of the world is not good" (Delacampagne, 2003, p. 12).The life-world of Islamic societies with a variety of historical and civilizational layers can take advantage of this capacity and pave the way for novel and successful governing strategies.

The authors of this article seek to point out the significance of justice in today's high-tension world and discuss the necessities of the Islamic-Iranian pattern of justice within the Islamic-Iranian Life-world framework. In other words, if one considers the realm of justice and just society in a diversified linguistic and ethnic community like Islam World and define justice as applying moderation, bravery plus independence, then this question shall be raised: How can existing capacities in the Islamic-Iranian intellectual tradition assist this ideal? In other words, may one thinks within the framework of the Islamic-Iranian pattern of justice to reduce the challenge of injustice in the Middle East? If the answer is positive, then the next step shall be to provide necessities and components of the justice theory. Since this article is using the framework of critical normative theory, its principles and significance will be discussed briefly here.

Critical normative theory: a theoretical framework

One of the important domains of applying normative theory is the topic of justice. Here, the critical theorists have targeted one of the most significant, continuous and controversial disputes.

Once raising the normative theories of justice, particularly facing the contemporary world problems, three streams are of importance. The first

stream is critical liberal approach provided by John Rawls within the framework of "Justice as Fairness"; this theory, which was developed by publishing "Theory of justice" (Rawls, 2004) is regarded as serious progress. In this book, by showing his affiliation with the social contract and normative thought, notably Kant, Rawls seeks to raise a general theory emphasizing human's unified nature and essence, so that the notion of justice as fairness is realized not only at national level but also at world levels. After various criticisms and other considerations, he decided to provide the theory of justice in a more certainmanner in which its western nature was explicitly expressed. By using the theory of social contract, Rawls decided to realize the possibility of establishing a fair or well-ordered society. In Rawls' thought, the unjustifiable shortages of liberal democracy are not neglected from his critical vision (Rawls, 2004).

The second critical current is communitarianism. Such thinkers as Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor and Michael Sandel criticize the justice claims of liberal democracy in their mechanical and atomist interpretation concerning the human being as isolated abstract "individual" and owing "eternal rights." On this basis, communitarians define a human being as a person belonging to various communities (including family, linguistic and cultural belongings) (Marsh & Stocker, 2008). As the third critical viewpoint, the postcolonial movement has similarly presented its specific interpretation ona sane and just society. At the same time, it will be possible to understand the postcolonial theoretical foundations whose theorists are mainly from the Third World by understanding the historical and epistemological nature of the unequal relationship between the Western world and the subaltern worlds. They believe that the "white western man" has regarded themselves as enjoying a superior civilization; thus they merit governing "non-white" civilizations. Consequently, the nature of political and economic action in liberal democracy throughout past two decades have been a kind of other-building which are marginal, the Third World, Oriental and eventually Muslim communities, and they have considered them as subaltern ones (Gandhi, 2012). It seems that the common point of these three viewpoints is that

liberal democracy in its continuous form cannot represent an ideal of justice at the world level despite the failure of communist myth.

Simultaneously, the central weakness of these theories including Rawls' is that Rawls' targeted notion could not succeed in the world by accepting "reasonable pluralism, "unless providing an alternative that covers the shortage. In other words, since Rawls regards his theory as a form of "realistic utopia" (Rawls, 2004, p. 23) he always hopes that the world governments move towards accepting his targeted principles and try to improve the world affairs gradually by observing the severe consequences of hostilities. As hinted above, by adding some Western epistemological and historical foundations, he seeks to classify human societies into three groups: (1) liberal (good) nations (2) decent (acceptable) nations plus (3) outlaw nations. In some critics' opinion, although classifying nations seems consistent with the principles of political theory, it is not in line with establishing equality and difference principles Rawls had emphasized already. In his book entitled "The Law of Peoples," Rawls interprets the concept of "difference" in an irregular and incorrect way, he, thus, classifies international law and banishes it from the international community, which is an authentic entity (Falsafi, 2011).

In this article, the theory of justice connects a form of a normative and adjusted model of justice, borrowed from Rawls' theory to the plural cultural life-world of the Middle East. Referring to this viewpoint, the part of Rawls' approach that emphasizes the necessity of reinforcing moral-political norms and relinquishes ultimate focusing on the liberal notion of democracy, is paid attention. In the interim, Rawls' civilization diversity and hierarchical order could be regarded as a departure for the plural context of the Iranian-Islamic pattern of justice in the Middle East. However, in the ultimate framework, this pattern avoids Rawls' theory shortages and problems. It means that even though in his book entitled "The Law of Peoples," Rawls has engaged in a broader concept of justice outside the Western meanness, but his ultimate focus is on that a just world is a world of liberal states; it is regarded as an obvious imperfection. After September 11th some analysts

have criticized Rawls and sought to show that Washington's just peace wants to combine Rawls' democratic peace with Fukuyama's end of history (Richardson, 2011).

Thus, such a pattern cannot spread justice in Iran, besides, imposing a pattern of justice for life-world of the Iranian-Islamic will culminate in being monolog situation if it is not .discussed in the public sphere. Since every monolog situation ultimately culminates in using force and obligation, the very situation will be unjust. The justice principles are regarded as valid, reasonable and acceptable if a rational consensus is being resulted from a verbal situation and ideal selection by the members of the very society. As Habermas says, there is no place for monolog and a truth-finder reason for solving the problems. Hence, given the importance of establishing an ideal verbal situation is a pre-requisite for justice plus main faults of Rawls' doctrine including founding on agreement, epistemological relativism, ethical pluralism, considering virtuous and non-virtuous notions and so on are raised, it seems necessary to provide a native Iranian-Islamic pattern of justice in the realm of life-world of the Middle East, which is inclusive and applicable.

Further to this, if a fair governor reflects the harmony adapted to the situation of the world by all its norms, the fundamental question would be how to integrate the quantity and quality of the matter proportionately, so that the expected fundamental idea of justice and fair administration will come true? What we call, the Iranian Islamic model is intended to reflect the civilization and brilliance of its own, which is bound up with literary, historical and ethical rituals. On the other hand, it can be effective for the current success of modern human beings in a modern religious society. Nonetheless, how do we live in the modern world today, so that the character of the "man's presence" (man-centered) and the life-blended with morality and sanctity would be possible? The fact seems to be concerned with those who thought about the ideological and intellectual foundations of Islamic revolution discourse. In a simpler sense, confronting the social division and the plan of justice promises in the Islamic revolution was not merely

ideological rather the realization and achievement of the social justice were one of the main goals and objectives of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. The Iranian-Islamic pattern has to establish justice in the Islamic world, and whether we can think within the framework of Iranian-Islamic justice, the authors believe that the Iranian-Islamic attitude can pave the way for this purpose.

Because the scrutiny of different aspects of justice allows us to come out of unjust web we are embedded, and accept that two origins of Iranshahri thought (native tradition) and Islamic thought (emphasizing Imam Khomeini's postcolonial political theory) are necessary for spreading justice in Iran. Thus, we have embarked on a particular selection among theorists of justice in order to analyze justice and provide a pattern of it. In this selection we have commenced from Iranshahri thought hitherto, and on the same basis, on top of the list, we have selected the first Imam of Shiites and the three prominent thinkers of justice in Iranshahri thought (Farabi, Khajeh Nasir Tusi, Khajeh Nizam al-Mulk Tusi) plus in the contemporary time, Imam Khomeini's theory of justice due to some particular reasons, which will be pointed out. The authors believe we can reach a theory of justice entitled "objective-humanly theory of justice in the framework of the Islam space."

The Iranian-Islamic pattern of justice in the Middle East region: a new theory of justice

Due to the impact of Iranshahri political thought on some Islam political thinkers plus given the fact that establishing Iranian-Islamic pattern of justice in the life-world of the Middle East is not plausible without considering Iran's history, it seems essential to use analytical-historical method to deal with summarizing the justice occasions in the context of Iranshahri, which is in turn connected with the main thinkers of Islamic political philosophy (Farabi and Khajeh Nasir Tusi), and writing admonition (Nizam al-Mulk Tusi). It is noteworthy to indicate that these thinkers have invited kings and rulers to justice as the most pivotal element in good

government establishment. In this section of the article, thus, we discuss justice as the principal component of good government in Iranshahri thought.

In his writings, Farabi has discussed justice in three books: "Civil Politics," "On the Perfect State," and "Solitaires of Philosophy." In Farabi's view, human individuals are not equal, and they are in a hierarchy of abilities and talents based on their merits. Considering the hierarchy is required for continuing a government. In more precise statements, as claimed by Farabi, the Almighty enjoys virtues and perfections, and he has established the universe on the basis of his justice. The polis head should also act as the most perfect and virtuous person in society regarding virtues and rationality, including justice. S/he should establish his/her government on the basis of justice so that the government functions. Due to the very reason, the head of the perfect state should have twelve attributes including enthusiasm for justice plus standing against injustice and cruelty; passion for truth and protest against lie; and moderateness in satisfying his/her desires (Nazerzadeh Kermani, 1997).

Farabi raises just division or public goods and ratifying laws in order to preserve the rights of citizens as the primary task of government plus its survival (Nazerzadeh Kermani, 1997). In his opinion, justice means "to divide public goods belonging to all among all." Therefore "possibility of partnership" is the distinctive feature of' public and social goods that makes them different from private ones. As these goods belong to all citizens and they are outside private ownership, no one, from the head of state to the lowest ranking person, can vest, occupy, recapture or abuse them. The key point is that there is an equal share of goods for each citizen based on their competence and qualification. Each person has the right .to enjoy a part of' these valuable things consisting with their competencies, and any ups or downs in peoples' shares are regarded as a sort of injustice (Nazerzadeh Kermani, 1997). Therefore, injustice in this sense means getting upper or downer than this share, and if someone gets less or more than his appropriate share, he/she have not only violated not only his/her right but also all citizens. Justice is that the remainder is backed to the owner (person or people). Accordingly, each

person owns their own right. In the perfect state (utopia), justice has such an importance that its role is to regulate relations among the components of the state. It connects these components; so in Farabi's view, it is the cause of the survival of state and government (Nazerzadeh Kermani, 1997).

On the other hand, in the history of Iranshahri thought, Khajeh Nasir Tusi's status is significant in political philosophy and his definition of justice matters. Although Khajeh's opinions about justice like other Islamic philosophers are affected by Plato and Aristotle's thought, they are mainly rooted in the Quran and Islam. However, by following Aristotle and Moskuyeh, he has provided some details, which are specific to him amongst successive philosophers. Khajeh's different views on justice in his masterpiece arc as follows: Justice means realizing competencies and talents and considering deservedness and hierarchy, not absolute equality. Similar to Farabi, Khajeh Nasir assumed some definitions for justice including "giving a right to the rightful," and "placing all things in its right place." He denied absolute equality but regarded erasing discrimination against those who deserve equality. This justice definition, which is one of the most popular Islamic and Platonic interpretations of the concept, is very significant for Khajeh, and he starts defining this concept by examining the meaning of equality.

Following Farabi, Khajeh Nasir discusses on just division of public goods among all citizens and believes everybody should have a share according to his/hercompetencies and deservedness. He expresses the issue when he describes "king's laws and prerequisites of moderateness. In Khajeh's attitude, as the survival and stability of state and government are dependent on moderateness, the king must consider the subjects' conditions and preserve the moderateness law. Then, he enlightens the laws and prerequisites of moderateness. The first prerequisite of moderateness is to stabilize the crafts of people. A moderate society is divided into four crafts: the craft of pen, sword, and business plus agriculture. Justice is that none of these crafts departs from its deserved position and no craft tries to overcome other crafts because this departure leads to the violation of moderateness and

social affairs turns into corruption. The second prerequisite of moderateness is that the king must consider the citizen's conditions and actions, and further determine their position according to their deservedness and talent. The third moderateness prerequisite includes the necessity for an equal division of public goods among people (Khajeh Nasir Tusi, 1994). Khajeh Nasir, thus, recalls repeatedly these three prerequisites to the king as the required and sufficient conditions of government lasting.

On the other hand, when we are discussing the position of Iranshahri thought, it is necessary to indicate Khajeh's book "Siyasatnama" (Politics Letter). In this book, the robust concept of "justice" as the vital element of government has been mentioned repeatedly. To put in other words, justice causes a government to be last; the kingdom is the God's gift, and the king should thank God by establishing justice. Applying such justice would bring about people's good wishes, which in turn, stabilizes government and causes salvation after death. Thus, the survival of political power depends on justice, and its ruin depends on injustice. Khajeh, therefore, by mentioning a hadith from the Prophet confesses "Power may last with infidelity (Kufr), but cannot continue with injustice (Zulm)" (Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, 1993, p. 6). On the other hand, Khajeh Nizam al-Mulk considers placing everything in its proper place and respecting competencies and deservedness plus hierarchies as the substantial components in lasting government; because according to this definition of Justice, social order is ruined as the result of displacing crafts and classes as well as by dissolving the frontiers between "the low class and high class" people. Therefore, lasting power is based on preserving hierarchy, or in more precise words, it is based on justice as by dissolving social order and the hierarchy of crafts, the state shall be corrupted, and the kings collapsed. Thus, to provide and preserve the government, Khajeh repeatedly uses the concepts of' justice" as "truth" as synonyms in Siyasatnama. "During history, from Adam (PBUH) hitherto, those nations that have established justice and equity, and sought the truth, have lasting power for many years" (Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, 1993, p. 42).

By examining various works (political philosophy and essay writing) of

leading figures of Iranshahri era, it is known that justice is the focal point of the political thought of Iranshahri time. In other words, the role and significance of justice have been regarded as the survival of the government, and consequently, it has acted as a criterion for implementing internal and external controller of authoritarian rulers. For that reason, it did not lose its manner as a criterion under pressure of authoritarianism. Thus, in order to provide a certain pattern of justice in the Middle East, we deal with examination of Shiite justice as a pattern for the Middle East life-world against socialist and liberal discourses (as dominant world paradigm).

Justice as a negation of discrimination and consideration of deservedness and equity: motive of Shiite thought of justice in Imam Ali's views

The category of justice as a meta-historical element is the permanent question of divine religions, particularly the Islamic thought. In the Islamic outlook, justice in itself has a fundamental position about which many have discussed, both in Quran and tradition. Consequently, justice as one of the most controversial religious concepts has been discussed and scrutinized by Muslim thinkers including clergymen and philosophers. The Shiite thought has regarded justice as one of its religious principles, and its historical culture and belief have always considered it as its integral element. The Shiite view not only explains divine prophets, Islam Prophet and Imam's vocation within the framework of spreading justice but also depicts its utopia, which shall be realized by emerging Imam Mahdi (PBUH) solely in the shadow of justice.

As George Jardagh claimed, "the story of Ali regarding justice is one of the valuable heritages that upgrades the human status and human spirit" (Jardagh, 1996, p. 117). Thus, it should be stated explicitly that as one of the most permanent and eternal questions of political philosophy, justice is one of the most fundamental principles of Imam Ali's government without which his government could not be understood properly. We should not regard justice in Imam Ali's thought and lifestyle merely a moral issue but as one of the most fundamental principles of sociopolitical management in his political

structure. As George Jardagh points out "justice in Imam Ali's view is not something learned from others, although it became a school afterward, and it is not a plan necessitated by politics, although it became an inseparable component of government, but justice in his moral and spiritual school is a principle connected firmly to other principles, and it has a nature that cannot act against itself, Thus, it is as if seeking justice is the constituting liquid of his corporal structure, it is the blood circulating in his heart and vessels, and a spirit without which corporal life could not continue." (Jardagh, 1996, p. 64).

A concept repeatedly mentioned in Imam Ali's speech is "negation of every kind of discrimination as well as consideration of deservedness." In Imam Ali's city of faith, attention to the deprived people's affairs indicate that he has tried to create a wide space for rehabilitating such damages, Of course, it is evident justice in this meaning does not mean absolute equality of individuals, rather is equality among similar deserved ones. Further, as peoples' deservedness is different, differences among people are taken for granted in Islam. Imam Ali's interpretation of these differences is as follows: "as the Almighty has created differences among people's wills, demands plus other manners, and these differences are means of establishing life" (Nahj al-Balagha, Letter. 53).In this direction, by considering economic and social gaps among Muslims in society, and also the formation of a class-based society, Imam Ali pays special attention to the lower classes, namely those who have not any hope for continuing a reasonable and respectful life. In this regards, he says:

> "I order you, Maalik, always to keep the fear of Allah in your mind. Regarding the class of the poor and the disabled persons, namely those miserable people who have not any hope in society, it is necessary that they should be looked after, helped and well-provided. The Merciful Allah has explained the ways and means of maintaining and providing for each of these classes. Also, everyone in this class has the right upon the ruler of the State; the least minimum necessities for his well-being and contented living be provided" (Nahj al-Balagha, Letter. 53)

Thus, considering individuals' rights and removing deprivation is the

inseparable component of Alavi justice, because he regards "just Imam as one who is guided and guides people as the God's uppermost follower and regards an oppressor leader, who is misled and is misleading, as the worst people" (Nahj al-Balagha, Letter. 53). This attitude has been reiterated in Imam Ali's letter to his agents in a more widespread manner. He emphasizes in his letter to Maalik Ashtar:

> "I order you, Maalik, treat people in a kind and good manner. Never treat them like beasts and never regard them as an opportunity for misusing them because they are two categories; they are either brothers,in religion with you, or similar in creation like you" (Nahj al-Balagha, Letter. 53)

Therefore, Imam Ali reiterates to Maalik "avoid monopolizing and allocating things in which all people are equal" (Nahj al-Balagha, Letter. 53). By this sentence, Imam says that the issues in which all people have equal rights should not be monopolized; because concerning the creation, Imam is like all other people, and thus, apart from any conditions, human beings are equal in terms of rights. Consequently, Imam considers right for all people, whether close or far, equally and says: "enforce right for the deserved people, whether close or far" (Nahj al-Balagha. Letter. 53). In Imam Ali's opinion, therefore, the concept of justice and right are closely intertwined, their meaning is connected. Further, one of the most, significant aspects of that meaning is to realize the rights of humans plus negation of discrimination in those spheres in which they are equal.

This section of the article was an attempt at scrutinizing the concept of justice in Imam Ali's view. No doubt that his speech and performance regarding government is the reflection of human historical conscience regarding justice, particularly Imam Ali's government is the only case in Islam history that an innocent Imam had seized political power and led the Islamic society. Certainly, the formation of Alavi state created a new political and spiritual life-world not only for the Islamic society but also for the human history. It provided required conditions for restoring the functions of a justice-seeking government among Muslims in the circumstances the Muslim society had experienced two decades of despair. Toward this end,

Imam Ali's government should be regarded as the most prominent pattern of Islamic government after the Prophet's one that provided a different definition of politics and used all powers, for spreading justice, negating oppression and discrimination, and realizing equity in the Islamic society.

Justice, an uprising against oppression, and injustice, and preserving independence: motive of justice discourse in Imam Khomeini's thought

Iranshahri thought and Islamic political philosophy experienced recession and weakness in a part of their history. In this period, the problematicity of justice was forgotten, and as the result of Shiite Akhbari School accompanied by authoritarian rulers' repressions, justice has been consigned to obscurity. However, in our time, justice has been revitalized again by a concussive thinker, i.e., Imam Khomeini, and his "Just government," "just law" and so forth, were paying attention to. Accordingly, justice-seeking and Islamic Awakening Movement engaged a part of Islam World gradually. As a religious thinker with a comprehensive understanding about religion and a rational-mystical look to religion and politics, Imam Khomeini considers establishing Mohammadian Pure Islam as the most reasonable practical way of realizing the oppressed people's rights.

An Islamic government based on monotheism is a just government, and all its consequences are just as well. In this regard, Imam Khomeini says: "Islam highly regards the law as an instrument for realizing the oppressed people's rights since it considers that as means of realizing justice in society. In other words, the law is for enforcing and establishing just social order to realize rights and nurturing elevated humans" (Vahdat, 2011, p. 227). Put differently, from his viewpoint, politics is the knowledge of virtue, justice and guiding human being on a spiritual path. Thus, Imam Khomeini could be considered as one of those who revitalized the Islamic political philosophy.

By scrutinizing Imam Khomeini's various books; we can find out that he explains the determining statements of justice in negating oppression and seeking independence in order to explain the general direction of Islamic Justice. Thus, he criticizes communism and capitalism in the direction of the

slogan "neither East nor West." As he says: "we are now trapped in two currents: the first current anti-communism according to which whoever talks about the oppressed and exploited people plus the oppressors and exploiters, is regarded as a communist. The second current says if one protests against the division of lands and properties, he defends capitalists and feudal. This is while Islam does not agree with neither capitalism nor communism" (Khomeini, 1989, p. 292). "Islam does not agree with oppressor irrational capitalism that deprives the oppressed masses. Preferably, in its texts and tradition, Islam condemns capitalism and regards it as a system against social justice. Islam is not a regime like communism and Marxism-Leninism, which is against private ownership and defends commune. Rather it is a moderate regime that respects ownership in production and consumption in a limited form, and thus, if principles of Islam are implemented, the wheels of a balanced economy will move, and social justice will be realized (Khomeini, 1989). Referring to this quotation, it can be stated in Imam Khomeini's political thought; justice means neither absolute individual freedom for an accumulation of capital nor true equality in terms of using resources of society. Instead, Islam regards equality in existent opportunities as justice.

In more precise words, Imam Khomeini regards justice as a negation of capitalism in order to gain independence: "Islam does not agree with cruel oppressor capitalism that deprives the oppressed masses. Islam condemns capitalism in its texts and traditions and regards it as against social justice. Although some who are trapped in misperceptions about Islamic government have shown that Islam is a proponent of uncontrolled capitalism and tried to blacken the bright face of Islam and pave the way for enemies of Islam plus introduced it as a pro-Western capitalist regime, it is a moderate regime that acknowledges private ownership. Islam respects ownership in a limited way conditioned so that it moves the wheels of the economy and realizes social justice, which is the required condition for a sane regime" (Khomeini, 1989, p. 36). Referring to Imam Khomeini's view, the state should interfere in economic policy in order to support the deprived strata and the poor, control properties

of capitalists and create equilibrium in society. On this basis, the state should organize the main parts of economic activities in society and takes responsibility for managing the economy (Khomeini, 1989).

Consequently, it is understood that Imam Khomeini regards justice as a tool for preserving independence and preventing from injustice and corruption. For that matter, Imam Khomeini interprets justice in the shadow of gaining independence and believes that they will pave the way for the oppressed and Imam Mahdi's world government. Imam Khomeini regards supporting the oppressed people, serving the weak people, considering the deprived and emancipating them, eradicating poverty and class gaps as the primary tools for reaching peace. Of course, he considers suitable bed-building in the international system that culminates in destroying the West and East dominant systems, considering human values establishing a just system in the world, and eradicating poverty (Khomeini, 1989). Consequently, Imam Khomeini regarded power and force politics at the international stage as an unjust and cruel system, which is not acceptable for the Islamic Republic, and he denied such an attitude in Iranian foreign policy to which Iranian people cannot compromise (Khomeini, 1989).

We can conclude from this section that despite major theses about justice provided by elites and intellectuals, most of them were not provided within the framework of native thought and never popularized. Justice, thus, (in both western arid eastern versions) could not be effective and could not resolve the problems of justice. While the dominant trends in the Middle Eastern geopolitics paid attention to only one dimension, some intellectual provided a complicated and multidimensional interpretation of the problems of Iran and Islam World. They had found out that the problem of Islam world is not political, religious or underdevelopment. They had realized that political, religious and underdevelopment are the consequences of a more fundamental problem, which is the lack of political independence. Imam Khomeini was one of the prominent figures of the twentieth century who found out that the main problem of Iranian society in particular and Islam World, in general, is the lack of independence in its real meaning. He

considered such independence in anti-Western ideology and confrontation with the US, which is the symbol of individual and social independence.

Conclusion

It seemed that the advancement of liberal democracy predicted by Alexis de Tocqueville more than a century ago, had reached its ultimate station; an event celebrated by some as "the end of history. "However, in the noises of this world event, we cannot ignore the opposite voices mainly propounded by ethnic, national and religious rivalries. These rivalries have different reasons. The new international Roman dominance (or the American international dominance) even when it conveys its blessings to non-western societies (and non-assimilated groups in the West) through non-violent means are faced popular resistance due to that they are regarded as lights of imperialist hegemony. Thus, in such political and economic situations, which is indicating "emergence of a long iced night" according to Max Weber's famous quote, we are witnessing the formation of some theories criticizing liberal democrat structures and providing new patterns of justice at a global level. However, by accepting relativism, these theories practically reached the justice pluralism because if a kind of justice has not a constant base distinct from the demands, wishes, and purposes of individuals in a society, then it cannot find strong bases for realizing itself and will move toward realism and conservatism plus being the ideology of dominant systems. Besides, it cannot prove itself. Such theories soak in ideologies, miss their path and goal and practically move in a path contrary to their objectives for which they have been created. Hence, Rawls' view about justice in the West has only effect on liberalism as much as Ash'arism on Sunni Islam, Akhbarism on Shiite Islam and Marx's relativism on socialism. One of the ways, therefore, for preventing a theory from being ideological is that it should be based on general and public principles, which do not change during time and they are valid for all humans in all history. Thus, they are not historic. We call these general principles "absoluteness" which is against "being historical" and "relativity."

Given the permanent justice problematicity in the Iranian-Islamic Life-world, we tried to provide an Iranian-Islamic pattern of justice, which is consisted of its cultural and social situation and others can use it as an alternative because this approach is comprehensive, i.e. the pattern includes all dimensions and spheres of human personal and social life. Further, it enjoys the potential for explaining and exploring all spheres of life and does not neglect any dimension of human, society and its constituent elements. We can find out the widespread feedbacks of Islamic Revolution doctrine in the recent uprisings of the Middle East region. Reflection about Islamic Revolution discursive principles and constructs indicate that justice, in both conceptual and content aspects, as the most precise and comprehensive attitude, has been propounded in Imam Ali's thought. The issue provided the grounds for theorizing on justice. However, the grounds used these elementary seeds and provided the base concerning justice in Islam, in general, and Iran, in particular, was Islamic political philosophy and Iranshahri thought.

Therefore, processing the theory of justice within the framework of Iranian-Islamic domain is remote from the radical approach (based on ancient values and irrational modernism) that regards Islam as not having any pattern for justice and thus, recommends the western pattern of development and equality including liberal democracy and socialism. Given the importance of independence-seeking, it prevents the Islam World from passiveness against the patterns based on western doctrines and non-native pattern because of more imitation of liberal and Marxist models are not appropriate for establishing justice and independence. Therefore, Islamic experts and thinkers including Sunni and Shiite ones must use Iranshahri justice and Islamic doctrines by paying attention to the requirements of time and place for explaining and operationalizing justice and progress according to the Iranian-Islamic approach. If these components of justice are implemented in the Middle East, the Iranian Islamic system will turn into a successful pattern in the contemporary world. Such ' an issue will not be realized unless a public movement takes place in order to reflect about

sublime Islamic concepts and Iranshahri doctrines, and through making it native, a model of justice is provided with an Islamic-Iranian approach to the Islamic Awakening movements. Finally, the purpose of the current paper was to return to the urgent need for the effective theorizing in fair governance, using the experience of the historical, cultural and religious life of our native society, to present the three components formulating such a model. Once, the reputable philosopher, Aristotle hinted "the problem statement is half of the way." If we borrow Aristotle's idea for the present paper, it must be stated that attempts to look at foundations of such a theory as an outset to the problem statement are the product of the basic necessity of society today.

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